CALIFORNIA COALITION EXPANDS FAMILY COURT ATTACK TO EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS


California Coalition Expands Family Court Attack to Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Briefing Filed Today

by ccfceditor

March 6, 2015–San Diego, CA and St. Paul, MN–California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC today announces strategic legal partnership with  attorney Michelle MacDonald, MacDonald Law Firm, LLC, www.FamilyCourt.com, www.Facebook.com\FamilyCourt to strengthen the family law reform movement within federal courts in the Eighth Circuit and Minnesota family courts.  In a brief filed today with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Ms. MacDonald—co-founder of Family Innocence, a nonprofit dedicated to keeping families out of court: resolving conflicts and injustices peacefully  (www.FamilyInnocence.com)—advances groundbreaking arguments with assistance of California Coalition.

“We’re honored to stand with Ms. MacDonald and FamilyCourt.com to engage the beast of Family Courts, and look forward to collaborating further in advancing the Grazzini-Rucki case through the federal courts” says Colbern Stuart, President of California Coalition.

https://www.scribd.com/embeds/257912195/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&show_recommendations=true

The Grazzini-Rucki brief expands on the approach taken by California Coalition in its ongoing appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Excerpts from the brief prepared jointly by MacDonald Law Firm, LLC, Michelle MacDonald, California Coalition, and Colbern Stuart:

 

INTRODUCTION

If aura there be, it is hardly protected by exonerating from
liability such lawless conduct as took place here
[1]
Nineteenth and twentieth century American judges have overstepped constitutional restriction to usurp powers reserved to the legislature and written for themselves an immunity far greater even than that of an English judge, or even a King, at common law.[2]  No court has ever denied that absolute immunity inflicts a “monstrous” injustice on wronged litigants, and taxes the credibility and integrity of judicial institutions.  Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 521 (1978).  It has been justified as a necessary evil to protect the “ardor” of judges and prosecutors.  Id.  While one might reasonably have concluded that our efforts to assure “justice is done”[3] would have been better-directed toward inculcating ardor through discipline and integrity than by “expanding” immunity, the issue is moot.
Unlike the 1871 era of federal procedure in which a judge could be forced to stand trial on mere “ascription” of culpable intent to an accused act,[4] the reasonable concern is today resolved at the pleading stage.  Modernly, like all litigants a judge is protected by procedural barriers provided in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) which protect against a mere “ascription” of malice.  These are bolstered by the plausibility test provided in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 thereafter.  The purposes of immunity—to protect efficient process—is today accomplished at the pleading stage.
A Judge’s invocation of the doctrine of judicial immunity to preserve judicial efficiency has effectively denied citizens remedy—a fundamentalright—for judicial injury.
Fundamental  rights such as of familial association are destroyed by the nod of a head. In error, Pierson and Sparkman have deprived scores of Americans remedy for criminalwrongdoingPierson and Sparkman’s despotism must end today.

 

The Outrages Committed Against the Grazzini-Rucki Family and Their Attorney

Ms. MacDonald represents Ms. Sandra Grazzini-Rucki and her children, who have been devastated by Minnesota family courts.  The lawsuit describes the outrages committed by Minnesota Family Court Judge David Knutson against the Grazzini-Rucki family and their attorney Ms. MacDonald.  Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s encounters with family courts began in 2011 when she sought and obtained a divorce, seeking orders of protection for her and her children.  Over the ensuing years, successive abusive rulings by the Minnesota Family Court rendered Grazzini-Rucki and her family homeless and bankrupt.

Judge Knutson’s illegal rulings included kicking the entire family out of their own home and separating the children from both parents, with no contact orders.  Last September, after a “listening session” conducted by Judge Knutson involving the Grazzini-Rucki children, two of Grazzini-Rucki’s children became so distressed that they fled from the homes into which they had been placed.  Teenagers Gianna and Samantha Rucki  have been missing since April 19, 2013. www.Missingkids.com.   In what can only be described as a bizarre absurdity, Judge Knutson insisted on conducting a “child custody “ trial after the children went missing.

