Rare Victory – Protective Mom Finally Wins Protection for Daughter!| Nelly and Noulenns’ Story


Real Mommy Nelly with daughter, Nouenn

 

 

Rare Victory – Protective Mom Finally Wins

Protection for Daughter!


8 Years and A Quarter Million Dollars Later – Nelly Gets Sole Custody

  HOPE FOR PROTECTIVE MOTHERS


On November 26th 2014, after 8 years of struggle both in the US and in France, the Quimper Family Court Judge gave me custody of my daughter, Noluenn, in France. Her father will be allowed to meet her 2 hours every two weeks in a supervised setting in Quimper, but right now, his visitations are suspended.”


Protective Mom, Nelly

Nelly and Noluenn’s story fits the Pattern of most Court Licensed Abuse cases: Child discloses sexual abuse; evidence disregarded; biased judge finds mom to be alienating; judge grants father full custody.

But Nelly fled the U.S. to France after which the biased and corrupt CLA Judge issued an arrest warrant.

Fortunately this story has a happy ending.

Congratulations to Nelly and Noluenn who are both safe in France!

Nelly, Never Without her Daughter

To read the English version, click on the first link below, or otherwise cut-and-paste into your browser or enter manually.

http://mothersoflostchildren.org/2014/11/after-american-court-fails-mother-france-provides-justice/

En Francaise,
http://www.letelegramme.fr/bretagne/enfance-nelly-jamais-sans-sa-fille-27-05-2014-10184147.php

See also, case of actress Kelly Rutherford’s case in which children have been taken to France by wealthy father, a case recently taken on by lawyer Wendy Murphy:

http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/gossip-girl-kelly-rutherford-takes-deported-kids-battle/story?id=24960793

Image result for kelly Rutherford caseImage result for kelly Rutherford caseImage result for kelly Rutherford case

Fair Use and Legal Disclaimer (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

Author of this blog, Dedicated to the Real Mommies and Daddies of the Real America, and our Children Who Want to Come Home, and Especially to My Little Julian, is not a lawyer, attorney, or legal practitioner, therefore, no information contained herein this post and/or blog could be (mis)construed as “legal advice.”  Anyone who exercises he/r rights, and private property sometimes called “child” for deceptive, possibly malicious or retaliatory, and profiteering/privateering and in the “best interests” . . . of the “state” Texas General and other Funds at one’s own peril, risk, and/ or self-fulfillment.  The choice is yours.

  • CENSORSHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED AS IT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE IN THE THIS REPUBLIC USA, THE LAWS TO WHICH YOU WILL BE HELD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the uS Constitution and  Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, uS Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.
  • (3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.
  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and/or requirement/demand, then contact Author of this blog immediately as fair notice and due diligence requires so that Author shall act lawfully and reasonably with expedience pursuant to any supplemental knowledge.

THE NEW ALANNA KRAUSE CASE| Nuszen, Gabrielle, v. Nuszen, Jack, et al. in the US Southern District of Texas, Houston Division


UPDATE: HANNAH NUSZEN(“H.N.,”)  

Transported to Solacium

New Haven Residential Treatment Center in

Utah . . .

to be Silenced, at Best

  1. Christina Wanies-Guirgis
    Texas Bar No. 24084772
    9555 W. Sam Houston Pkwy S., Suite 130
    Houston, Texas 77099
    Tel: (832) 582-8331
    Fax: (832) 379-7490
    Christinaw@waniesguirgispllc.com

       Thomas M. Burton via pro hac vice
        Utah Bar No. 00518
       California Bar No. 035856
       P.O. Box 1619
       Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
       Tel: (801) 918-1656
       Thomasburtonlaw@aol.com

     ATTORNEYS FOR GABRIELLE NUSZEN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
______________________________________________________________

GABRIELLE NUSZEN, an individual and Guardian ad Litem for her minor sisters,

H.N., K.N., D.N. and Z.N., Minors,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

JACK NUSZEN; SHANNON ORAND NUSZEN; KAREN GOLLAHER; JAY BEVAN; GUARDIANS OF HOPE, a Texas Corporation; NORMA WILLCOCKSON; DOE DEFENDANTS I through X, inclusive; and DOE DEFENDANTS XI through XX, inclusive.

Defendants.

Case No. _________________________

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY,

FALSE IMPRISONMENT;

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS;

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS;

INVASION OF PRIVACY;

NEGLIGENCE; BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY;

STRICT LIABILITY OF CARRIER;

CHILD ABUSE;

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF;

HABEAS CORPUS

JURY DEMANDED

     COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, GABRIELLE NUSZEN individually and as Guardian ad Litem for her minor sisters, H.N., K.N., D.N. and Z.N.

NATURE OF THE CASE

     This is a case brought by all five daughters of Defendant, JACK NUSZEN (hereinafter “JACK”), their physically and emotionally abusive biological father, seeking protection from him notwithstanding physical custody that Harris County has negligently bestowed upon him in defiance of medical reports of serious and repetitive physical and emotional abuse that he has visited upon them. JACK has been able to buy immunity from prosecution for child abuse in the family courts of Harris County, and has defied a Harris County custody order with impunity. Harris County agencies charged with protecting the Plaintiffs from JACK suffer from extreme laxity of duty and neglect of care, forcing the Plaintiffs to resort to this Court to protect their freedom and their constitutional rights.

PARTIES

1.      Plaintiff, GABRIELLE NUSZEN, (hereinafter “Gabrielle”), is a citizen of the State of [CONFIDENTIAL].
2.      Plaintiff H.N. has been held captive against her will and without her consent at several Utah licensed residential treatment centers — Aspen Assessment Center in Syracuse, Utah and New Haven Academy in Saratoga Springs, Utah for over a year, and has thus been forced to become a citizen of Utah.
3.      Plaintiffs, K.N., D.N. and Z.N., are minor citizens of the State of Texas, who have endured years of physical and emotional abuse at the hands of the Defendants, particularly JACK and SHANNON (referenced to below).
4.      Defendant, JACK NUSZEN, is the biological father of Gabrielle Nuszen and her minor sisters, H.N, K.N., D.N., and Z.N., and is a citizen of Texas.
5.      Defendant, SHANNON ORAND NUSZEN, is the wife of JACK and step-mother of Gabrielle and her minor sisters, H.N, K.N., D.N., and Z.N., and is a citizen of Texas.
6.         Defendant, KAREN GOLLAHER, is a psychologist appointed by the Harris County District Court and has failed and refused to protect any and all of the Plaintiffs.
7.       Defendant, JAY BEVAN, is a therapist appointed by Harris County and has failed and refused to protect any and all of the Plaintiffs.
8.        Defendant, GUARDIANS OF HOPE, is a Texas corporation that is an escort service that JACK paid to       take H.N. from her school and transport her across State lines from Texas to Utah to leave her stranded against   her will and without her consent.
9.       Defendant, NORMA WILLCOCKSON, is a Texas resident who owns and operates Guardians of Hope.
10.     Doe Defendants I through X are citizens of the State of Texas and employees of Harris County, Texas or   affiliated with it who, at all times material, were acting within the course and scope of their employment, or   authorization, as agents for the other named Defendants.
11.      Doe Defendants XI through XX were government agencies having regulatory powers and responsibilities   over the safety of the Plaintiffs, and the employees of said agencies, who at all times material were acting either within the course and scope of their employment and authorization, or else as individuals, but in either case as agents for the other named Defendants.

JURISDICTION

12.      Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to: (a) 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b), and (c); and (d) .  The    amount in controversy exceeds the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars.

VENUE

13.      Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) and (c).

FACTS

14.      After Miriam Nuszen divorced JACK he thereafter manipulated Harris County into giving him primary custody of all five of his daughters.
15.      In that position JACK promoted, by a frequent and consistent pattern of false representations and suppressions of fact, that Miriam was afflicted with several levels of mental and emotional illness that adversely affected each and all of the Plaintiff children. He many times reported her and the children to The Department of Child and Family Services as part of a strategy to have them removed from their home with her, and to be placed with him for eventual shipment out of state in further retribution for the divorce.
16.      JACK established a pattern and practice of telling Harris County psychologists, counselors, judges, attorneys, police officers, and any and all other officials having anything to do with child care that Miriam was an inept and incompetent mother psychologically unfit to raise his daughters.

          Contrary to fact, Miriam is a brilliant health care industry employee whom each and all of the daughters      dearly love and wish to be with.
17.      Miriam filed a police report, on or about two years ago, alleging that JACK threatened to kill her and their children. However, the Court refused to listen to such evidence and testimony, and failed to take such a report into consideration in rendering the custody order. In fact, JACK has sexually and physically abused Miriam during the course of their marriage, as well as abuse the children on repeated occasions.
18.      JACK, however, is a sociopathic liar and abuser of his children. For this reason, he hired Defendant NORMA WILLCOCKSON, and her escort service to remove H.N. without warning and against her will and consent from her Texas high school where she was a very excellent student of sound character.
19.      JACK sent H.N. to Island View Academy in Syracuse, Utah.

See Exhibit A:

     Humana Provider Demographic Report Rendering Provider Name with Address. Island View’s philosophy is to deprive its participants of all contact with the outside world, to treat them with rudeness and hostility, and to punish them for disobedience by deprivation and physical abuse. Island View has been and continues to be the subject of much litigation and controversy over its mistreatment of the captive children under its supervision and control.

     The tuition costs are enormous for a program run by amateurs who have no concept of proper health care administration or behavior. It has received much notoriety and adverse comment on survivor sites for its maltreatment of adolescents kept captive in its care.
20.      The state of Utah licenses such places as “residential treatment centers,” but there is no transparency, no accountability and minimal regulation, mostly by low level social workers aided by minimum wage enforcers of mindless rules measured by forced behavior of mostly truants thrown together without discrimination about who needs what treatment and why.
21.      There was never any screening or adjudication that H.N. needed any type of behavior modification. H.N. was taken without warning and has been forced to survive at Island View Academy. It is now upon new information and belief that H.N. has been moved to New Haven Academy without anyone accounting for her welfare or condition, either physical or mental.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: PERSONAL INJURY

22.       Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
23.       JACK, as father and custodian of H.N., had a duty to protect her, care for her, and keep her safe. JACK, however, breached his duty:
     a.      By failing to notify H.N. that he was going to send her out of state to Utah to be confined for the indefinite future at Island View Academy.
     b.      By failing to obtain H.N.’s informed consent to be confined at Island View Academy.
     c.      By failing to inform himself that Island View Academy was not a school, but a rigorous and punitive behavior modification technique reformatory, to which H.N. was not accustomed, and by failing to have determined by an independent physician or psychologist that there was any legitimate need to send H.N. to Island View in Utah for such harsh treatment that typically in adolescents causes post-traumatic stress disorder.
   d.      By failing to understand that H.N. would be put in the company of many young women who were truant, addicted to drugs, promiscuous, convicted of criminal behavior, and that they were at Island View not for recreation, education, or counseling, but for severe behavior modification.
     e.      By failing to consider whether H.N’s association with such individuals needing severe obedience training, often by rough handling and rude treatment, and that she would be there as well as the others under the overall assumption that everyone enrolled was truant, defiant, drug addicted, and sexually active, would be an appropriate placement for H.N. who was none of the above, but who would be likely contaminated by those who were.
     f.      By making a placement that would deprive, for an indefinite period, H.N. of any association and communication with her mother and sisters whom she dearly loves.
     g.      By instructing Island View Academy to prohibit H.N’s mother from having any contact with H.N., and not informing H.N. that she had not been abandoned by her mother and sisters, and that their not contacting her was due to their father’s prohibition carried out by the academies.
     h.      By keeping H.N. separate from her sisters with whom she has had no contact whatsoever for over a year.
24.      Miriam Blank, H.N.’s mother, along with her sisters, had a close, warm and loving relationship with H.N. As a proximate result of the described separation, JACK deliberately damaged and harmed H.N., her sisters and their mother.
25.      JACK’s conduct was malicious, wanton and in reckless disregard of H.N.’s health, safety and welfare, by reason of which she and her sisters are entitled to recover punitive damages.
26.      Plaintiffs pray that this Court order JACK to release H.N. from Island View Academy or New Haven Academy or wherever else he is hiding her, and return her to her sister and Guardian ad Litem, Gabrielle, in [CONFIDENTIAL].

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: FALSE IMPRISONMENT

27.      Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
28.      H.N. learned upon arrival at Island View Academy that its operation was designed to imprison her against her will and without her consent, and that she had no recourse by communicating with her mother to free her from the benighted treatment to which she was hopelessly subject. She sought to leave the program, but Island View restrained her from any contact with the outside world, and refused her request to return to her mother.
29.      JACK’s confinement of H.N. at Island View in Utah wrongfully violated the Texas custody order that governed his care and keeping of H.N. He knew that his daughter, H.N., was of an age where she had federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a liberty interest not to be unlawfully confined by any parent, with or without custody, in a punitive, isolated, foreign venue with no recourse or contact with family members or legal assistance to gain release. JACK also knew full well that Island View, in keeping H.N. captive and isolated, would cause H.N. to suffer severe emotional distress due to the punitive treatment she would receive and the absence from her mother and the Plaintiffs that she would suffer.
30.      JACK’s conduct was malicious, wanton and in reckless disregard of H.N.’s health, safety and welfare, by reason of which she is entitled to recover punitive damages against him.
31.      Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

32.      Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
33.      JACK’s sordid history of physically hurting H.N. and locking her away from family, friends, teachers, coaches, and home without warning, and in a brusque, public, humiliating manner, as if she were a person severely mentally ill or highly truant, caused her grievous mental and emotional distress.
34.      JACK’s conduct was outrageous, malicious, wanton and in reckless disregard of H.N.’s health, safety and welfare, by reason of which she is entitled to recover punitive damages.
35.      Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

36.      Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
37.      JACK had a duty to safeguard H.N. from demented hazing, denigration, isolation, confinement, and deprivation at his sole pleasure, and also not to inflict emotional distress on her sisters by depriving each and all of them from having contact with H.N. and she with them.
38.      JACK violated his duty to H.N. and her sisters by keeping them not only apart, but also in secret silence from each other, and their mother.
39.      JACK’s conduct was in reckless disregard of H.N.’s and her sisters’ health, safety and welfare, by reason of which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages.
40.      Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: INVASION OF PRIVACY

41.      Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
42.      By having H.N. suddenly taken in broad daylight from her high school and in front of her peers by an escort service, and put in a Utah punitive behavior modification program totally isolated and silenced from all contact with family and friends, JACK cast H.N. in a false light as having done something so horribly wrong so that she was not fit to be trusted in normal society, including her own family.

43.      JACK’s conduct has caused Plaintiffs great mental and emotional distress.
44.      JACK’s conduct was malicious, wanton and in reckless disregard of H.N. and her sisters’ health, safety                 and welfare, by reason of which the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages.
45.      Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE

46.        Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.

47.       JACK had a father’s duty to treat her with dignity, respect, and tenderness. He, however, negligently conceived, supervised, maintained and controlled H.N.’s negligent imprisonment at Island View Academy and New Haven Academy in the particulars set out above.

48.      JACK’s conduct proximately caused personal injury and emotional distress to H.N. for all of 2014, and there is every indication, unless this Court intervenes, that he will continue to keep her away from the Plaintiffs and her mother until her majority two years hence.

49.       JACK’s conduct is in reckless disregard of H.N.’s health, safety and welfare, by reason of which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages.

50.      Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

51.      Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
52.      By enrolling H.N. at Island View Academy and New Haven Academy in Utah, JACK cavalierly transferred his fiduciary duty as custodian of H.N. to surrogate strangers of no known merit in a foreign state who would, in turn, take H.N. into an unknown isolated, inhospitable and unforgiving area in a captive situation. JACK signed a power of attorney, giving custody of H.N. to Aspen and New Haven, which is evidenced in the contract between JACK and the residential treatment centers.
53.      Island View and New Haven breached their transferred fiduciary duties as surrogates to act in H.N.’s best interest, which proximately caused H.N. to sustain great pain, suffering, bodily injury and feelings of abandonment, and the Plaintiffs to suffer grievous mental and emotional distress over the needless suffering and isolation of their sister.
54.      The conduct of JACK in abandoning his duties under Title 5, Section 151.001(a)(2) and (3) of the Texas Family Code in favor of unknown Utah surrogates of no merit and dubious reputation was malicious, wanton and in reckless disregard of his fiduciary duty to care for H.N.’s health, safety and welfare, by reason of which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover both general and punitive damages against JACK, their father, for splitting them up and sending H.N. away, never to be seen or heard from again, a likely destiny for the remaining younger sisters unless this Court intervenes to prevent such a prospect.
55. Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION: STRICT LIABILITY OF CARRIER

56. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
57.      JACK, in hiring NORMA WILLCOCKSON, to transport H.N. from Houston, Texas into Syracuse, Utah had a duty to use utmost care and diligence for H.N’s safe carriage, and was under the obligations to provide everything necessary for that purpose and to exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.
58.      For the reasons above stated, NORMA WILLCOCKSON failed to use utmost care
and diligence for the safe carriage of H.N., but followed JACK’s instructions to take H.N., whose mother also had custody, from her to an undisclosed location, and to take her suddenly without warning, and against her will and without her consent, knowing full well that such transport had to do with minors who have constitutional rights not to be kidnapped by one parent from another, both of whom have custodial rights and duties to be with their children, and they with them.
59.      NORMA WILLCOCKSON does this transporting of young people across state lines as a lucrative business without checking to see whether or not the transportation is regulated by interstate compact, and knows that her cargo is going to be confined in lock-down captivity without due process or any way to escape.
60.      The conduct of NORMA WILLCOCKSON was in reckless disregard of H.N.’s, health, safety and welfare, by reason of which both H.N. and her sisters are entitled to recover punitive damages.
61.      Plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereafter stated.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION: CHILD ABUSE

62.      Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs as if stated in full.
63.      JACK, while having the care, custody and control of H.N., isolated her from her mother in an unfamiliar area of the Utah desert at Island View and New Haven academies, and did so in order to:
a.      Subject H.N. to conditions and circumstances likely to produce great bodily and emotional harm;
b.      Cause her to suffer, and negligently allowed to be inflicted upon her unjustifiable physical pain and mental suffering;
c.      Cause or permit her to be injured; and
d.      Cause or permit her to be placed in such a situation that her health would be endangered.
64.      Before H.N. was sent to Utah, JACK physically abused both H.N., Gabrielle, and all of her sisters as their individual affidavits will show. Gabrielle has endured abuse from her father; as noted in a physician’s statement regarding Gabrielle’s injury in 2010, “dad hit…in face…abrasion to inside of bottom lip.[Gabrielle] has bruise to lower back and 2 fingerprint marks to L. [left] side of neck. [Gabrielle] states dad held her under water…”

See Exhibit B: Physician’s Statement Regarding Injury to Gabrielle Nuszen;

see also Exhibit C: Gabrielle Nuszen’s Affidavit, dated September 29, 2013; also see Exhibit D: Physician’s Statement Regarding Injury to Kayla Nuszen.
65.      JACK’s cruel and reckless conduct toward these choice young girls is inexcusable and warrants this Court’s removal of JACK’s custody of and contact with his children hereinafter and forever.
66.      This Court has a duty to order a complete independent psychological assessment of JACK in order to ascertain whether or not he is a sociopath, in addition to having a narcissistic personality disorder or other mental health defects that need treatment, supervision and restraint from contact with his children.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

     WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1.      A Writ of Habeas Corpus producing H.N. before this Court to be examined as to her present circumstances and as to whether or not she has the right to be released from Island View, Aspen, or New Haven in Utah and returned to her sister, Gabrielle, in [CONFIDENTIAL].
2.      Injunctive relief in the form of an Order enjoining further possession of H.N. by any aforesaid venue in Utah, and immediately releasing H.N. and transferring legal and physical custody to her sister, Gabrielle, so that she may provide for H.N.’s education at legitimate schools in the State of [CONFIDENTIAL] or elsewhere, before H.N. falls further behind academically.
3.      General damages according to proof, but in no event lower than $100,000.
4.      Punitive damages according to proof.
5.      Costs of suit.
6.      Such other and further relief that the Court deems just.
Dated: March 12, 2015

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Thomas M. Burton
Thomas M. Burton via pro hac vice
Utah Bar No. 00518
California Bar No. 035856
P.O. Box 1619
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Tel: (801) 918-1656
Thomasburtonlaw@aol.com

/s/ Christina Wanies-Guirgis
Christina Wanies-Guirgis
Texas Bar No. 24084772
9555 W. Sam Houston Pkwy S., Suite 130
Houston, Texas 77099
Tel: (832) 582-8331
Fax: (832) 379-7490
Christinaw@waniesguirgispllc.com\

Legal Disclaimer and Fair Use Notice

(PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

 Nothing contained in this post or on this blog, Dedicated to the Real Mommies and Daddies of the Real America, and our Children Who Want to Come Home, and and especially for my little Julian, could be (mis)construed as “legal advice” of any kind as author of this post is expressly NOT a lawyer, attorney, or legal practitioner.

  • CENSORSHIP and censorship shall be challenged strongly as censorship, being in breach of, among so many other unlawful acts and omissions, is a violation of sometimes described as “Julian’s Real Mummy’s” First Amendment u.S Constitutional right to the free exercise of speech, and also to peaceably assemble herein and also to freely exercise whatever religion, if any, that said natural, American u.S “citizen,” “citizen” meaning fo the purposes of this post. conditionally as i, being natural (wo)man, individual, living and corporeal body,  exclusively reserve the right to revoke or rescind the offer at any and all times, inherently “sovereign” and “elect” in nature, spirit, and essence because imbued with the spirit of our divine Creator ALMIGHTY GOD. ;
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.;
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by “Julian’s Real Mummy’s” First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Federa, u.S. Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal,u.S Constitution and its  Bill of Rights, pursuant to the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.;
  • (3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.;
  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and Author will be happy to follow the law and respect your wishes.

Disabled Mother Deprived of Her Children, Discriminatory Hate Crimes in U.S.


Disabled Mother Deprived of Her Children,

Discriminatory Hate Crimes in U.S.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6lCpBwDt1o&feature=player_detailpage

Posted by: Mamasuntwinkle on Youtube.com, April 15, 2010mamasuntwinkle

Uploaded on Apr 15, 2010

Fighting for a Disabled Mother’s Right to See Her Children; After a Mother’s Brain Injury Following Childbirth, Her Family Fights for Her to See Her Triplets. April 14, 2010, ABC news. Growing up, Abbie Dorn always dreamed of becoming a mother. Now, at age 34, she is the mother of three healthy toddlers. Her home is filled with pictures of the children, triplets named Esti, Reuvi and Yossi.

But in the 4 years since her children were born, Dorn has not been able to talk to them. She can’t hold them or watch them play. That’s because Dorn endured severe brain damage following their birth.
Now, while her children run and play in their Los Angeles home, Dorn’s family, more than 2,500 miles away in Myrtle Beach, S.C., is locked in a legal battle with the children’s father to grant Dorn the right to see her children.
The family’s lawsuit, which could make its way to a courtroom by May, could become a landmark in defining what it means to be a parent, especially when that parent is disabled.
After graduating from college in Ohio and becoming a chiropractor in Atlanta, she married Dan Dorn, a devoutly religious man who shared her beliefs in Orthodox Judaism. They settled in Los Angeles near his family, and began to plan a family of their own. But Dorn struggled to conceive. After turning to fertility treatments, she finally received word in the fall of 2005 that she was expecting triplets. “She was so excited to be pregnant, she was beginning to say, ‘I don’t know if I’ll ever get to be a mother,'” Dorn’s mother, Susan Cohen, said.
Happiness turned to heartbreak after Dorn delivered the three children. What happened in the hospital in the hours after the triplets were born is not clear. And the case was eventually settled out of court for more than $7 million. What the family does know is that Dorn began bleeding internally. Her injury was not caught soon enough, and after a series of missteps, Dorn’s brain was deprived of oxygen, leaving her severely brain damaged. Since the day her three children were born, Dorn has required around-the-clock care. She can’t speak or move on her own, and she remains in bed unless one of her caretakers moves her to a chair. Dorn spent nearly a year in hospital and rehabilitation care in California near her children.
On the anniversary of his wife’s injury, Dan called Dorn’s parents. “He said, ‘Well I need to move on,'” said Paul Cohen. Dorn’s husband eventually divorced her in 2007. In court documents, his attorney said he was “faced with the necessity of beginning to rebuild his life.”
Since the divorce, Abbie Dorn has been moved to her parents’ home in Myrtle Beach, where she undergoes a daily regime of therapies and rehab.
Dorn’s now ex-husband has refused to bring the children to see her. They said he refuses to send videos or to allow Dorn to see the children via webcam.
Dan’s attorneys argue that exposing the children to their severely disabled mother would traumatize them. Medical experts hired by his attorneys to review her records said she would never recover.
But Dorn’s parents say Dan Dorn’s experts are looking at old records, and that after years of rehabilitation, it is clear she has brain function, can understand when people talk to her and can read short passages. Having devoted the past five years to her rehabilitation, Susan and Paul Cohen believe their daughter communicates through her eyes. They say when Dorn has one long blink it means “yes.” When she is in pain, she cries out. When she is happy, they say, she can smile. Her eyes follow movements in the room. Her caretakers say several times a day she will say “yeah” or “no” in response to direct questions.
Legal Battle Over Children of a Disabled Parent
ABC News spent a day with Dorn and watched her undergo therapy. When asked if seeing her children was important to her, Dorn replied with a long blink.
“A mother needs to see her children, she gave them life,” Paul Cohen said. “Her blood is in their veins. These children need to know they have a mommy and she needs to know her children are growing.”
The family’s lawyer argues that Dorn has rights that have been ignored. “Abbie has a right, a constitutional, legal right to have her parents, her own representatives, to request visitation on her behalf,” Lisa Helfend, an attorney for Dorn and her parents, said.
Dorn’s mother believes her daughter is still “there,” saying Dorn cries, smirks and even smiles. “I know that Abbie is there … it’s well beyond a mother’s love,” Susan Cohen said.
“If all she can say to them is one or two words and show in her eyes how much she loves them, I think that will mean a great deal to those children,” Susan Cohen said.
ABC News’ requests for an interview with Dan Dorn were declined.

Fair Use and Legal Disclaimer (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

  • CENSORSHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED AS IT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE IN THE THIS REPUBLIC USA, THE LAWS TO WHICH YOU WILL BE HELD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.
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http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/brain-injur…

Terri Schindler Schiavo Foundation
http://www.terrisfight.org/

The ex-husband is an ignorant fool.  Children do better if they are exposed to all kinds of people, including the disabled.  Understanding prevents bigotry and discrimination of people just because they don’t look like us.  He’s not only doing a great wrong to his ex-wife, he is doing an equally great wrong to his children.

She probably could have recovered a lot more if she had her children around her! This is horrible!!

Recovery would be significantly enhanced if she were enabled to see her children on a regular basis

Come on let her see her children she gave them life his really being a jerk …

So sad 😦😦😸

Sadly, the disabled are NOT respected in the United States, regardless if parent or child.

well  then that needs to change now would be a good time.

What comes around goes around. God will make him pay

Tear jerker 😦

DAN IS A EFFING BASTARD!! SOME HUSBAND!! HE COULD NOT EVEN STAY FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE. MEN, IF YOU DO THIS EVIL TO THE WOMAN YOU MARRY AND SHE GETS SICK LIKE THAT, YOU WILL GO TO HELL AND YOUR CHILDREN WILL HATE YOU IN THE END JUST AS THE CHILDREN WILL HATE DAN. AND THEY WILL. I AM GLAD THEY TELEVISED THIS BECAUSE THE KIDS WILL SEE THIS IN TIME> THEY SHOULD KEEP THIS ON DVD SO THAT THE KIDS WILL GET THIS IN A LIVING WILL THROUGH HER ATTORNEY. PLEASE FORWARD THIS TO THIS FAMILY AND LET THEM KNOW. I AM REALLY ANGRY ABOUT THIS ANSD EVERY ONE OF YOU SHOULD BE ALSO!!!!!!!!!!!DAN IS A BASTARD AND HE LIED WHEN HE TOOK HIS VOWS. THIS MOTHER HAS THE RIGHT TO VISIT WITH HER CHILDREN WHEN HER PARENTS OR REPRESENTATIVE IS PRESENT. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO DEVISE A COMPREHENSIVE LIVING WILL FOR EACH CHILD TO BE GIVEN WHEN THEY TURN OF AGE TO SHOW THEM THAT THEIR MOMMY ALMOST DIED FOR THEM! UGH!! THIS PISSES ME OFF, DAN IS EVIL!!!

HOW CAN WE HELP THIS WOMAN!!!!!!! SOMEBODY?????

NOT FAIR! DAD let those children KNOW THEIR MOTHER!

“You have no right to have a lawyer, you have no right to have your home, all your families possessions fraudulently taking from you and put on the lawn with a free sign. Forced into homelessness, just after major spine surgeries with no immunity. Using a walker You are NOT allowed to speak while a plaintiff.  Evidence will be refused. All motions DENIED. You have no right to protect your child, against the school that excludes her, provokes her to hysteria ,forces her into a dark cement room, not allowed to call home. Your concerns, ideas, inputs  ignored because “you are disabled your disability has a negative affect on your daughter” you have no right to speak, have witnesses, the only right you have is to be emotionally, verbally violated, slandered, discriminated, blamed for your disability, we  lie to you and about you, and include the invented “mental”  disabilities .  Your disabled child used as a pawn, weapon, because you made formal complaints against abuse to your family and for that, the child you love and care for is fraudulently judicially kidnapped. you are locked out of your paid apartment on the way back from your doctor regardless of how much physical pain you are in, how exhausted you are, how hungry you are. We stop you from getting medical attention even though you claimed you lost the use of your legs, and needed to get to your doctor. instead you are detained in your hot car ,humiliated, interrogated, sweat soaking your clothes. we even called your doctor, force you to have a blood test, charge you w a dwi, even though you don’t drink,  we take the car you only drove 6  times, you have no money so your car is impounded, your SSI DI is still going to the “benefits coordinator” That was forced to resign for violating the laws and rules of a paid rep payee. In the letter of resignation she stated “you are incompetent”, yet she was caught defrauding SSI di and paid too. after the embarrassing charge for the DWI, release you , barely able to walk, sick, in unbearable physical, emotional pain. because “you are disabled” Its dark out , nowhere to go, so sick you don’t remember collapsing, then several days later waking in critical condition in a ICU, the doors closed due to the severe community acquired pneumonia you have and the shock. your temp reaches 104.8. a spine doctor comes in and says “you are not a candidate for surgery” then leaves after giving some mediation for the unbearable pain caused by reconstructed spine surgeries, that were unsuccessful. You “missed the court date because you are on a ventilator, so your license  is suspended . Your daughter is in a foster home. As soon as you move closer to her she is moved across the state. You can only see your child under “supervision” because you tried to protect your child and for that you are a “bad parent” you and your child are hated because of the way you look. You are female with obvious physical differences YOU HAVE NO RIGHTS in the State of New Hampshire. The only right you have is to be tortured. A year has passed, still looking for a permanent 2 bedroom home . You just went trough more landlord hell who at the last minute after receiving money changed his mind ,he didn’t want to “clean his chimney”, He didn’t like the idea that you may have a paid helper. In VT. Everything I ever believed of was told is nothing but a LIE!  A American disabled  mom with a American  disabled child TORTURED BY HATE.

No doubt that bastard would have walked if his kids were disabled too! The new generation is much more accepting than the ones that institutionalised and hid our disabled people. He is cruel. Give them the option of loving their mum. No doubt they can, even if he is too shallow.

Wow really what happened to “for better or for worse”? Dads a dick…

what happened to the vows” in sickness and in  heatlh? A child will loves his/her mom no matter what. Dad is so wrong.I hope she gets to see her kids soon.

Don’t EVER keep the truth from a child, regardless of what that truth is. I’ve seen first had what happens when people lie.

awesome parents, not so awesome husband. parents should check out Family Hope Center http://www.familyhopecenter.org/
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Termination of Parental Rights Reversed in Murfreesboro, TN: In re Alysia S.


Herston on Tennessee Family Law

Knoxville family law attorneysFacts: in 2010, Mother sought assistance in caring for Child after Mother lost her job. She signed a power of attorney and authorization of temporary guardianship stating Child would reside with another couple for approximately six months. During that period, the couple filed a petition alleging Child was dependent and neglected and seeking temporary custody of Child.

The juvenile court found Child dependent and neglected and granted custody to the couple.

Mother appealed to the circuit court, which found no clear and convincing evidence of dependency and neglect and ordered the juvenile court to reunify Child with Mother.

The couple appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court.

Despite that procedural history, Child was never reunified with Mother because, in part, the trial court deferred to a psychologist who wanted to reunify Mother and Child over a period of two years. While this reunification process was occurring…

View original post 904 more words

RISK IN “SAFE” SUPERVISED “VISITATION” NEEDS ASSESSED


Image result for pics of child safety

RISK IN “SAFE” SUPERVISED ‘VISITATION'” NEEDS ASSESSED

Mr. Edward/”Ted” Taupier posed an interesting and telling question to the local supervised “visitation” center or pogrom of another name in Connecticut.  What is your level of insurance coverage for pedophiles or alleged pedophiles or abusers by another name?  The answer yielded Mr. Taupier home supervised “visits” with his own private property sometimes mistaken deceptively by the “state” as “children” or “wards” “disabled” due to age as opposed to the court-“ordered” public pay-per-view access awarded by the local court system and d/b/a judge___________.  Author of Dedicated to the Real Mommies and Daddies of the Real America and our Children who Want to Come Home tells America to ask the critical question of whether or not US Constitutionally impermissible to “order” and charge individual property-owners sometimes called “parents” by a profiteering “state” and “non-for-profit” joint public-private installations (un)”SAFE” (free stalking) centers and counties to pay to see one’s own private property. . . an extension of he/r own physical, corporeal vessel, genetics, intelligence, creativity, mannerisms, affectations, emotions . . . in a glorified jail for families.  Not asking and answering this critical question makes the downward slope on which America has been pushed even more slippery.  In history, we have seen this before.  Many did not make it.