Even more outrageous, after Ms. MacDonald advised Judge Knutson that the trial was improper, Judge Knutson caused Ms. MacDonald to be placed  in handcuffs shackled to a belt around her waist, sat in a wheel chair, and forced to finish trial to finish the “custody” trial without eyeglasses, pen, paper, or files.  While Ms. MacDonald was being arrested, courtroom bailiffs told Ms. Grazzini-Rucki that MacDonald would be retained in custody and would not be returning to the courtroom.  Ms. Grazzini-Rucki therefore left the courthouse.  When MacDonald was returned to the courtroom in shackles, Grazzini-Rucki had already left—yet Judge Knutson insisted on completing the trial without Ms. Grazzini-Rucki.  The events were captures on security video.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson sought, and the district court granted, dismissal of all claims as barred by absolute judicial immunity, finding every act accused in the Amended Complaint to be a judicial act within Judge Knutson’s jurisdiction.  Order at 21.  The many non-judicial acts of which Judge Knutson was accused in the Amended Complaint—but not analyzed in the district court’s sweeping immunity holding—include:
  • Searching and seizing person and property of Grazzini-Rucki and her children without probable cause or a warrant, including that she abandon her children;
  • Circumventing the Minnesota Court Information system regarding various Dakota County matters involving the litigants;
  • Causing state court administrators to assign “all future hearings” in various matters involving Grazzini-Rucki to Judge Knutson;
  • Illegally usurping jurisdiction over several existing matters involving Grazzini-Rucki, including the State of Minnesota against David Rucki, and third parties, and making rulings in those matters without notice to Grazzini-Rucki;
  • Illegally ordering Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s children into “therapy”;
  • Illegally intercepting and sealing a recorded transcript Ms. Grazzini-Rucki was entitled to receive and view;
  • Ordering both parents to have no contact with their own children whatsoever;
  • Ordering Grazzini-Rucki to refrain from participation in her own family’s association activities;
  • Ordering Grazzini-Rucki to be separated from her children and have no contact with them at their schools, or through third parties;
  • Conducting a “listening” psychotherapy session between Judge Knutson, Dr. Gilbertson, and the Grazzini-Rucki’s children at which Judge Knutson was alleged to have coerced, intimidated, and threatened the Grazzini-Rucki children, contributing the children’s decision to run away from their home just days later;
  • Insisting that Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel try Grazzini-Rucki’s case while in handcuffs shackled to a waist belt, unable to rise from a wheelchair, without Grazzini-Rucki present, without Ms. MacDonald’s files, and without glasses, pen, or papers, seized by courtroom deputies;
  • Retaliating against Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel by the foregoing after Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel informed Judge Knutson that this action was pending against him, and ignoring the glaring conflict of interest.
Though this brief focuses primarily on the administrative assignment and “listening” therapy session, Appellant does not waive her assertion that none of the above functions, and those listed in the Amended Complaint warrant immunity.  The district court’s analysis of these many claims was skeletal yet sweeping, finding Judge Knutson immune for “actions taken in his capacity as a state court judge”, relying primarily on Stump v. Sparkman and Pierson v. Ray.  Order p. 32.  In response to Appellee Knutson’s Brief, and analyzed below, this broad “judicial capacity” scope and sweeping “analysis” was error.

 

 