Granted, the director of the local “visitation” center refused to answer the question by hanging up on Mr. Taupier and trying to refer him to another program listed in the telephone book.  Undeniably, however, Mr. Taupier’s orders in Taupier v. Taupier clearly “stated” that he and his property were to attend that specific program_____________.

The Connecticut “SAFE” “visitation” and “access” funded, and “state” and locally by county or borough/district/area/township/city/town social reform movement to overthrow and infiltrate all American systems of government, values, education, belief systems, religion, and culture in fact did not have the state insurance to stake and sustain or to foster a healthy “community partnership” in Ted’s private property or “children” in spite of its colorful “collaborative” policy and procedure “Memorandum of Understanding” which is common among most if not all supervised “visitation” pogroms around the US.  Just pick up your local phonebook and find the “state” insurance government office relevant to your current situation and inquire as to competent levels of risky pedophile/social worker “suspected” class insurance. Then, make the call to the “SAFE” prison to which you and your property have been US unconstitutionally “ordered” for state/local/county/judicial discretion tributary joint public-private profit that benefited everyone except you and your property and in fact depreciated its value, tremendously.  Remember to wish everyone a have a nice day with a smile in your voice because you are expected to be happy and grateful for their terrorism.

Without fail, pogram or “program” supervisors, directors, managers, and executive directors will tell their “clients” and “victims” that they have nothing to do with the court or the decisions of the court, but do threaten jail or police when questioned about the rate of referrals or clientele called-in by local BAR members and judges or domestic relations and offices of child support enforcement offices termed “friend of the court” (though, according to former Michigan member Carol Rhodes), “enemy of the family.”  This statistic especially relates to the unprofessional conduct of Cherie Menzies, Marinelle Timmons, and Tamisha Laster of “SAFE” Victim’s Assistance, Centre, Inc. in Harris County, Texas in City of Houston with regard to the little boy they sold out, Julian Jacob Worrell of Genealogy Saloom, artfully in some locations discounted “J.J.W.” or “J.W.” where no jurisdiction lies, nor could have and without, among other things, any imaginable con cept of due process or equal protections of US Constitutional and natural, unalienable, and inalienable laws of two American US “citizens,” sovereign and elect in nature, spirit, and essence, living and corporeal, imbued with the spirit our divine Creator ALMIGHTY GOD, Joni Saloom and he/r natural real private property deceptively kidnapped in collusion with other rogue criminals of whom they had been noticed under color of law for “state of Texas” on May 08, 2012 in City of Pearland, Brazoria County just outside of Houston (Harris County). It has been three years since Saloom and he/r only private property described as “Julian,” who is now eight years old, have had any meaningful communication as the parentally alienating, maternally depriving father, family and his wife continue to act as if they need supervised “visitation,” among other things, especially where false allegations of sexual abuse against himself he made or paid “play therapist” (licensed by CPS, who also runs “SAFE” visitation to keep an eye on their . . . “survivors” of the RICO family court con in Harris County in Houston, Texas) to otherwise manufacture, along with a couple other profitable lies.

In conclusion, “GET SMART,” and ask your local “SAFE” Victim’s Assistance Centre, Inc., as did Mr. Edward/”Ted” Taupier, “How is your level of pedophile protection insurance coverage TODAY.”

Fair Use and Disclaimer

(PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

  • CENSORSHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED AS IT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE IN THE THIS REPUBLIC USA, THE LAWS TO WHICH YOU WILL BE HELD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.
  • (3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.
  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand,

BEWARE SAN ANTONIO: CORRUPT JUDGE SOL CASSEB III IS AT IT AGAIN, SAYS “BATTERED MOTHERS” BLOG


JUDGE SOL CASSEB, III, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS (BEXAR COUNTY) SON OF A JUDGE IN THE SAME COUNTY, SAME NAME, SECOND GENERATION, BUT THEN AGAIN ISN’T THAT THE CASE WITH EVERY JUDGE IN TEXAS YOU EVER KNEW? YA’ KNOW HOW THE SONG PLAYS, FOLKS, “BECAUSE IT’S JUST A FAMILY TRADITION!”

I find that, beyond clear and convincing evidence, the FBI’s most wanted posters with big red X’s splattered as if in blood across the faces of loving mothers who did everything they could to protect the only “possession” that mattered to them, private property sometimes called “child” for deceptive and unnoticed “state” purposes, and worse, with the words “Captured” and dates and locations violently confessing their own sins who marketed this scheme and NCMEC/Silver Care/Amber Alerts–I am told by one in family court that these are nothing more than a way for the govt. to keep track of certain. . . contraband to leverage where someone didn’t get paid, by the way, that no men grace the same posters yet, without a doubt, based on individual observation and experience, threaten to and do actually parentally kidnap their little hostages and flee the country and “state” without every being reported, though the mother was most likely falsely imprisoned and the reports rejected as a “false allegation” from a certain stereotype, pernicious and damning–you know the one–the “hysterical,” “borderline,” “schizophrenic,” or “bi-polar” fit parent who obeyed the law and the court orders to begin with, all to he/r virtue, and downfall.

Battered Mothers - A Human Rights Issue

RightsForMothers

FILED IN: BAD JUDGES, BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, CHILD ABUSE, CHILD CUSTODY, CHILD CUSTODY BATTLE, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, COERCIVE CONTROL, CORRUPT JUDGES, CORRUPT BASTARDS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FATHERS RIGHTS, GETTING SCREWED BY THE FAMILY COURTS, JEAN PAUL LACOMBE DIAZ,JUDGE SOL CASSEB, LAZY JUDGES, LEGAL ABUSE, NONCUSTODIAL MOTHERS, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

Remember little Jean Paul Lacombe Diaz? You may not, because there is not a lot of Congressmen or other government officials running around screaming to get this child back. Like they so willing do for fathers. Refresh your memory:

Eight months later, Jean Paul is still missing, thanks to Judge Sol Casseb III and his father-loving/mother-hating rulings.

Another dear mother now is facing the wrath of Judge Casseb today. Here are the details:

1. Judge Sol Casseb III, 288 District…

View original post 890 more words

RESEARCH SURVEY COLLECTION|California Protective Parent Association


 

 

RESEARCH SURVEY COLLECTION

California Protective Parent Association and Our Future Charitable Foundation are conducting an ongoing collection of data for a national research project. The project involves cases of children placed by family law courts into the custody of, or unsupervised visitation with their identified abusing parent.
The collection and compilation of this data is a very important step in promoting awareness, providing actual statistics, increasing funding possibilities, and bringing about family court reform and legislative change. Your input is greatly appreciated.
You can see the results of our preliminary survey after 22 participants on our Research Data page, and an updated May 2003 statistical report after 67 participants by visiting the California Protective Parents site by clicking here.

PROTECTIVE PARENT SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE Re: Custody Outcomes of Children Reporting Incest/Battery

NOTE: If you are concerned about secure confidentiality, we suggest you PRINT this survey (from pdf format) and mail it to us by US mail at our CPPA/OCOF address. If you prefer and are not concerned with confidentiality, you may send it online, but be aware it is not on a secured server at this time.
Identifying information is for contact information purposes only, and will not be included in our data.

CONTACT INFORMATION
 Your Name:
 Mailing Address:
 City:
 State:

Please answer all questions appropriate to your case.You may use the space below for comments or questions: Thank you for contributing to this survey.
Please print and mail this survey to: CPPA/OCOF 1731 Howe Ave. #168, Sacramento, CA 95825-9785
Or fax it to: (530) 758-9785 (phone: 800 441-7886)
Or submit it electronically by clicking the “send Request” button below. (Confidentiality respected, but not guaranteed, due to Internet security.)

 Zip Code:
 Phone Number:
 Alternate Phone:
 E-mail Address:
CASE INFORMATION
     Case Name:
1.) Jurisdiction State:
2.) Jurisdiction County:
3.) Case Number:
4.) Year documents 1st filed:
5.) Case still in progress? Yes No
FINANCIAL COST
6.) Approximate sum of money paid related to case?
      (Include attorney fees, court filings, mediation, evaluations, supervised       visitation, court ordered classes, therapy, etc.)
7.) Have you ever had to file bankruptcy as a result of litigation costs?       Yes No
ATTORNEY HISTORY
8.) Have you ever been represented by an attorney in this case?       Yes No
9.) If so, how many attorneys represented you in this case?
10.) Has your ex-spouse/partner ever had legal representation when        you did not? Yes No
CHILDREN
11.) What were the ages of the child(ren) of this relationship at the time        of the separation?        Girl’s ages:      Boy’s ages:
12.) What is the approximate percentage of time each caretaker spent        caring for the child(ren) before the separation?         Mother:   %         Father:    %         Relative:      %         Other:          %
13.) At the time of separation, did the primary caretaker maintain primary        physical custody? Yes No
PRIMARY ISSUES
14.) Over which of the following issues were there disputes in your court        case? (mark all that apply)         Property settlement         Spousal support         Child support         Move away         Child custody/visitation         Alcoholism         Drug abuse/type of drugs:         Other:
15.) Who initiated the litigation?         Mother         Father
16.) Were you the victim of domestic violence perpetrated upon you by        the other parent? Yes No
17.) If so, did your children witness the violence?        Yes No
18.) Did the violence begin or escalate after separation?        Yes No
19.) Did your ex-spouse/partner ever threaten to take the child(ren) if        you left the relationship? Yes No
20.) Were there allegations of child abuse made during your family        court litigation? Yes No
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS
Complete the information below regarding allegations made during litigation, including who is the identified perpetrator and who first made the allegation (mark all that apply):
21.) Physical abuse allegation? Yes No        Identified as perpetrator:FatherMotherOther:        First allegated by:ChildFatherMotherOther:
22.) Sexual abuse allegation? Yes No        Identified as perpetrator:FatherMotherOther:        First allegated by:ChildFatherMotherOther:
23.) Verbal/emotional abuse allegation? Yes No        Identified as perpetrator:FatherMotherOther:        First allegated by:ChildFatherMotherOther:
24.) Neglect allegation? Yes No        Identified as perpetrator:FatherMotherOther:        First allegated by:ChildFatherMotherOther:
25.) Other allegation? Yes No        Identified as perpetrator:FatherMotherOther:        First allegated by:ChildFatherMotherOther:
26.) What was the age and gender of the first child at the onset of        his/her abuse?   Boy Girl
27.) What was the age and gender of the second child at the onset of        his/her abuse?   Boy Girl
28.) Did the child positively identify the other parent as the perpetrator?        Yes No
29.) Was there medical/physical evidence of the abuse?        Yes No
30.) Was there other corroborative evidence of the abuse?        Yes No
31.) What were the child(ren)’s symptoms? (check all that apply)         Sexual acting out         Depression         Stomach/head/other pain         Dissociation         Overwhelming anger/rage         Nightmares/insomnia/sleep disorders         Fears/phobias:         Eating disorders         Regression (bedwetting/leak feces/thumb sucking)         Constipation/diarrhea         Learning disability         Attention deficit         Suicide attempt         Other:
32.) Did the child(ren) receive Victim of Crime funding for therapy       related to the crime? Yes No
EX-SPOUSE/PARTNER HISTORY
33.) Prior to the separation, did your ex-spouse/partner receive any of the         following labels by mental health professionals? (mark all that apply)         Schizophrenia         Bi-polar disorder         Borderline personality         Depression         Anxiety         Post Traumatic Stress Disorder         Other:
34.) Does s/he have a history of alcohol and/or drug use?         Yes No
35.) If so, is s/he clean and sober?        Yes No     36.) Length of time clean and sober:
37.) Does s/he have a criminal history?        Yes No
38.) If so, what was s/he…        Arrested for?: 39.) Convicted of?:        Description:
PROTECTIVE PARENT HISTORY
40.) Prior to the separation, did you receive any of the         following labels by mental health professionals? (mark all that apply)         Schizophrenia         Bi-polar disorder         Borderline personality         Depression         Anxiety         Post Traumatic Stress Disorder         Other:
41.) Do you have a history of alcohol and/or drug use?         Yes No
42.) If so, are you clean and sober?        Yes No     43.) Length of time clean and sober:
44.) Do you have a criminal history?        Yes No
45.) If so, what were you…        Arrested for? 46.) Convicted of?        Description:
ADVISE
47.) Did anyone ever advise or insist that you not mention domestic         violence or child abuse in family law court?        Yes No
48.) If so, who advised you?         Attorney         Mediator         Advocate         Court personnel         Other:
49.) Did your attorney ever tell you that pursuing court action against        your ex-spouse/partner could negatively affect your case?        Yes No
CHILD CUSTODY
50.) Was custody changed to the other parent over your objection, by        an emergency court order, or without your court presence?        Yes No
51.) Was unsupervised contact given to the identified offender despite        evidence of violence or abuse?        Yes No
52.) Was unsupervised contact given to the identified alcoholic/drug         abuser without drug testing?        Yes No N/A
53.) Was custody changed after you raised any of the following issues?        (Mark all that apply)         Violence         Child abuse         Substance abuse         Criminal conduct         Violations of court order         Move-away         Spousal support         Child support
54.) Were judicial findings made stating that you were a danger to your        child(ren) or that you were an unfit parent?        Yes No
55.) Were you ever placed on supervised visitation?        Yes No     56.) If so, length of time:
57.) Were you restricted from having any contact with your child(ren)?        Yes No     58.) If so, length of time:
59.) Do you believe the other parent attempted to gain increased custody        to avoid paying child support?        Yes No
60.) Was financial discovery conducted in your case?        Yes No
61.) Did you give up assets to keep custody?        Yes No
COURT MEDIATION
62.) Did you participate in court-connected mediation regarding custody?        Yes No
63.) If so, was mediation:         Voluntary         Court ordered         Coerced by threats
64.) Were you required to meet face-to-face with an ex-spouse/partner        who perpetrated violence and/or threats of harm?        Yes No
65.) Did you lose any custody rights or contact with your children as a        result of recommendations by a mediator?        Yes No
EVALUATIONS
66.) Did you participate in court connected evaluations regarding        custody?        Yes No
67.) If so, who was evaluated?:         Mother         Father         Child(ren)         Others:
68.) Who selected the evaluator?:         Mother         Father         Court         Others:
69.) Who paid for the evaluator?:         Mother         Father         Court         Others:         
70.) Total amount paid for custody evaluation:
71.) Did you lose any custody rights or contact with your children as a         result of recommendations by the evaluator?        Yes No
CHILD’S ATTORNEY
72.) Did your child(ren) have an attorney/guardian?        Yes No
73.) If so, was he/she court appointed?:        Yes No
74.) Who selected the child(ren)’s attorney?:         Mother         Father         Court         Others:
75.) Who paid for the child(ren)’s attorney?:         Mother         Father         Court         Others:
76.) Total amount paid for child attorney:
77.) Did this attorney aggressively advocate for the safety of your         child(ren)?        Yes No
SYSTEM SUPPORT
78.) Was the other parent ever Arrested and/or Prosecuted        for spousal or child abuse?        Yes No
79.) Was Child Protective Services ever contacted to intervene in your        case?        Yes No
80.) If so, did they protect your child?        Yes No
EVIDENCE
81.) Did any court related professional ignore, minimize, or refute        evidence of abuse in your case?        Yes No
82.) If so, who?         Mediator         Evaluator         Attorney for minor         Judge         Other:
83.) Did any court related professional label you with any of the        following?         Parent Alienation Syndrome         Alienator         Folie a duex         Munchhausen’s Syndrome by Proxy         Delusional         Schizophrenia         Bi-polar disorder         Borderline personality         Depression         Anxiety         Post traumatic stress disorder         Other rare/unscientific label:
84.) In your case, was Richard Gardener, MD.:         An expert witness         A consultant         Quoted         Other:
PROCESS
85.) Do you believe you were discriminated against for your        attempts to protect yourself and/or your child(ren)?        Yes No
86.) If so, do you believe this occurred due to:         Unethics among court-related professionals         Unethics between ex-spouse/partner & court-related professionals         Financial/social status of your ex-spouse/partner         Gender bias         Other:
87.) Were evaluator or mediator recommendations ever provided to the        court less than 10 days before a hearing?        Yes No
88.) Were you prevented from seeing evaluations or reports that resulted        in custody decisions?:        Yes No
89.) Were you ever denied the ability to adequately present your case        (unable to present/examine witnesses, etc.)?:        Yes No
90.) Were hearings resulting in custody decisions held without your        knowledge or ability to be present (ex parte)?:        Yes No
91.) Were hearings regarding custody and visitation ever conducted        without a court reporter present?:        Yes No
92.) Were you ever threatened that talking publicly could result in        damage to your case?:        Yes No
93.) Were court transcripts complete and accurate?:        Yes No
94.) Were court transcripts denied or delayed?        Yes No
95.) If so, how long were the transcripts denied?
96.) Have you ever been incarcerated in a jail or mental health        facility due to the family law case?:        Yes No
CURRENT CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT
97.) What best describes your children’s current custody         arrangement? (mark all that apply)         Primary with protective parent, supervised with perpetrator         Primary with protective parent, UNsupervised with perpetrator         Joint custody         Full custody with perpetrator parent         Supervised visitation with protective parent         No contact with protective parent         Other:
98.) Are you able to protect your child(ren)?         Yes No
99.) Do you believe your child(ren) are still being abused?         Yes No
100.) Did your child(ren) continue to report abuse after custody was        changed to the identified abuser?:        Yes No
101.) Did you stop reporting suspected child abuse for fear your contact        with your child(ren) will be terminated?:        Yes No
Do you give us permission to contact you for further information?        Yes No
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THE PARENT THAT ABUSES THE OTHER PARENT WITH CHILD


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CALIFORNIA COALITION EXPANDS FAMILY COURT ATTACK TO EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS


California Coalition Expands Family Court Attack to Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Briefing Filed Today

by ccfceditor

March 6, 2015–San Diego, CA and St. Paul, MN–California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC today announces strategic legal partnership with  attorney Michelle MacDonald, MacDonald Law Firm, LLC, www.FamilyCourt.com, www.Facebook.com\FamilyCourt to strengthen the family law reform movement within federal courts in the Eighth Circuit and Minnesota family courts.  In a brief filed today with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Ms. MacDonald—co-founder of Family Innocence, a nonprofit dedicated to keeping families out of court: resolving conflicts and injustices peacefully  (www.FamilyInnocence.com)—advances groundbreaking arguments with assistance of California Coalition.

“We’re honored to stand with Ms. MacDonald and FamilyCourt.com to engage the beast of Family Courts, and look forward to collaborating further in advancing the Grazzini-Rucki case through the federal courts” says Colbern Stuart, President of California Coalition.

https://www.scribd.com/embeds/257912195/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&show_recommendations=true

The Grazzini-Rucki brief expands on the approach taken by California Coalition in its ongoing appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Excerpts from the brief prepared jointly by MacDonald Law Firm, LLC, Michelle MacDonald, California Coalition, and Colbern Stuart:

 

INTRODUCTION

If aura there be, it is hardly protected by exonerating from
liability such lawless conduct as took place here
[1]
Nineteenth and twentieth century American judges have overstepped constitutional restriction to usurp powers reserved to the legislature and written for themselves an immunity far greater even than that of an English judge, or even a King, at common law.[2]  No court has ever denied that absolute immunity inflicts a “monstrous” injustice on wronged litigants, and taxes the credibility and integrity of judicial institutions.  Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 521 (1978).  It has been justified as a necessary evil to protect the “ardor” of judges and prosecutors.  Id.  While one might reasonably have concluded that our efforts to assure “justice is done”[3] would have been better-directed toward inculcating ardor through discipline and integrity than by “expanding” immunity, the issue is moot.
Unlike the 1871 era of federal procedure in which a judge could be forced to stand trial on mere “ascription” of culpable intent to an accused act,[4] the reasonable concern is today resolved at the pleading stage.  Modernly, like all litigants a judge is protected by procedural barriers provided in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) which protect against a mere “ascription” of malice.  These are bolstered by the plausibility test provided in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 thereafter.  The purposes of immunity—to protect efficient process—is today accomplished at the pleading stage.
A Judge’s invocation of the doctrine of judicial immunity to preserve judicial efficiency has effectively denied citizens remedy—a fundamentalright—for judicial injury.
Fundamental  rights such as of familial association are destroyed by the nod of a head. In error, Pierson and Sparkman have deprived scores of Americans remedy for criminalwrongdoingPierson and Sparkman’s despotism must end today.

 

The Outrages Committed Against the Grazzini-Rucki Family and Their Attorney

Ms. MacDonald represents Ms. Sandra Grazzini-Rucki and her children, who have been devastated by Minnesota family courts.  The lawsuit describes the outrages committed by Minnesota Family Court Judge David Knutson against the Grazzini-Rucki family and their attorney Ms. MacDonald.  Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s encounters with family courts began in 2011 when she sought and obtained a divorce, seeking orders of protection for her and her children.  Over the ensuing years, successive abusive rulings by the Minnesota Family Court rendered Grazzini-Rucki and her family homeless and bankrupt.

Judge Knutson’s illegal rulings included kicking the entire family out of their own home and separating the children from both parents, with no contact orders.  Last September, after a “listening session” conducted by Judge Knutson involving the Grazzini-Rucki children, two of Grazzini-Rucki’s children became so distressed that they fled from the homes into which they had been placed.  Teenagers Gianna and Samantha Rucki  have been missing since April 19, 2013. www.Missingkids.com.   In what can only be described as a bizarre absurdity, Judge Knutson insisted on conducting a “child custody “ trial after the children went missing.

Even more outrageous, after Ms. MacDonald advised Judge Knutson that the trial was improper, Judge Knutson caused Ms. MacDonald to be placed  in handcuffs shackled to a belt around her waist, sat in a wheel chair, and forced to finish trial to finish the “custody” trial without eyeglasses, pen, paper, or files.  While Ms. MacDonald was being arrested, courtroom bailiffs told Ms. Grazzini-Rucki that MacDonald would be retained in custody and would not be returning to the courtroom.  Ms. Grazzini-Rucki therefore left the courthouse.  When MacDonald was returned to the courtroom in shackles, Grazzini-Rucki had already left—yet Judge Knutson insisted on completing the trial without Ms. Grazzini-Rucki.  The events were captures on security video.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson sought, and the district court granted, dismissal of all claims as barred by absolute judicial immunity, finding every act accused in the Amended Complaint to be a judicial act within Judge Knutson’s jurisdiction.  Order at 21.  The many non-judicial acts of which Judge Knutson was accused in the Amended Complaint—but not analyzed in the district court’s sweeping immunity holding—include:
  • Searching and seizing person and property of Grazzini-Rucki and her children without probable cause or a warrant, including that she abandon her children;
  • Circumventing the Minnesota Court Information system regarding various Dakota County matters involving the litigants;
  • Causing state court administrators to assign “all future hearings” in various matters involving Grazzini-Rucki to Judge Knutson;
  • Illegally usurping jurisdiction over several existing matters involving Grazzini-Rucki, including the State of Minnesota against David Rucki, and third parties, and making rulings in those matters without notice to Grazzini-Rucki;
  • Illegally ordering Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s children into “therapy”;
  • Illegally intercepting and sealing a recorded transcript Ms. Grazzini-Rucki was entitled to receive and view;
  • Ordering both parents to have no contact with their own children whatsoever;
  • Ordering Grazzini-Rucki to refrain from participation in her own family’s association activities;
  • Ordering Grazzini-Rucki to be separated from her children and have no contact with them at their schools, or through third parties;
  • Conducting a “listening” psychotherapy session between Judge Knutson, Dr. Gilbertson, and the Grazzini-Rucki’s children at which Judge Knutson was alleged to have coerced, intimidated, and threatened the Grazzini-Rucki children, contributing the children’s decision to run away from their home just days later;
  • Insisting that Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel try Grazzini-Rucki’s case while in handcuffs shackled to a waist belt, unable to rise from a wheelchair, without Grazzini-Rucki present, without Ms. MacDonald’s files, and without glasses, pen, or papers, seized by courtroom deputies;
  • Retaliating against Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel by the foregoing after Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel informed Judge Knutson that this action was pending against him, and ignoring the glaring conflict of interest.
Though this brief focuses primarily on the administrative assignment and “listening” therapy session, Appellant does not waive her assertion that none of the above functions, and those listed in the Amended Complaint warrant immunity.  The district court’s analysis of these many claims was skeletal yet sweeping, finding Judge Knutson immune for “actions taken in his capacity as a state court judge”, relying primarily on Stump v. Sparkman and Pierson v. Ray.  Order p. 32.  In response to Appellee Knutson’s Brief, and analyzed below, this broad “judicial capacity” scope and sweeping “analysis” was error.

 

 

Judges Bear the Burden of Proof on Immunity

Grazzini-Rucki asserted many of the challenges to judicial immunity as did California Coalition in its briefing before the Ninth Circuit.  California Coalition was pleased to join Grazzin-Rucki family in asserting those challenges in the Eight Circuit.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson Bears the Burden of Proving Immunity
Judge Knutson repeatedly asserts that Grazzini-Rucki “failed to raise” immunity issues in the district court.  See, e.g., Knutson Brf. p. 31, 34.  This is an improper attempt to shift onto plaintiff-appellant the burden of proving the affirmative defense of immunity, which rests solely with the party asserting it.  Fed.R. Civ.P. 8(c)(1);  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) (“An official seeking such immunity, however, must at the outset show that a “counterpart to the privilege he asserts” was recognized at common law in 1871, for “[w]here we have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.”).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that an official claiming an affirmative defense of immunity bears the burden to prove that 1871 common law immunized the function of each act accused in the complaint.  See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-340 (1986) (“Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.”); The Court “has for that reason been quite sparing in recognizing absolute immunity for state actors.”  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993).
 The “function” analysis considers only historical fact.  Malley at 342 (“We emphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law tradition.”); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (“Section 1983 immunities are ‘predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.’”).
Courts investigating the intent of the 1871 42nd Congress have examined accounts of 1871 social and legal systems from Nineteenth Century case law, legal treatises, and the congressional record.  The Supreme Court undertook this historical analysis most recently in Rehberg v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012), examining nineteenth century cases to determine that the function accused—testimony of a grand jury witness—enjoyed immunity at common law.  Id. at 1503-07.[5]
An officer’s failure to prove up a common law analog is dispositive of the issue regardless of countervailing policy considerations. Rehberg at 1502-03 (“We do not simply make our own judgment about the need for immunity. We have made it clear that it is not our role ‘to make a freewheeling policy choice,’ and that we do not have a license to create immunities based solely on our view of sound policy.”).  Granting an immunity absent this historical analysis is error.  Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974) (“These cases, in their present posture, present no occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity available to state executive officials.”). 
Neither the District Court Nor Judge Knutson Have Analyzed Historical Foundations for an Immunity of Accused Function
Judge Knutson proffered, and the district court undertook, no historical analysis of whether any of the two dozen functions accused in the Amended Complaint were functions that enjoyed judicial immunity at common law in 1871.  The district court’s sweeping Order proclaimed that Judge Knutson’s “case management, his signing of orders, the substance of his orders, and the trial proceeding” were all taken in a “judicial capacity.”  Order p 33.  The district court reached this conclusion finding only that (1) “Judge Knutson has not interacted with Plaintiff outside of his courtroom or his judicial chambers” and (2) “the underlying family law case was within [his] jurisdictional authority.  Order p. 33.  On these purported findings, the district court found Judge Knutson acted in a “judicial capacity” and was thus immune.  Id.
Analyzed below, this broad-brush “judicial capacity” scope and summary analysis fails to “affirmatively state” the defense, which was exclusively Judge Knutson’s burden.  Fed.R. Civ.P. 8(c); Rehberg, supra.
The District Court Extended Immunity Based On Factors Not Relevant to Judicial Immunity
The district judge applied a “judicial capacity” scope of immunity that was far broader than that provided in controlling Supreme Court authority.  Immunity does not depend on the act or actor, but on the nature of the accused act.  Sparkman at 362.  Immunity may exist only if the accused act is both (1) “judicial in nature” and (2) within statutory subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  The first “Judicial in nature” factor in turn depends on (a) “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,” and (b) “the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”  Id.  Not all official or authorized acts of a judge are “judicial acts”—judges also perform administrative, ministerial, or other types of acts that are not entitled to judicial immunity.  See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (firing court employees could be performed by administrator and thus not “judicial”).
The test to distinguish between “judicial” and other types of acts is to analyze whether the act can only be performed by a judge.  See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340 (1879) (selection of jurors could be performed by administrator, thus not “judicial”); Forrester, supra; Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993) (court reporters “part of judicial function” yet not absolutely immune).  Absolute immunity is justified because judicial acts—and only judicial acts—are subject to standardized, scrutinized proceedings, restrained by principles of law, and are subject to appellate review.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n. 4 (1967).  Because judicial acts are subject to such safeguards, the Supreme Court has justified relieving the actors from liability for civil money damages.  Id.

 

Administrative Behaviors of a Judge in Assigning Cases Are Not Immune

Judge Knutson also asserted that his administrative or ministerial behaviors in Family Court case assignments was an immune “judicial act” simply because he was a judge.  Grazzini-Rucki and California Coalition analyzed abundant law demonstrating that even though an administrative act is authorized or performed by a judge, the administrative act is not converted into a judicial act.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson’s Administrative Behavior in Assigning Himself to Certain Cases is Not Immune

The district court’s high-level “analysis” that Judge Knutson’s “case management” and “trial proceedings” extended immunity far beyond Sparkman’s scope of immunity to include behaviors which are clearly not judicial acts.  As one example, Judge Knutson’s “case management” behaviors in assigning all Grazzini-Rucki cases, including all future cases with third parties, and those with the State of Minnesota,  to himself is clearly an administrative act because it cannot be reviewed on appeal, is not subject to law, is conducted in private before parties are even aware of a judge, and may be performed by administrators as well as judges.
     The cases cited by Judge Knutson support Appellant’s conclusion.  Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986)[6] relied on Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 305 (5th Cir. 1980) (extending absolute immunity for “jurisdictional authority to appoint and supervise court reporters.”).  In both cases the “jurisdictional authority” was a statutory grant of administrative authority—not jurisdiction.[7]  Parent v. New York, 786 F. Supp. 2d 516, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) also drew authority from Matinez’s (moot) holding.  “The assignment of cases and issuance of consolidation orders are judicial functions normally performed by, and statutorily reserved to, Judge Lippman. See [statute] giving Chief Judge and Chief Administrator the authority to assign judges to judicial terms and parts. . . .”  Parent at 532 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Parent’s holding is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s judicial act jurisprudence.  The fact that the “Chief Administrator” function happened to be performed by a judge does not convert the “administrator” function to a judicial one—nothing in the New York statute prohibits a non-judge from undertaking the role of “chief administrator”, meaning that, like juror selection, it is an act that may be performed by a non-judge, and thus not a judicial act.  See Ex Parte Virginia, supra.  A “Chief Administrator’s” assignment process is ministerial—the only “function” is to follow the assignment procedure.  Failure to abide the ministerial process is not an appealable event.  A judge or administrator is not applying law to facts.  The process is not highly scrutinized.  As such, Parent reached its holding on analysis inconstant with controlling Supreme Court authority, and is error.
Similarly, in Zahl v. Kosovsky, No. 08 CIV. 8308 LTS THK, 2011 WL 779784 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011) the district court considered a claim for immunity of a judge who allegedly “manipulated the assignment system to take control of Plaintiff’s case . . . .”   According to the district court in Zahl, the plaintiff “cite[ed] no relevant authority in support of his conclusory assertions that such actions vitiated Justice Diamond’s jurisdiction to handle his case, and the Court has found none.”  Id. at *9.  The Zahl plaintiff apparently failed to identify any of the abundant relevant authorities including Ex Parte Virginia, Forrester, and Antoine, supra, which provide means to distinguish non-appealable acts of administrators from appealable acts only judges may perform.  Moreover, like the district court and Judge Knutson, the Zahl court improperly placed the burden of proving immunity on the Plaintiff rather than the official.  Malley at 339.
Zahl also erroneously relied on language in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) instructing courts to construe subject matter jurisdiction (the second element of Sparkman’s two-element immunity test) broadly.  Zahl at *9. Sparkman’s instruction does not apply to the first “judicial act” element.  Sparkman at 362.  As above, the Supreme Court has been “quite sparing” in extending immunity under the judicial act element of the test.  Buckley at 269.  Zahl also focused analysis on failure to recuse when faced with motion identifying conflict of interest.  Id.  Ruling on a motion is an act which only a judge “normally” performs, and thus falls within Sparkman’s “judicial act” scope.
Bracci v. Becker, No. 1:11-CV-1473 MAD/RFT, 2013 WL 123810, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013) aff’d, 568 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2014) is derived from Martinez, Parent, and Zahl and is error for the same reasons.  Further, in Bracci the plaintiff’s accused Judge Mulvey’s (a “chief administrative judge”) failure to remove Judge Becker (the trial judge) form the case, making Bracci more of a recusal case.  Like Zahl, recusal requires ruling on a motion—a judicial act.
In both cases the courts found what they (incorrectly) identified as “jurisdiction” based on statutes authorizing judges—as well as non-judge administrators—to assign cases.  Statutory empowerment goes to Sparkman’s second “within the jurisdiction” element of the immunity test—but is insufficient to satisfy the first, “judicial act” element.  Sparkman, supra.[8]  Judge Knutson repeats the error.  Knutson Brf. at 29-30 (citations to Billingsley and Duty).
Judge Knutson’s reliance on Hardy v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., No. 93 C 1348, 1993 WL 85750, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1993) is misplaced.  Hardy erroneously analyzed judicial acts under the test for prosecutorial immunity.  Hardy cited Imbler v. Pachtman, applying the “intimately related with the judicial phase of the criminal process” standard.  Id. at *2.  Hardy failed to cite or analyze under judicial immunity precedents including Sparkman, Pierson, Bradley, or Randall.  Judges do not perform prosecutorial function, and thus the immunity of a judge is lost if she performs such functions.   Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1236 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding judge performing functions of a prosecutor not entitled to either judicial or prosecutorial immunity).
Finally, none of the authority relied on by Judge Knutson analyzed the critical test—whether the function of assigning cases was a judicial act at 1871 common law.  Absent such analysis, the authority is error.  Rehberg, supra.