Judges Bear the Burden of Proof on Immunity

Grazzini-Rucki asserted many of the challenges to judicial immunity as did California Coalition in its briefing before the Ninth Circuit.  California Coalition was pleased to join Grazzin-Rucki family in asserting those challenges in the Eight Circuit.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson Bears the Burden of Proving Immunity
Judge Knutson repeatedly asserts that Grazzini-Rucki “failed to raise” immunity issues in the district court.  See, e.g., Knutson Brf. p. 31, 34.  This is an improper attempt to shift onto plaintiff-appellant the burden of proving the affirmative defense of immunity, which rests solely with the party asserting it.  Fed.R. Civ.P. 8(c)(1);  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) (“An official seeking such immunity, however, must at the outset show that a “counterpart to the privilege he asserts” was recognized at common law in 1871, for “[w]here we have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.”).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that an official claiming an affirmative defense of immunity bears the burden to prove that 1871 common law immunized the function of each act accused in the complaint.  See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-340 (1986) (“Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.”); The Court “has for that reason been quite sparing in recognizing absolute immunity for state actors.”  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993).
 The “function” analysis considers only historical fact.  Malley at 342 (“We emphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law tradition.”); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (“Section 1983 immunities are ‘predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.’”).
Courts investigating the intent of the 1871 42nd Congress have examined accounts of 1871 social and legal systems from Nineteenth Century case law, legal treatises, and the congressional record.  The Supreme Court undertook this historical analysis most recently in Rehberg v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012), examining nineteenth century cases to determine that the function accused—testimony of a grand jury witness—enjoyed immunity at common law.  Id. at 1503-07.[5]
An officer’s failure to prove up a common law analog is dispositive of the issue regardless of countervailing policy considerations. Rehberg at 1502-03 (“We do not simply make our own judgment about the need for immunity. We have made it clear that it is not our role ‘to make a freewheeling policy choice,’ and that we do not have a license to create immunities based solely on our view of sound policy.”).  Granting an immunity absent this historical analysis is error.  Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974) (“These cases, in their present posture, present no occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity available to state executive officials.”). 
Neither the District Court Nor Judge Knutson Have Analyzed Historical Foundations for an Immunity of Accused Function
Judge Knutson proffered, and the district court undertook, no historical analysis of whether any of the two dozen functions accused in the Amended Complaint were functions that enjoyed judicial immunity at common law in 1871.  The district court’s sweeping Order proclaimed that Judge Knutson’s “case management, his signing of orders, the substance of his orders, and the trial proceeding” were all taken in a “judicial capacity.”  Order p 33.  The district court reached this conclusion finding only that (1) “Judge Knutson has not interacted with Plaintiff outside of his courtroom or his judicial chambers” and (2) “the underlying family law case was within [his] jurisdictional authority.  Order p. 33.  On these purported findings, the district court found Judge Knutson acted in a “judicial capacity” and was thus immune.  Id.
Analyzed below, this broad-brush “judicial capacity” scope and summary analysis fails to “affirmatively state” the defense, which was exclusively Judge Knutson’s burden.  Fed.R. Civ.P. 8(c); Rehberg, supra.
The District Court Extended Immunity Based On Factors Not Relevant to Judicial Immunity
The district judge applied a “judicial capacity” scope of immunity that was far broader than that provided in controlling Supreme Court authority.  Immunity does not depend on the act or actor, but on the nature of the accused act.  Sparkman at 362.  Immunity may exist only if the accused act is both (1) “judicial in nature” and (2) within statutory subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  The first “Judicial in nature” factor in turn depends on (a) “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,” and (b) “the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”  Id.  Not all official or authorized acts of a judge are “judicial acts”—judges also perform administrative, ministerial, or other types of acts that are not entitled to judicial immunity.  See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (firing court employees could be performed by administrator and thus not “judicial”).
The test to distinguish between “judicial” and other types of acts is to analyze whether the act can only be performed by a judge.  See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340 (1879) (selection of jurors could be performed by administrator, thus not “judicial”); Forrester, supra; Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993) (court reporters “part of judicial function” yet not absolutely immune).  Absolute immunity is justified because judicial acts—and only judicial acts—are subject to standardized, scrutinized proceedings, restrained by principles of law, and are subject to appellate review.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n. 4 (1967).  Because judicial acts are subject to such safeguards, the Supreme Court has justified relieving the actors from liability for civil money damages.  Id.