 

A Judge Working with a Psychologist in Child Custody Proceedings Is Not Performing a “Judicial Act” and is Thus Not Immune

Judge Knutson followed the modern trend of Family Court judges to wander far afield from traditional judicial functions—in his case performing what he called a “listening session” to “further” the children’s psychotherapy.  It was because of Judge Knutson’s harsh commands at the “listening session” that the Grazzini-Rucki children ran away.  California Coalition assisted Ms. MacDonald in formulating arguments that disproved Judge Knutson’s claim to immunity for working with a psychologist in the custody setting.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson’s “Listening” Psychotherapy Session with the Grazzini-Rucki Children is Not a Judicial Act

 Judge Knutson concedes he conducted a “listening session” with the five Grazzini-Rucki children “for the sole purpose” of facilitating psychotherapy of the children —complying with a “request from a court-appointed therapist for a structured family meeting.”[9]  During this psychotherapy session Judge Knutson harshly reprimanded and the children.  Days later two of them ran away from their home and have not been seen since.[10]
Following Rehberg, the district court should have analyzed whether the function of psychotherapy performed at the “listening session” was an immune function at 1871 common law.  Rehberg at 1503. The district court’s failure conduct this historical inquiry is error sufficient to reverse.  Scheuer at 249-50 (1974).
If the district court had conducted appropriate inquiry, it would find no tradition for psychotherapy function at 1871 common law.  Given that psychotherapy is a function developed in the twentieth century, and is only legally performed by licensed psychologists,[11] it would seem unlikely that Judge Knutson could identify an 1871 common law immunity for his psychotherapy behavior.
Other courts considering the question have found no immunity for psychologists (Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no “firmly rooted tradition” of immunity for functions performed by private psychiatrists employed by prison)).  See also Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under § 1983.  This all assumes, of course, that “social workers” (at least as we now understand the term) even existed in 1871. If that assumption is false, the argument for granting absolute immunity becomes (at least) more difficult to maintain.”).
Further, the history of psychologists in the divorce industry demonstrates such functions are late twentieth century innovations.  “Family Courts” are a creation of the 1970s after the 1966 California Report on the Governor’s Commission on the Family.  L. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective 63 Or. L. Rev. 649, 667 (1984).  The function of “psychologist-as-judge” custody evaluator was unknown to a divorce courtroom until the mid-1990s “as the supply of psychologists continued to increase and stricter third-party payer regimens were imposed for mental health treatment (Gould, 2006). [C]ustody evaluation services generally are neither highly regulated nor institutionalized, but rather may be characterized as a cottage industry (Schepard, 2005).” Robert F. Kelly, Sarah H. Ramsey, Child Custody Evaluations: The Need for Systems-Level Outcome Assessments, 47 Fam. Ct. Rev. 286, 291 (2009).
Finally, it is unlikely that the district court could have identified any function of a family court—including “listening sessions,” “therapy”, “reconciliation,” custody evaluations, or otherwise—existed at 1871 common law because in 1871 no civil judicial tribunal possessed jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, or child custody.  “It is elementary that in the early history of jurisprudence in England the common law courts exercised no jurisdiction over divorce cases, jurisdiction in such matters resting entirely with the ecclesiastical courts of the realm.” Peterson v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 239, 246 (1918).  See also Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law and Contemp. Prob. 226, 234 (1975).

 

 Modern Family Court Jurisdiction Is Inferior; If It Has Immunity It is Extremely Narrow

 Knutson’s Brief speciously asserts that general jurisdiction includes jurisdiction over “family law matters.” [12]Family court jurisdiction is incontrovertibly inferior because it is specific.  Minn. Stat. 518.  Many courts recognize family courts as inferior tribunals.  Family Court “in a dissolution proceeding is a court of limited jurisdiction.”  King v. State Educ. Dep’t, 182 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.1999); People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Family Court not a “court of competent jurisdiction” for Rooker-Feldman analysis).
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868) describes the limited scope of immunity for “inferior courts”: Judges exercising limited jurisdiction were immune for acts within the limited jurisdiction, and could be liable for civil damages for acts in excess of their jurisdiction, and for acts done “maliciously or corruptly.”  Randall at 531. [13]  While Judge Knuston bears the burden of demonstrating modern family court functions enjoyed any immunity at 1871 common law, in no case will he achieve an immunity scope greater than an 1871 inferior court; for judicial acts within their jurisdiction not done “maliciously or corruptly.”  Id.
Judge Knutson’s Assertion of Broad Immunity Lacks Authority
Judge Knutson asserts: “Acts and orders related to overseeing a family law case, including orders requiring therapy and efforts to facilitate it, are acts inherently judicial in nature.”  Knutson Brf. p. 35.  His authority does not support this proposition.
Judge Knutson cites Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1448 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated by Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991).  Myers was the first case in this Circuit to consider the 1976 decision of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).  Imbler was the seminal Supreme Court case extending prosecutorial immunity under Section 1983 to acts of “the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State.”  Id. at 431 n. 33.  The Court recognized that its general description was broad, and could potentially encompass administrative acts as well as prosecutorial acts, yet declined to provide a more precise definition:  “At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them.”  Id.
Myers picked up where Imbler left off, analyzing several acts by Scott County Prosecuting Attorney R. Kathleen Morris which fell within Imbler’s broad range of potentially-immune acts.  Meyers at 1449.  Myers extended a generous scope of immunity to every function of Ms. Morris that plaintiffs accused, including “her role in the initiation of criminal proceedings against them and her handling of evidentiary material.”  Id.  These several functions included investigation, advising police, interviewing children, and advocacy for the state during the criminal proceeding.  Id. at 1446-1452.
Meyers’ limited immunity incorrectly, drawing a line between pre-charging and post-charging phases.  Today post-charging investigative, administrative, administrative, and enforcement functions are not immune.  See, e.g, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).  Myers correctly limited prosecutorial immunity to criminal proceedings.  Meyers at 1452.  Myers also recognized that absolute immunity would not extend to enforcement or investigative functions in “approv[ing] or direct[ing] the removal of children from their homes upon the arrest of one or both parents.”  Id. at n. 11.[14]
Judge Knutson claim Myers immunizes “family law judges to work with experts to determine the care provided to children in custody and applying judicial immunity to that work.”  Knutson Brf. at 35.  This is incorrect.  Myers involved a criminal prosecution, not “family law judges.”  Myers at 1452 .  Myers did not involve Minnesota laws regarding “best interests,” nor a judge or psychologist determining “best interests”—but criminal prosecution.  Moreover, Myers expressly recognized that investigative functions such as the “listening session” in which Dr. Gilbertson and Judge Knutson “the session was held for the sole purpose of facilitating therapy…” are not prosecutorial. [15] Myers did not extend immunity to psychotherapy.
Judge Knutson finally claims—citing no authority—that “sealing the transcript of the session” was a judicial act.  The record indicates the opposite—that Judge Knutson was not undertaking the listening session pursuant to any order.  Having no relationship to any judicial act, the transcript—and its sealing—cannot be converted into one.

 

 The District Court’s “Judicial Capacity” Scope Relied on Elements Not Relevant To Judicial Immunity

The district judge’s sweeping analysis of the dozens of acts accused focused on a single fact that Judge Knutsen interacted with Grazinni-Rucki inside of his courtroom.  Order at 33.  Judge Knutson repeats the error.  Knutson Brf. p. 31.
The location of an accused act is not relevant to Sparkman’s two-factor test, which focusses on function regardless of location.  For example, Sparkman favorably cited Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974), which held that physically evicting a litigant from a courtroom is not an act “of a judicial nature.”  Sparkman at 370, fn. 10.  Justice White also cited a Sixth Circuit decision, Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970), holding that a county judge who had a plaintiff “forcibly removed” from a “fiscal court” and jailed was not immune.  Id.  See also Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981) (child support enforcement proceeding inside of courtroom and chambers not immune); Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (physical assault outside of courtroom held immune).  Location of the act was one of the four-factor “debris” elements from McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972) which Justice White “cast aside” in distilling Sparkman’s “cogent two-part test.”  Harper at 857.[16]

 

 The District Court’s Reliance on Pierson v. Ray and Stump v. Sparkman Was Error

 Section 1983 Does Not Require Proof of Malicious or Corrupt Intent
The district court cited the seminal judicial immunity case, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), in connection with its holding that Judge Knutson is immune even if he acted “maliciously or corruptly.”  Order at 33.  Appellant did not—and need not—assert that Judge Knutson acted “maliciously or corruptly.”  Appellant asserts merely that he acted to deprive of constitutional rights.   Section 1983 does not require an allegation of specific intent, including malice or corruption, but only general intent to perform the act causing the deprivation of a constitutional right.  Monell at 685; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 232 (1970).  Malice and corruption were relevant in defeating common law immunities for common law torts.  Section 1983 was enacted to supplement common law tort liability—it turns on a “strict liability” standard, requiring no proof of intent.  IdSee also n. 22, infra (comment of Representative David A. Clark).
Pierson and Sparkman Erroneously Extended Common Law Immunity to Civil Rights Liability
 Pierson and Sparkman stand in error for exceeding the judicial power vested in United States courts under Article III of the United States Constitution.  In deciding Pierson and Sparkman, the Supreme Court construed Section 1983 to find an immunity which is not present on—and entirely inconsistent with—the face of the strict liability statute.   Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665-94 (1978)  Yet Section 1983 is not a subject for statutory interpretation; clearer language has likely never emerged from Congress.  Id.; see also Monroe at 185-191.
Instead of examining the unambiguous statute, Chief Justice Warren in Pierson instructs us to examine congressional intent, which Chief Justice Warren claims does not indicate an intent to abrogate the common law immunities of a judge.  “The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities . . . .  The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established [as the speech and debate privilege], and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.”  Pierson at 554-555 (1967).
The “presumption” is as worthy as any speculation.  It overlooks the most obvious evidence of congressional intent—the unambiguous language of the statute itself.  Moreover, actual analysis of the congressional record, and history of judicial immunity reveals Chief Justice Warren’s presumption is simply wrong.
Pierson Incorrectly Analyzed Legislative Privilege Rather Than Judicial Immunity
In Pierson Chief Justice Warren “presumed” that “the immunity of judges” was “equally well established” as the legislative privilege.  Remarkably, in presuming, he failed to conduct analysis of the common law of judicial immunity—citing only to Bradley’s (post-Civil Rights Act) holding and Scott v. Stansfield, 3 Law Reports, Exchequer, 220.[17]   Pierson at 554.  Despite having on hand the meticulous historical analysis of nineteenth century common law and the 42nd Congress’ legislative intent provided by Justice Douglas in 1961’s Monroe v. Pape decision, Chief Justice Warren’s 1967 opinion ignored it.
Dissenting, Justice Douglas—the author of Monroe—did draw from his prior historical analysis of common law and the congressional record to the Civil Rights Act, reaching a forceful conclusion: “The Court’s ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions.”  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Similar rich analyses and enlivened opinions are evident in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665-94 (1978); Pulliam at 529-544; Sparkman at 368 (Stewart, J., Powell, J., dissenting), Dykes v. Hoseman, 776 F.2d 942, 954 (11th Cir.  1985) (Hatchett, J, dissenting) (“[T]he en banc court holds that judicial immunity is complete, unqualified, and without exception . . .  As the majority concedes, no precedent, Supreme Court or otherwise, requires such a broad definition and application of the judicial immunity doctrine.  [N]o policy considerations justify such a result. . . .  Judges . . . will be able to deal willy nilly with the rights of citizens without having to account for willful unconstitutional actions.”).
Instead of analyzing judicial immunity, Justice Warren adopted analysis of legislative privilege from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).  In Tenney Justice Frankfurter considered whether a California legislative committee conducting a contempt proceeding against a man circulating a flyer protesting the committee was immune from an action under Section 1983.  Id. at 377.   The question was whether a common law “speech or debate” privilege protecting lawmaking activity could be extended to a lawmaker’s behavior in conducting the contempt hearing.  Id.
Justice Frankfurter traced the history of English common law preserving legislative speech or debate privilege as derivative of liberty—an extension of the voters’ freedom of speech and conscience.  Id. at 372-73.  Protection of “speech or debate” was necessary to prohibit the English King and his aristocracy from persecuting members of Parliament making laws unfavorable to the then-ruling class.  Justice Frankfurter aligned the English speech liberty with the federal “speech or debate” analog in the United States Constitution at Article I, Sec. 6, cl. 1.[18] Like Chief Justice Warren, Justice Frankfurter presumed—analyzing no legislative history—that the 42nd Congress would not have intended to limit any state’s legislative activity in enacting the 1871 Civil Rights Act because Congress was itself a “staunch advocate of legislative freedom.”  Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
Tenney justified extending the speech or debate liberty to the committee hearing function because legislators are directly-elected and immediately accountable to voters.  Id. at 378.  Tenney also held the narrow immunity was lost if “there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.”  Id.
Judicial Immunity is the Opposite of Legislative Privilege—Judges Are Sovereigns Possessing Not “Rights” but Delegated Authority
 Judicial authority and legislative freedom are night and day.  Judges exercise jurisdiction as sovereigns—not liberties from sovereigns.  While judges have all the rights of any citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge possesses no rights.  “First and Fourteenth Amendments restrain “only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).  “[T]he censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). There is no need for a judge to express opinions, experiences, or desires of her own or those she represents to create law—he/she is given law.  [19]Other than necessary for faithful adjudication, a judge’s “freedom of conscience” is irrelevant to judicial function—relevant “conscience” is given in the form of law that has matured through free debate elsewhere. County Judges do not function as a body, and (should) have no one to “debate.”  The United States and State of Minnesota constitutions do not extend a speech or debate privilege to the judiciary because courts are not empowered to speak or debate.  The function of a judge is to adjudicate—apply the given law to properly-admitted facts.  Judges are not representatives of voters, but independent of electoral will, passion, and accountability. There is no need to protect a judge’s “speech” other than to preserve the judge’s ability to pronounce adjudication—merely a “substantial state interest”[20] that must yield to Minnesota’s “fundamental law”—citizen rights such as remedy,[21] due process, equal protection, speech, and association.  See Theide v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 226-27, 14 NW 2d 400, 406 (1944) (forcibly removing woman and children from their home in sub-zero weather by the town sheriff and forced to return to their “legal settlement” in another town for the purpose of obtaining poor relief violated “fundamental law”[22] despite consistency with state law.).  Minnesota courts may not construe statutes contrary to citizen rights under the “fundamental law.”  See T. Flemming, J. Norby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist, 7 Hamline L.Rev. 194 (1984).
 The long history of preservation of legislative speech and debate—a fundamental liberty—is entirely absent from the history of judicial immunity.  See Monell at 665-94; Pierson (Douglas, J. dissenting); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (“Indeed, as the Court also indicated in Monroe v. Pape, supra, the legislative history indicates that there is no absolute immunity”); Pulliam at 540 (1984) (“every Member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be liable under § 1983”).  There being no “judicial speech” liberty in 1871, there is no reason to “presume” that the 1871 Congress would have seen need to expressly abrogate a tradition that has never existed.
Far from tradition, the “hoary doctrine of judicial immunity”[23] is expropriation.  Tenney’s “presumption” was a modest stretch of liberty over the border with sovereignty to protect the functions of elected representatives of the people.  Pierson’s adoption of Tenney’s stretch to protect sovereigns of the people was a full-force embezzlement of liberty.  Deployed today to exonerate sovereign county judges in their oppression of those in whom liberty is vested by the fundamental law, Pierson’s manufacture of judicial immunity is—in perspective—nothing short of a third American revolution.
Congress Expressly Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity
            Nor can Chief Justice Warren’s “presumption” withstand the incontrovertible record—The 1871 Congress repeatedly expressed intent that the Civil Rights Act would abrogate judicial immunity.  Congress adopted the language of Section 1983 from its criminal analog—the 1866 Civil Rights Act, today codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).[24]  Section 1983 was introduced by Ohio Representative Shellabarger, who explained his bill on the House floor by referencing Section 2 of the 1866 Act: “that section provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for . . . ”[25]  The Acts thus “must be construed as in pari materia”—any construction of the 1871 Act must admit congressional intent in enacting the 1866 Act.  Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
On that record it is incontrovertible that the 42nd Congress affirmatively rejected common law judicial immunity.
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the States than permit it to invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded.
 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (1866) (remarks of Representative Lawrence).  The 1866 Act was vetoed by President Johnson because it abrogated common law judicial immunity.[26]  In the fight to defeat the veto, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Trumbull expressed revulsion at the entire concept of judicial immunity: “It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched.”[27]
            Section 1 of the 1871 Act (now Section 1983) passed rapidly through Congress because debate wasn’t necessary—Congress recognized Section 1 as merely “adding” a civil remedy to the 1866 Act.  Debate instead focused on section 2 of the bill (modernly Section 1985) because of concerns over federalism and regulation of private behavior.  Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
            The recorded debate demonstrates unequivocally that Congress intended to abrogate common law judicial immunity:
[T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out the demands of the legislature which elected them-powers which, almost without exception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard to law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous violations, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscrupulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of parties in this country or any other.
 Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1871) (remarks of Representative Platt).
What is to be the case of a judge? . . . Is that State judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in an action?  … It is the language of the bill: for there is no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be used.
Id. (remarks of Senator Thurman).
“[T]he judge of a State court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in the Federal Court and subject to damages for his decision against a suitor, however honest and conscientious that decision may be . . .”
Id. (remarks of Representative Lewis).  Representative Arthur recognized the law would be a drastic reversal of common law immunity:
Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts …. Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability . . . .  Under the provisions of this section every judge in the State court. . . will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him . . .”
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) 365-366.[28]
Courts considering parallel questions have deferred to this vivid record.  See, e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) (“But the privilege as we have stated was a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to wipe it out. We think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the Civil Rights Act sub judice intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated by that act and in fact did so . . . .  The statute must be deemed to include members of the state judiciary acting in official capacity.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 643 (1980) (“Nowhere in the debates, however, is there a suggestion that the common law excused a city from liability on account of the good faith of its authorized agents, much less an indication of a congressional intent to incorporate such an immunity into the Civil Rights Act”); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543 (1984).
Far from an intent to incorporate common law judicial immunity, Congress in passing both Acts specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the monumental evil of state-sponsored oppression jeopardizing our nation’s existence by precipitating civil warfare.[29]

 

“The devastation caused by Minnesota Family Courts may be even more abominable than what we have  seen in California, Florida, Connecticut, and throughout the nation” says Colbern Stuart, President of California Coalition.  “Ms. Grazzin-Rucki’s family was so severely abused by Minnesota Family Courts that the children simply couldn’t withstand the turmoil.  Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s and her children’s tragedy shows how atrociously incompetent and downright criminal American Family Courts have become despite handling delicate family matters, and why Family Court must immediately cease its disastrous experiment with family well-being” says Stuart.

California Coalition is passing along Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s and Ms. MacDonald’s request to assist in locating the Grazzini-Rucki children–if you have any information about their whereabouts, please visit www.Missingkids.com to learn how to help.

With briefing on these critical family court immunity issues now ongoing in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, Family Courts are facing more pressure than they’ve ever before experienced.  WeightierMatter will be posting regular updates of both cases.

 

Footnotes:

[1] Sparkman at 368 (Stewart, J. dissenting).

[2]  “[T]o no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”  Magna Carta (1215); “[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (quoting William M. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *23).

[3] Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365 (2011)

[4] “Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action.” Bradley at 348.

[5] Similar historical analyses are apparent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-85 (1961); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 703 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-62 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under § 1983; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).  See also Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no “firmly rooted tradition” of immunity for function of a private psychiatrist employed by prison).

[6] Martinez is abrogated law “mooted” by abandonment of the appeal.  Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986).

[7]  Rheuark relied on Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (5th Cir.) opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled by Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Under Texas [statutory] law trial judges select their court reporters, who thereafter serve during the pleasure of the judge.”  Sparks affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision denying immunity to co-conspirators.  Dissenters in the Sparks en banc decision relied heavily on Slavin.  The Supreme Court’s affirmation in Sparks abrogates Slavin.

[8] A simple example is that the Chief Justice of the United States is authorized by law to serve as the Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.  20 U.S.C. § 76cc. Such authorization does not convert such service to a judicial act.  See, e.g., Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (1970) (“A judge does not cease to be a judge when he undertakes to chair a PTA meeting, but, of course, he does not bring judicial immunity to that forum, either.”)  Id. at 820 (cited favorably in Sparkman at 370 n. 10).

[9] Opening Brief of Appellant’s, APP 124

[10] APP COA -291

[11] Minn. Stat 148.88, Psychology Practice Act. Also see Minn. Admin. Rules 7200

[12] Knutson’s Brief page 21

[13] This distinction was recognized in Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978), fn. 7.  See also Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1868) (“In reference to judges of limited and inferior authority, it has been held that they are protected only when they act within their jurisdiction.”); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson 282, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) 1810 WL 1044, aff’d, 1811 WL 1445 (1811) (“[T]he judges of the king’s superior courts of general jurisdiction were not liable to answer personally for their errors in judgment. . . .  [W]ith respect to the inferior courts, it was only while they act within their jurisdiction.”); Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315, 327 (1804).  See also 1871 comments of Representative Arthur, infra, describing common law immunity: “Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts …. Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability . . . .  “

[14] Specific to family issues, the Meyers plaintiffs accused “us[ing] the interviews [of children] to coerce perjured statements from young and vulnerable witnesses” in a criminal investigation and “initiat[ing] neglect proceedings in the family court on behalf of the Scott County Human Services Department [and] sign[ing] and approv[ing] the neglect petitions.”  Id. at 1450.  Because these functions are “functionally comparable to prosecutor’s initiation of the judicial process,” this Court extended absolute immunity.  Id. at 1452.

[15] Appellants’ Brf, APP 125

[16] All of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuit authority derived from McAlester’s four-part test is error after Sparkman.  See, e.g., Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir.  1985); Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1985); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986), and dozens of authority-in-error relying thereon.

[17] Analyzed in Bradley at n. 16.  “[A] judge of a county court was sued for slander, and he put in a plea that the words complained of were spoken by him in his capacity as such judge, while sitting in his court, and trying a cause in which the plaintiff was defendant.”

[18] That privilege is narrow: “The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”  The privilege is against arrest—not civil liability—does not extend to felonies or treason, or “breach of the peace”— a misdemeanor.  Arrest outside of “Session” is permitted, and members maybe “questioned” for activity other than “speech or debate.”  Tenney at 377 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (false imprisonment not privileged); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).  Even so limited Jefferson was fearful of the power it gave legislators.  Tenney at 375.  Hamilton was not so fearful of “the least dangerous branch”—because it exercised no similar liberty. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (1788).

[19] See Separation of powers Minn. Const. Art 3, sec 1.

[20] Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991).

[21] Minnesota Constitution, Article 1. sec. 8 provides:

Redress of injuries or wrongs.

Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.

[22] “The entire social and political structure of America rests upon the cornerstone that all men have certain rights which are inherent and inalienable.  Among these are the right to be protected in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the right to acquire, possess and enjoy property; and the right to establish a home and family relations—all under equal and impartial laws which govern the whole community and each member thereof… The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific enumeration thereof in State Constitutions.”  Theide at 226-27, 14 NW 2d at 406.

[23] See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 337 (1969) (“Yale Note”).

[24] See also Yale Note at 327-328.

[25] Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871); Yale Note at 327.

[26] Yale Note at 327.

[27] Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull); Yale Note at 328.

[28] See also Yale Note at 328 and references to additional consistent comments in n. 38.  “On three occasions during the debates, legislators explicitly stated that judges would be liable under the [1871] Act.  No one denied the statements.”  “In sum, the question of congressional intent seems relatively clear: there was no universal acceptance of the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only legislative history available supports the proposition that Congress intended Section 1983 to cover judges.”  Yale Note at 328. Yale Note’s 1969 author left open the door that “the legislative history does not preclude entirely the Court’s construction of the statute if the policy reasons for judicial immunity are sufficiently persuasive.”  That “policy reasons” door was closed eleven years later in Malley.

[29] Congress’ intent to hold judges accountable is recorded as recently as 1979 by the 96th Congress:

[Section 1983] is an essential element of an extraordinary series of congressional enactments that transformed the relationship between the Federal Government and its constituent parts.  [T]he very purpose of the 1983 was to interpose the Federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s Federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of State law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.

Statement of Representative David A. Clarke, Chairperson, Committee on Judiciary, Government of the District of Columbia on the  Act of Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284, PL 170 LH, 1st Sess. (Dec. 29, 1979) (emphasis added).

FAIR USE AND LEGAL DISCLAIMER AND WARNING (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

CENSORSHIP IS A CRIME, AND SO IS THE “AS IS PHILOSOPHY” THAT ANYONE WOULD USE TO JUSTIFY IT IN COMMITTING SUCH A CRIME AND HIGH TREASON, AMONG OTHER THINGS.

1) CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS BLOG AND AUTHOR IS NOT A LAWYER, ATTORNEY, PARALEGAL, LEGAL PRACTITIONER, OR ADVOCATE, THUS, NONE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS POST COULD POSSIBLY BE USED AS LEGAL ADVICE.  IT IS EXPLICITLY NOT THE INTENT.  ONE WOULD, HYPOTHETICALLY, USE AT ONE’S OWN RISK AND PERIL IN REALITY.

2)  THIS POST IS MADE IN GOOD FAITH.

3)  THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS POST AND ON THIS BLOG IS SOLELY FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH PURPOSES AND/OR ENTERTAINMENT AND SHOULD EXPRESSLY NOT BE USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES.  IT IS PROTECTED BY 17 USC, SECTION 107 (“FAIR USE”).

4)  THE ORIGINAL AUTHOR OF THIS POST IS the EDITOR FOR CCFC, CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, A PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION.

RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD LEGISLATION BY SANTORUM|ALL SINGLE MOTHERS NEED TO READ AND STUDY THIS AND STAY OUT OF COURT AND AWAY FROM CPS AND POLICE


[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[S. 2830 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]






                                                       Calendar No. 714
108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2830

   To amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to promote 
 healthy marriages and responsible fatherhood, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 22, 2004

Mr. Santorum (for himself and Mr. Bayh) introduced the following bill; 
                     which was read the first time

                           September 23, 2004

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to promote 
 healthy marriages and responsible fatherhood, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Healthy Marriages and Responsible 
Fatherhood Act of 2004''.

         TITLE I--HEALTHY MARRIAGES AND RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD

SEC. 101. PROMOTION OF FAMILY FORMATION AND HEALTHY MARRIAGE.

    (a) TANF State Plans.--Section 402(a)(1)(A) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 602(a)(1)(A)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
                            ``(vii) Encourage equitable treatment of 
                        healthy 2-parent married families under the 
                        program referred to in clause (i).''.
    (b) Healthy Marriage Promotion Grants; Repeal of Bonus for 
Reduction of Illegitimacy Ratio.--Section 403(a)(2) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 603(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(2) Healthy marriage promotion grants.--
                    ``(A) Authority.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall 
                        award competitive grants to States, 
                        territories, and Indian tribes and tribal 
                        organizations for not more than 50 percent of 
                        the cost of developing and implementing 
                        innovative programs to promote and support 
                        healthy 2-parent married families.
                            ``(ii) Use of other tanf funds.--A State or 
                        Indian tribe with an approved tribal family 
                        assistance plan may use funds provided under 
                        other grants made under this part for all or 
                        part of the expenditures incurred for the 
                        remainder of the costs described in clause (i). 
                        In the case of a State, any such funds expended 
                        shall not be considered qualified State 
                        expenditures for purposes of section 409(a)(7).
                    ``(B) Healthy marriage promotion activities.--Funds 
                provided under subparagraph (A) and corresponding State 
                matching funds shall be used to support any of the 
                following programs or activities:
                            ``(i) Public advertising campaigns on the 
                        value of marriage and the skills needed to 
                        increase marital stability and health.
                            ``(ii) Education in high schools on the 
                        value of marriage, relationship skills, and 
                        budgeting.
                            ``(iii) Marriage education, marriage 
                        skills, and relationship skills programs that 
                        may include case management for, and referrals 
                        to, programs for parenting skills, financial 
                        management, conflict resolution, and job and 
                        career advancement, for non-married pregnant 
                        women, non-married expectant fathers, and non-
                        married recent parents.
                            ``(iv) Pre-marital education and marriage 
                        skills training for engaged couples and for 
                        couples or individuals interested in marriage.
                            ``(v) Marriage enhancement and marriage 
                        skills training programs for married couples.
                            ``(vi) Divorce reduction programs that 
                        teach relationship skills.
                            ``(vii) Marriage mentoring programs which 
                        use married couples as role models and mentors.
                            ``(viii) Programs to reduce the 
                        disincentives to marriage in means-tested aid 
                        programs, if offered in conjunction with any 
                        activity described in this subparagraph.
                            ``(ix) Training for individuals who will 
                        conduct any of the programs or activities 
                        described in clauses (i) through (viii).
                    ``(C) Voluntary participation.--Participation in 
                programs or activities described in any of clauses 
                (iii) through (vii) of subparagraph (B) shall be 
                voluntary.
                    ``(D) General rules governing use of funds.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The rules of section 
                        404, other than subsection (b) of that section, 
                        shall not apply to a grant made under this 
                        paragraph.
                            ``(ii) Rule of construction.--Nothing in 
                        this part or part C shall be construed as 
                        prohibiting a State from using funds made 
                        available under a grant awarded under this 
                        paragraph to award a subgrant or contract to a 
                        fatherhood promotion organization to carry out 
                        programs or activities described in 
                        subparagraph (B).
                    ``(E) Requirements for receipt of funds.--A State, 
                territory, or Indian tribe or tribal organization may 
                not be awarded a grant under this paragraph unless the 
                State, territory, Indian tribe or tribal organization, 
                as a condition of receiving funds under such a grant--
                            ``(i) consults with experts in domestic 
                        violence or with relevant community domestic 
                        violence coalitions in developing such programs 
                        or activities; and
                            ``(ii) describes in the application for a 
                        grant under this paragraph--
                                    ``(I) how the programs or 
                                activities proposed to be conducted 
                                will address, as appropriate, issues of 
                                domestic violence; and
                                    ``(II) what the State, territory, 
                                or Indian tribe or tribal organization, 
                                will do, to the extent relevant, to 
                                ensure that participation in such 
                                programs or activities is voluntary, 
                                and to inform potential participants 
                                that their involvement is voluntary.
                    ``(F) Appropriation.--
                            ``(i) In general.--Out of any money in the 
                        Treasury of the United States not otherwise 
                        appropriated, there are appropriated for each 
                        of fiscal years 2005 through 2006, $100,000,000 
                        for grants under this paragraph.
                            ``(ii) Extended availability of funds.--
                                    ``(I) In general.--Funds 
                                appropriated under clause (i) for each 
                                of fiscal years 2005 through 2006 shall 
                                remain available to the Secretary until 
                                expended.
                                    ``(II) Authority for grant 
                                recipients.--A State, territory, or 
                                Indian tribe or tribal organization may 
                                use funds made available under a grant 
                                awarded under this paragraph without 
                                fiscal year limitation pursuant to the 
                                terms of the grant.''.
    (c) Counting of Spending on Non-Eligible Families To Prevent and 
Reduce Incidence of Out-of-Wedlock Births, Encourage Formation and 
Maintenance of Healthy 2-Parent Married Families, or Encourage 
Responsible Fatherhood.--Section 409(a)(7)(B)(i) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 609(a)(7)(B)(i)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
                                    ``(V) Counting of spending on non-
                                eligible families to prevent and reduce 
                                incidence of out-of-wedlock births, 
                                encourage formation and maintenance of 
                                healthy 2-parent married families, or 
                                encourage responsible fatherhood.--
                                Subject to subclauses (II) and (III), 
                                the term `qualified State expenditures' 
                                includes the total expenditures by the 
                                State during the fiscal year under all 
                                State programs for a purpose described 
                                in paragraph (3) or (4) of section 
                                401(a).''.
    (d) Purposes.--Section 401(a)(4) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 601(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``two-parent families'' and 
inserting ``healthy 2-parent married families, and encourage 
responsible fatherhood''.

SEC. 102. RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD PROGRAM.

    (a) Responsible Fatherhood Program.--
            (1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
                    (A) Nearly 24,000,000 children in the United 
                States, or 34 percent of all such children, live apart 
                from their biological father.
                    (B) Sixty percent of couples who divorce have at 
                least 1 child.
                    (C) The number of children living with only a 
                mother increased from just over 5,000,000 in 1960 to 
                17,000,000 in 1999, and between 1981 and 1991 the 
                percentage of children living with only 1 parent 
                increased from 19 percent to 25 percent.
                    (D) Forty percent of children who live in 
                households without a father have not seen their father 
                in at least 1 year and 50 percent of such children have 
                never visited their father's home.
                    (E) The most important factor in a child's 
                upbringing is whether the child is brought up in a 
                loving, healthy, supportive environment.
                    (F) Children who live without contact with their 
                biological father are, in comparison to children who 
                have such contact--
                            (i) 5 times more likely to live in poverty;
                            (ii) more likely to bring weapons and drugs 
                        into the classroom;
                            (iii) twice as likely to commit crime;
                            (iv) twice as likely to drop out of school;
                            (v) more likely to commit suicide;
                            (vi) more than twice as likely to abuse 
                        alcohol or drugs; and
                            (vii) more likely to become pregnant as 
                        teenagers.
                    (G) Violent criminals are overwhelmingly males who 
                grew up without fathers.
                    (H) Between 20 and 30 percent of families in 
                poverty are headed by women who have suffered domestic 
                violence during the past year, and between 40 and 60 
                percent of women with children receiving welfare were 
                abused sometime during their life.
                    (I) Responsible fatherhood includes active 
                participation in financial support and child care, as 
                well as the formation and maintenance of a positive, 
                healthy, and nonviolent relationship between father and 
                child and a cooperative relationship between parents.
                    (J) States should be encouraged to implement 
                programs that provide support for responsible 
                fatherhood, promote marriage, and increase the 
                incidence of marriage, and should not be restricted 
                from implementing such programs.
                    (K) Fatherhood programs should promote and provide 
                support services for--
                            (i) loving and healthy relationships 
                        between parents and children; and
                            (ii) cooperative parenting.
                    (L) There is a social need to reconnect children 
                and fathers.
                    (M) The promotion of responsible fatherhood and 
                encouragement of healthy 2-parent married families 
                should not--
                            (i) denigrate the standing or parenting 
                        efforts of single mothers or other caregivers;
                            (ii) lessen the protection of children from 
                        abusive parents; or
                            (iii) compromise the safety or health of 
                        the custodial parent;
                but should increase the chance that children will have 
                2 caring parents to help them grow up healthy and 
                secure.
                    (N) The promotion of responsible fatherhood must 
                always recognize and promote the values of nonviolence.
                    (O) For the future of the United States and the 
                future of our children, Congress, States, and local 
                communities should assist parents to become more 
                actively involved in their children's lives.
                    (P) Child support is an important means by which a 
                parent can take financial responsibility for a child 
                and emotional support is an important means by which a 
                parent can take social responsibility for a child.
            (2) Fatherhood program.--Title I of the Personal 
        Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
        (Public Law 104-193) is amended by adding at the end the 
        following:

``SEC. 117. FATHERHOOD PROGRAM.

    ``(a) In General.--Title IV (42 U.S.C. 601-679b) is amended by 
inserting after part B the following:

               ```PART C--RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD PROGRAM

 ```SEC. 441. RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD GRANTS.

    ```(a) Grants to States To Conduct Demonstration Programs.--
            ```(1) Authority to award grants.--
                    ```(A) In general.--The Secretary shall award 
                grants to up to 20 eligible States to conduct 
                demonstration programs to carry out the purposes 
                described in paragraph (2).
                    ```(B) Eligible state.--For purposes of this 
                subsection, an eligible State is a State that submits 
                to the Secretary the following:
                            ```(i) Application.--An application for a 
                        grant under this subsection, at such time, in 
                        such manner, and containing such information as 
                        the Secretary may require.
                            ```(ii) State plan.--A State plan that 
                        includes the following:
                                    ```(I) Project description.--A 
                                description of the programs or 
                                activities the State will fund under 
                                the grant, including a good faith 
                                estimate of the number and 
                                characteristics of clients to be served 
                                under such projects and how the State 
                                intends to achieve at least 2 of the 
                                purposes described in paragraph (2).
                                    ```(II) Coordination efforts.--A 
                                description of how the State will 
                                coordinate and cooperate with State and 
                                local entities responsible for carrying 
                                out other programs that relate to the 
                                purposes intended to be achieved under 
                                the demonstration program, including as 
                                appropriate, entities responsible for 
                                carrying out jobs programs and programs 
                                serving children and families.
                                    ```(III) Records, reports, and 
                                audits.--An agreement to maintain such 
                                records, submit such reports, and 
                                cooperate with such reviews and audits 
                                as the Secretary finds necessary for 
                                purposes of oversight of the 
                                demonstration program.
                            ```(iii) Certifications.--The following 
                        certifications from the chief executive officer 
                        of the State:
                                    ```(I) A certification that the 
                                State will use funds provided under the 
                                grant to promote at least 2 of the 
                                purposes described in paragraph (2).
                                    ```(II) A certification that the 
                                State will return any unused funds 
to the Secretary in accordance with the reconciliation process under 
paragraph (5).
                                    ```(III) A certification that the 
                                funds provided under the grant will be 
                                used for programs and activities that 
                                target low-income participants and that 
                                not less than 50 percent of the 
                                participants in each program or 
                                activity funded under the grant shall 
                                be--
                                            ```(aa) parents of a child 
                                        who is, or within the past 24 
                                        months has been, a recipient of 
                                        assistance or services under a 
                                        State program funded under part 
                                        A, D, or E of this title, title 
                                        XIX, or the Food Stamp Act of 
                                        1977; or
                                            ```(bb) parents, including 
                                        an expectant parent or a 
                                        married parent, whose income 
                                        (after adjustment for court-
                                        ordered child support paid or 
                                        received) does not exceed 150 
                                        percent of the poverty line.
                                    ```(IV) A certification that the 
                                State has or will comply with the 
                                requirements of paragraph (4).
                                    ```(V) A certification that funds 
                                provided to a State under this 
                                subsection shall not be used to 
                                supplement or supplant other Federal, 
                                State, or local funds that are used to 
                                support programs or activities that are 
                                related to the purposes described in 
                                paragraph (2).
                    ```(C) Preferences and factors of consideration.--
                In awarding grants under this subsection, the Secretary 
                shall take into consideration the following:
                            ```(i) Diversity of entities used to 
                        conduct programs and activities.--The Secretary 
                        shall, to the extent practicable, achieve a 
                        balance among the eligible States awarded 
                        grants under this subsection with respect to 
                        the size, urban or rural location, and 
                        employment of differing or unique methods of 
                        the entities that the eligible States intend to 
                        use to conduct the programs and activities 
                        funded under the grants.
                            ```(ii) Priority for certain states.--The 
                        Secretary shall give priority to awarding 
                        grants to eligible States that have--
                                    ```(I) demonstrated progress in 
                                achieving at least 1 of the purposes 
                                described in paragraph (2) through 
                                previous State initiatives; or
                                    ```(II) demonstrated need with 
                                respect to reducing the incidence of 
                                out-of-wedlock births or absent fathers 
                                in the State.
            ```(2) Purposes.--The purposes described in this paragraph 
        are the following:
                    ```(A) Promoting responsible fatherhood through 
                marriage promotion.--To promote marriage or sustain 
                marriage through activities such as counseling, 
                mentoring, disseminating information about the benefits 
                of marriage and 2-parent involvement for children, 
                enhancing relationship skills, education regarding how 
                to control aggressive behavior, disseminating 
                information on the causes of domestic violence and 
                child abuse, marriage preparation programs, premarital 
                counseling, marital inventories, skills-based marriage 
                education, financial planning seminars, including 
                improving a family's ability to effectively manage 
                family business affairs by means such as education, 
                counseling, or mentoring on matters related to family 
                finances, including household management, budgeting, 
                banking, and handling of financial transactions and 
                home maintenance, and divorce education and reduction 
                programs, including mediation and counseling.
                    ```(B) Promoting responsible fatherhood through 
                parenting promotion.--To promote responsible parenting 
                through activities such as counseling, mentoring, and 
                mediation, disseminating information about good 
                parenting practices, skills-based parenting education, 
                encouraging child support payments, and other methods.
                    ```(C) Promoting responsible fatherhood through 
                fostering economic stability of fathers.--To foster 
                economic stability by helping fathers improve their 
                economic status by providing activities such as work 
                first services, job search, job training, subsidized 
                employment, job retention, job enhancement, and 
                encouraging education, including career-advancing 
                education, dissemination of employment materials, 
                coordination with existing employment services such as 
                welfare-to-work programs, referrals to local employment 
                training initiatives, and other methods.
            ```(3) Restriction on use of funds.--No funds provided 
        under this subsection may be used for costs attributable to 
        court proceedings regarding matters of child visitation or 
        custody, or for legislative advocacy.
            ```(4) Requirements for receipt of funds.--A State may not 
        be awarded a grant under this section unless the State, as a 
        condition of receiving funds under such a grant--
                    ```(A) consults with experts in domestic violence 
                or with relevant community domestic violence coalitions 
                in developing such programs or activities; and
                    ```(B) describes in the application for a grant 
                under this section--
                            ```(i) how the programs or activities 
                        proposed to be conducted will address, 
as appropriate, issues of domestic violence; and
                            ```(ii) what the State will do, to the 
                        extent relevant, to ensure that participation 
                        in such programs or activities is voluntary, 
                        and to inform potential participants that their 
                        involvement is voluntary.
            ```(5) Reconciliation process.--
                    ```(A) 3-year availability of amounts allotted.--
                Each eligible State that receives a grant under this 
                subsection for a fiscal year shall return to the 
                Secretary any unused portion of the grant for such 
                fiscal year not later than the last day of the second 
                succeeding fiscal year, together with any earnings on 
                such unused portion.
                    ```(B) Procedure for redistribution.--The Secretary 
                shall establish an appropriate procedure for 
                redistributing to eligible States that have expended 
                the entire amount of a grant made under this subsection 
                for a fiscal year any amount that is returned to the 
                Secretary by eligible States under subparagraph (A).
            ```(6) Amount of grants.--
                    ```(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), 
                the amount of each grant awarded under this subsection 
                shall be an amount sufficient to implement the State 
                plan submitted under paragraph (1)(B)(ii).
                    ```(B) Minimum amounts.--No eligible State shall--
                            ```(i) in the case of the District of 
                        Columbia or a State other than the Commonwealth 
                        of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin 
                        Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the 
                        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
                        receive a grant for a fiscal year in an amount 
                        that is less than $1,000,000; and
                            ```(ii) in the case of the Commonwealth of 
                        Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, 
                        Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of 
                        the Northern Mariana Islands, receive a grant 
                        for a fiscal year in an amount that is less 
                        than $500,000.
            ```(7) Definition of state.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``State'' means each of the 50 States, the District of 
        Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States 
        Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of 
        the Northern Mariana Islands.
            ```(8) Authorization of appropriations.--Out of any money 
        in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise 
        appropriated, there are appropriated $45,000,000 for each of 
        fiscal years 2005 through 2006 for purposes of making grants to 
        eligible States under this subsection.
    ```(b) Grants to Eligible Entities To Conduct Demonstration 
Programs.--
            ```(1) Authority to award grants.--
                    ```(A) In general.--The Secretary shall award 
                grants to eligible entities to conduct demonstration 
                programs to carry out the purposes described in 
                subsection (a)(2).
                    ```(B) Eligible entity.--For purposes of this 
                subsection, an eligible entity is a local government, 
                local public agency, community-based or nonprofit 
                organization, or private entity, including any 
                charitable or faith-based organization, or an Indian 
                tribe (as defined in section 419(4)), that submits to 
                the Secretary the following:
                            ```(i) Application.--An application for a 
                        grant under this subsection, at such time, in 
                        such manner, and containing such information as 
                        the Secretary may require.
                            ```(ii) Project description.--A description 
                        of the programs or activities the entity 
                        intends to carry out with funds provided under 
                        the grant, including a good faith estimate of 
                        the number and characteristics of clients to be 
                        served under such programs or activities and 
                        how the entity intends to achieve at least 2 of 
                        the purposes described in subsection (a)(2).
                            ```(iii) Coordination efforts.--A 
                        description of how the entity will coordinate 
                        and cooperate with State and local entities 
                        responsible for carrying out other programs 
                        that relate to the purposes intended to be 
                        achieved under the demonstration program, 
                        including as appropriate, entities responsible 
                        for carrying out jobs programs and programs 
                        serving children and families.
                            ```(iv) Records, reports, and audits.--An 
                        agreement to maintain such records, submit such 
                        reports, and cooperate with such reviews and 
                        audits as the Secretary finds necessary for 
                        purposes of oversight of the demonstration 
                        program.
                            ```(v) Certifications.--The following 
                        certifications:
                                    ```(I) A certification that the 
                                entity will use funds provided under 
                                the grant to promote at least 2 of the 
                                purposes described in subsection 
                                (a)(2).
                                    ```(II) A certification that the 
                                entity will return any unused funds to 
                                the Secretary in accordance with the 
                                reconciliation process under paragraph 
                                (3).
                                    ```(III) A certification that the 
                                funds provided under the grant will be 
                                used for programs and activities that 
                                target low-income participants and that 
                                not less than 50 percent of the 
                                participants in each program or 
                                activity funded under the grant shall 
                                be--
                                            ```(aa) parents of a child 
                                        who is, or within the past 
24 months has been, a recipient of assistance or services under a State 
program funded under part A, D, or E of this title, title XIX, or the 
Food Stamp Act of 1977; or
                                            ```(bb) parents, including 
                                        an expectant parent or a 
                                        married parent, whose income 
                                        (after adjustment for court-
                                        ordered child support paid or 
                                        received) does not exceed 150 
                                        percent of the poverty line.
                                    ```(IV) A certification that the 
                                entity has or will comply with the 
                                requirements of paragraph (3).
                                    ```(V) A certification that funds 
                                provided to an entity under this 
                                subsection shall not be used to 
                                supplement or supplant other Federal, 
                                State, or local funds provided to the 
                                entity that are used to support 
                                programs or activities that are related 
                                to the purposes described in subsection 
                                (a)(2).
                    ```(C) Preferences and factors of consideration.--
                In awarding grants under this subsection, the Secretary 
                shall, to the extent practicable, achieve a balance 
                among the eligible entities awarded grants under this 
                subsection with respect to the size, urban or rural 
                location, and employment of differing or unique methods 
                of the entities.
            ```(2) Restriction on use of funds.--No funds provided 
        under this subsection may be used for costs attributable to 
        court proceedings regarding matters of child visitation or 
        custody, or for legislative advocacy.
            ```(3) Requirements for use of funds.--The Secretary may 
        not award a grant under this subsection to an eligible entity 
        unless the entity, as a condition of receiving funds under such 
        a grant--
                    ```(A) consults with experts in domestic violence 
                or with relevant community domestic violence coalitions 
                in developing the programs or activities to be 
                conducted with such funds awarded under the grant; and
                    ```(B) describes in the application for a grant 
                under this section--
                            ```(i) how the programs or activities 
                        proposed to be conducted will address, as 
                        appropriate, issues of domestic violence; and
                            ```(ii) what the entity will do, to the 
                        extent relevant, to ensure that participation 
                        in such programs or activities is voluntary, 
                        and to inform potential participants that their 
                        involvement is voluntary.
            ```(4) Reconciliation process.--
                    ```(A) 3-year availability of amounts allotted.--
                Each eligible entity that receives a grant under this 
                subsection for a fiscal year shall return to the 
                Secretary any unused portion of the grant for such 
                fiscal year not later than the last day of the second 
                succeeding fiscal year, together with any earnings on 
                such unused portion.
                    ```(B) Procedure for redistribution.--The Secretary 
                shall establish an appropriate procedure for 
                redistributing to eligible entities that have expended 
                the entire amount of a grant made under this subsection 
                for a fiscal year any amount that is returned to the 
                Secretary by eligible entities under subparagraph (A).
            ```(5) Authorization of appropriations.--Out of any money 
        in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise 
        appropriated, there are appropriated $30,000,000 for each of 
        fiscal years 2005 through 2006 for purposes of making grants to 
        eligible entities under this subsection.

```SEC. 442. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 
              PROGRAMS.

    ```(a) Media Campaign National Clearinghouse for Responsible 
Fatherhood.--
            ```(1) In general.--From any funds appropriated under 
        subsection (c), the Secretary shall contract with a nationally 
        recognized, nonprofit fatherhood promotion organization 
        described in subsection (b) to--
                    ```(A) develop, promote, and distribute to 
                interested States, local governments, public agencies, 
                and private entities a media campaign that encourages 
                the appropriate involvement of parents in the life of 
                any child, with a priority for programs that 
                specifically address the issue of responsible 
                fatherhood; and
                    ```(B) develop a national clearinghouse to assist 
                States and communities in efforts to promote and 
                support marriage and responsible fatherhood by 
                collecting, evaluating, and making available (through 
                the Internet and by other means) to other States 
                information regarding the media campaigns established 
                under section 443.
            ```(2) Coordination with domestic violence programs.--The 
        Secretary shall ensure that the nationally recognized nonprofit 
        fatherhood promotion organization with a contract under 
        paragraph (1) coordinates the media campaign developed under 
        subparagraph (A) of such paragraph and the national 
        clearinghouse developed under subparagraph (B) of such 
        paragraph with national, State, or local domestic violence 
        programs.
    ```(b) Nationally Recognized, Nonprofit Fatherhood Promotion 
Organization Described.--The nationally recognized, nonprofit 
fatherhood promotion organization described in this subsection is an 
organization that has at least 4 years of experience in--
            ```(1) designing and disseminating a national public 
        education campaign, as evidenced by the production and 
        successful placement of television, radio, and print public 
service announcements that promote the importance of responsible 
fatherhood, a track record of service to Spanish-speaking populations 
and historically underserved or minority populations, the capacity to 
fulfill requests for information and a proven history of fulfilling 
such requests, and a mechanism through which the public can request 
additional information about the campaign; and
            ```(2) providing consultation and training to community-
        based organizations interested in implementing fatherhood 
        outreach, support, or skill development programs with an 
        emphasis on promoting married fatherhood as the ideal.
    ```(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Out of any money in the 
Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, there are 
appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2006 to 
carry out this section.

```SEC. 443. BLOCK GRANTS TO STATES TO ENCOURAGE MEDIA CAMPAIGNS.

    ```(a) Definitions.--In this section:
            ```(1) Broadcast advertisement.--The term ``broadcast 
        advertisement'' means a communication intended to be aired by a 
        television or radio broadcast station, including a 
        communication intended to be transmitted through a cable 
        channel.
            ```(2) Child at risk.--The term ``child at risk'' means 
        each young child whose family income does not exceed the 
        poverty line.
            ```(3) Poverty line.--The term ``poverty line'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 673(2) of the Community 
        Services Block Grant Act (42 U.S.C. 9902(2)), including any 
        revision required by such section, that is applicable to a 
        family of the size involved.
            ```(4) Printed or other advertisement.--The term ``printed 
        or other advertisement'' includes any communication intended to 
        be distributed through a newspaper, magazine, outdoor 
        advertising facility, mailing, or any other type of general 
        public advertising, but does not include any broadcast 
        advertisement.
            ```(5) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the 50 
        States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
        Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, 
        and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
            ```(6) Young child.--The term ``young child'' means an 
        individual under age 5.
    ```(b) State Certifications.--Not later than October 1 of each of 
fiscal year for which a State desires to receive an allotment under 
this section, the chief executive officer of the State shall submit to 
the Secretary a certification that the State shall--
            ```(1) use such funds to promote the formation and 
        maintenance of healthy 2-parent married families, strengthen 
        fragile families, and promote responsible fatherhood through 
        media campaigns conducted in accordance with the requirements 
        of subsection (d);
            ```(2) return any unused funds to the Secretary in 
        accordance with the reconciliation process under subsection 
        (e); and
            ```(3) comply with the reporting requirements under 
        subsection (f).
    ```(c) Payments to States.--For each of fiscal years 2005 through 
2006, the Secretary shall pay to each State that submits a 
certification under subsection (b), from any funds appropriated under 
subsection (i), for the fiscal year an amount equal to the amount of 
the allotment determined for the fiscal year under subsection (g).
    ```(d) Establishment of Media Campaigns.--Each State receiving an 
allotment under this section for a fiscal year shall use the allotment 
to conduct media campaigns as follows:
            ```(1) Conduct of media campaigns.--
                    ```(A) Radio and television media campaigns.--
                            ```(i) Production of broadcast 
                        advertisements.--At the option of the State, to 
                        produce broadcast advertisements that promote 
                        the formation and maintenance of healthy 2-
                        parent married families, strengthen fragile 
                        families, and promote responsible fatherhood.
                            ```(ii) Airtime challenge program.--At the 
                        option of the State, to establish an airtime 
                        challenge program under which the State may 
                        spend amounts allotted under this section to 
                        purchase time from a broadcast station to air a 
                        broadcast advertisement produced under clause 
                        (i), but only if the State obtains an amount of 
                        time of the same class and during a comparable 
                        period to air the advertisement using non-
                        Federal contributions.
                    ```(B) Other media campaigns.--At the option of the 
                State, to conduct a media campaign that consists of the 
                production and distribution of printed or other 
                advertisements that promote the formation and 
                maintenance of healthy 2-parent married families, 
                strengthen fragile families, and promote responsible 
                fatherhood.
            ```(2) Administration of media campaigns.--A State may 
        administer media campaigns funded under this section directly 
        or through grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements with 
        public agencies, local governments, or private entities, 
        including charitable and faith-based organizations.
            ```(3) Consultation with domestic violence assistance 
        centers.--In developing broadcast and printed advertisements to 
        be used in the media campaigns conducted under paragraph (1), 
        the State or other entity administering the campaign shall 
        consult with representatives of State and local domestic 
        violence centers.
            ```(4) Non-federal contributions.--In this section, the 
        term ``non-Federal contributions'' includes contributions by 
        the State and by public and private entities. Such 
        contributions may be in cash or in kind. Such term does not 
        include any amounts provided by the Federal Government, or 
        services assisted or subsidized to any significant extent by 
        the Federal Government, or any amount expended by a State 
        before October 1, 2004.
    ```(e) Reconciliation Process.--
            ```(1) 3-year availability of amounts allotted.--Each State 
        that receives an allotment under this section shall return to 
        the Secretary any unused portion of the amount allotted to a 
        State for a fiscal year not later than the last day of the 
        second succeeding fiscal year together with any earnings on 
        such unused portion.
            ```(2) Procedure for redistribution of unused allotments.--
        The Secretary shall establish an appropriate procedure for 
        redistributing to States that have expended the entire amount 
        allotted under this section any amount that is--
                    ```(A) returned to the Secretary by States under 
                paragraph (1); or
                    ```(B) not allotted to a State under this section 
                because the State did not submit a certification under 
                subsection (b) by October 1 of a fiscal year.
    ```(f) Reporting Requirements.--
            ```(1) Monitoring and evaluation.--Each State receiving an 
        allotment under this section for a fiscal year shall monitor 
and evaluate the media campaigns conducted using funds made available 
under this section in such manner as the Secretary, in consultation 
with the States, determines appropriate.
            ```(2) Annual reports.--Not less frequently than annually, 
        each State receiving an allotment under this section for a 
        fiscal year shall submit to the Secretary reports on the media 
        campaigns conducted using funds made available under this 
        section at such time, in such manner, and containing such 
        information as the Secretary may require.
    ```(g) Amount of Allotments.--
            ```(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), of 
        the amount appropriated for the purpose of making allotments 
        under this section for a fiscal year, the Secretary shall allot 
        to each State that submits a certification under subsection (b) 
        for the fiscal year an amount equal to the sum of--
                    ```(A) the amount that bears the same ratio to 50 
                percent of such funds as the number of young children 
                in the State (as determined by the Secretary based on 
                the most current reliable data available) bears to the 
                number of such children in all States; and
                    ```(B) the amount that bears the same ratio to 50 
                percent of such funds as the number of children at risk 
                in the State (as determined by the Secretary based on 
                the most current reliable data available) bears to the 
                number of such children in all States.
            ```(2) Minimum allotments.--No allotment for a fiscal year 
        under this section shall be less than--
                    ```(A) in the case of the District of Columbia or a 
                State other than the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
                United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and 
                the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 1 
                percent of the amount appropriated for the fiscal year 
                under subsection (i); and
                    ```(B) in the case of the Commonwealth of Puerto 
                Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American 
                Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
                Islands, 0.5 percent of such amount.
            ```(3) Pro rata reductions.--The Secretary shall make such 
        pro rata reductions to the allotments determined under this 
        subsection as are necessary to comply with the requirements of 
        paragraph (2).
    ```(h) Evaluation.--
            ```(1) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct an 
        evaluation of the impact of the media campaigns funded under 
        this section.
            ```(2) Report.--Not later than December 31, 2006, the 
        Secretary shall report to Congress the results of the 
        evaluation under paragraph (1).
            ```(3) Funding.--Of the amount appropriated under 
        subsection (i) for fiscal year 2005, $1,000,000 of such amount 
        shall be transferred and made available for purposes of 
        conducting the evaluation required under this subsection, and 
        shall remain available until expended.
    ```(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--Out of any money in the 
Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, there are 
appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2006 for 
purposes of making allotments to States under this section.'.
    ``(b) Inapplicability of Effective Date Provisions.--Section 116 
shall not apply to the amendment made by subsection (a) of this 
section.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--Section 2 of such Act is amended in the 
table of contents by inserting after the item relating to section 116 
the following new item:

``Sec. 117. Responsible fatherhood program.''.

SEC. 103. RESEARCH, EVALUATIONS, AND NATIONAL STUDIES.

    Section 413 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 613) is amended 
by adding at the end the following:
    ``(k) Funding for Research, Demonstrations, and Technical 
Assistance.--
            ``(1) Appropriation.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Out of any money in the Treasury 
                of the United States not otherwise appropriated, there 
                are appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
                2005 through 2006, which shall remain available to the 
                Secretary until expended.
                    ``(B) Use of funds.--
                            ``(i) In general.--Funds appropriated under 
                        subparagraph (A) shall be used for the purpose 
                        of--
                                    ``(I) conducting or supporting 
                                research and demonstration projects by 
                                public or private entities; or
                                    ``(II) providing technical 
                                assistance in connection with a purpose 
                                of the program funded under this part, 
                                as described in section 401(a), to 
                                States, Indian tribal organizations, 
                                sub-State entities, and such other 
                                entities as the Secretary may specify.
                            ``(ii) Requirement.--Not less than 80 
                        percent of the funds appropriated under 
                        subparagraph (A) for a fiscal year shall be 
                        expended for the purpose of conducting or 
                        supporting research and demonstration projects, 
                        or for providing technical assistance, in 
                        connection with activities described in section 
                        403(a)(2)(B). Funds appropriated under 
                        subparagraph (A) and expended in accordance 
                        with this clause shall be in addition to any 
                        other funds made available under this part for 
                        activities described in section 403(a)(2)(B).
            ``(2) Secretary's authority.--The Secretary may conduct 
        activities authorized by this subsection directly or through 
        grants, contracts, or interagency agreements with public or 
        private entities.
            ``(3) Requirement for use of funds.--The Secretary shall 
        not pay any funds appropriated under paragraph (1)(A) to an 
        entity for the purpose of conducting or supporting research and 
demonstration projects involving activities described in section 
403(a)(2)(B) unless the entity complies with the requirements of 
section 403(a)(2)(E).''.

SEC. 104. RESCISSION OF HIGH PERFORMANCE BONUS AND BONUS TO REWARD 
              DECREASE IN ILLEGITIMACY RATIO.

    (a) Rescission.--With respect to the amounts appropriated under 
paragraphs (2)(D) and (4)(F) of section 403(a) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 603(a)), the amounts remaining available for obligation 
for any fiscal year after fiscal year 2004 are rescinded.
    (b) Budget Scoring.--Notwithstanding section 257(b)(2) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 
907(b)(2)), the baseline shall assume that no bonus grants shall be 
made under section 403(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
603(a)(2)) (relating to bonuses to reward decreases in the illegitimacy 
ratio) or under section 403(a)(4) of that Act (42 U.S.C. 603(a)(4)) 
(relating to high performance bonuses) after fiscal year 2004.
    (c) Application of Budget Savings.--Budget savings resulting from 
the application of subsections (a) and (b) shall be applied to offset 
the costs of making healthy marriage promotion grants under section 
403(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (as amended by section 101(b) of 
this Act), funding research, demonstrations, and technical assistance 
under section 413(k) of the Social Security Act (as added by section 
103 of this Act), and carrying out the responsible fatherhood program 
under part C of title IV of the Social Security Act (as added by 
section 102(a)(2) of this Act).

            TITLE II--EXTENSION OF TANF AND RELATED PROGRAMS

SEC. 201. EXTENSION OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES 
              BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM THROUGH MARCH 31, 2005.

    (a) In General.--Activities authorized by part A of title IV of the 
Social Security Act, other than the activities authorized by sections 
403(a)(2) and 413(k) of such Act (as amended by sections 101(b) and 
103, respectively, of this Act), and by sections 510, 1108(b), and 1925 
of such Act, shall continue through March 31, 2005, in the manner 
authorized for fiscal year 2002, notwithstanding section 1902(e)(1)(A) 
of such Act, and out of any money in the Treasury of the United States 
not otherwise appropriated, there are hereby appropriated such sums as 
may be necessary for such purpose. Grants and payments may be made 
pursuant to this authority through the second quarter of fiscal year 
2005 at the level provided for such activities through the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2002. Activities authorized by sections 
403(a)(2) and 413(k) of the Social Security Act (as so amended), and by 
part C of title IV of such Act (as added by section 102(a)(2) of this 
Act)), shall continue through the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006 in 
accordance with the amendments made by sections 101(b), 102(a)(2), and 
103, respectively, of this Act.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 403(a)(3)(H)(ii) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 603(a)(3)(H)(ii)) is amended by striking 
``September 30, 2004'' and inserting ``March 31, 2005''.

SEC. 202. EXTENSION OF THE NATIONAL RANDOM SAMPLE STUDY OF CHILD 
              WELFARE AND CHILD WELFARE WAIVER AUTHORITY THROUGH 
              SEPTEMBER 30, 2004.

    Activities authorized by sections 429A and 1130(a) of the Social 
Security Act shall continue through March 31, 2005, in the manner 
authorized for fiscal year 2002, and out of any money in the Treasury 
of the United States not otherwise appropriated, there are hereby 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for such purpose. Grants and 
payments may be made pursuant to this authority through the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2005 at the level provided for such activities 
through the second quarter of fiscal year 2002.




                                                       Calendar No. 714

108th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 2830

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

   To amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to promote 
 healthy marriages and responsible fatherhood, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           September 23, 2004

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar

MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR “ACCESS” AND “VISITATION” IN TEXAS FOR RESPONSIBLE ABUSERS


RE-POST, RE-POST, RE-POST

 

 MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR “ACCESS”

AND “VISITATION” IN TEXAS FOR

RESPONSIBLE ABUSERS

money.public money private agenda

 Click on the link below to read more.

 JPittard.TX Sunset Testimony

 

Fair Use and Legal Disclaimer (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

  • CENSORSHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED AS IT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE IN THE THIS REPUBLIC USA, THE LAWS TO WHICH YOU WILL BE HELD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.
  • (3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.
  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and/or requirement for  a full or partial retraction in a timely manner so that Author of this blog may respond expediently and lawfully.

Congressional Testimony of Brenda Battle Jordan(MI) Regarding Family Court Fraud, Racketeering, and Conspiracy


Watch the stories that the mainstream media, including Facebook, does not want or is not allowed to let you see and hear.

http://beforeitsnews.com/blogging-citizen-journalism/2012/09/brenda-battle-jordan-sorry-your-account-is-currently-unable-to-use-facebook-for-websites-for-more-information-please-log-in-to-www-facebook-com-and-follow-the-instructions-you-see-there-securi-2444154.html

Watch and Listen to Brenda Battle Jordan’s Congressional Testimony to Bill Windsor, Lawless America producer on Youtube.com.  Battle Jordan exposes crimes of the family courts in her divorce case in Michigan. Brenda Battle Jordan mentions that former F.B.I. agent Ted Gunderson helped her to understand that her case was of the type generally referred to as “The Damon 10,000 Screw,” or, “The Fix is In,” in which a $10,000 (actually, it is now $20,000.00) pay-off to the court allows a litigant to have his way.  Clerks and sundry court personnel to include administrators are complicit in most cases.  Listen carefully to how they tried to falsely indict her for an alleged murder plot against her own daughter that was manufactured by social workers and psychologists because Battle Jordan fired her complicit attorneys and obviously couldn’t be bought by the court to participate in the conspiracy against her.

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Fair Use and Legal Disclaimer (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

(1)  This post is made in good faith and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.

(2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, US Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.

(3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.

(4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and/or requirement for  a full or partial retraction in a timely manner so that Author of this blog may respond expediently and lawfully.

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