 

Administrative Behaviors of a Judge in Assigning Cases Are Not Immune

Judge Knutson also asserted that his administrative or ministerial behaviors in Family Court case assignments was an immune “judicial act” simply because he was a judge.  Grazzini-Rucki and California Coalition analyzed abundant law demonstrating that even though an administrative act is authorized or performed by a judge, the administrative act is not converted into a judicial act.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson’s Administrative Behavior in Assigning Himself to Certain Cases is Not Immune

The district court’s high-level “analysis” that Judge Knutson’s “case management” and “trial proceedings” extended immunity far beyond Sparkman’s scope of immunity to include behaviors which are clearly not judicial acts.  As one example, Judge Knutson’s “case management” behaviors in assigning all Grazzini-Rucki cases, including all future cases with third parties, and those with the State of Minnesota,  to himself is clearly an administrative act because it cannot be reviewed on appeal, is not subject to law, is conducted in private before parties are even aware of a judge, and may be performed by administrators as well as judges.
     The cases cited by Judge Knutson support Appellant’s conclusion.  Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986)[6] relied on Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 305 (5th Cir. 1980) (extending absolute immunity for “jurisdictional authority to appoint and supervise court reporters.”).  In both cases the “jurisdictional authority” was a statutory grant of administrative authority—not jurisdiction.[7]  Parent v. New York, 786 F. Supp. 2d 516, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) also drew authority from Matinez’s (moot) holding.  “The assignment of cases and issuance of consolidation orders are judicial functions normally performed by, and statutorily reserved to, Judge Lippman. See [statute] giving Chief Judge and Chief Administrator the authority to assign judges to judicial terms and parts. . . .”  Parent at 532 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Parent’s holding is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s judicial act jurisprudence.  The fact that the “Chief Administrator” function happened to be performed by a judge does not convert the “administrator” function to a judicial one—nothing in the New York statute prohibits a non-judge from undertaking the role of “chief administrator”, meaning that, like juror selection, it is an act that may be performed by a non-judge, and thus not a judicial act.  See Ex Parte Virginia, supra.  A “Chief Administrator’s” assignment process is ministerial—the only “function” is to follow the assignment procedure.  Failure to abide the ministerial process is not an appealable event.  A judge or administrator is not applying law to facts.  The process is not highly scrutinized.  As such, Parent reached its holding on analysis inconstant with controlling Supreme Court authority, and is error.
Similarly, in Zahl v. Kosovsky, No. 08 CIV. 8308 LTS THK, 2011 WL 779784 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011) the district court considered a claim for immunity of a judge who allegedly “manipulated the assignment system to take control of Plaintiff’s case . . . .”   According to the district court in Zahl, the plaintiff “cite[ed] no relevant authority in support of his conclusory assertions that such actions vitiated Justice Diamond’s jurisdiction to handle his case, and the Court has found none.”  Id. at *9.  The Zahl plaintiff apparently failed to identify any of the abundant relevant authorities including Ex Parte Virginia, Forrester, and Antoine, supra, which provide means to distinguish non-appealable acts of administrators from appealable acts only judges may perform.  Moreover, like the district court and Judge Knutson, the Zahl court improperly placed the burden of proving immunity on the Plaintiff rather than the official.  Malley at 339.
Zahl also erroneously relied on language in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) instructing courts to construe subject matter jurisdiction (the second element of Sparkman’s two-element immunity test) broadly.  Zahl at *9. Sparkman’s instruction does not apply to the first “judicial act” element.  Sparkman at 362.  As above, the Supreme Court has been “quite sparing” in extending immunity under the judicial act element of the test.  Buckley at 269.  Zahl also focused analysis on failure to recuse when faced with motion identifying conflict of interest.  Id.  Ruling on a motion is an act which only a judge “normally” performs, and thus falls within Sparkman’s “judicial act” scope.
Bracci v. Becker, No. 1:11-CV-1473 MAD/RFT, 2013 WL 123810, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013) aff’d, 568 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2014) is derived from Martinez, Parent, and Zahl and is error for the same reasons.  Further, in Bracci the plaintiff’s accused Judge Mulvey’s (a “chief administrative judge”) failure to remove Judge Becker (the trial judge) form the case, making Bracci more of a recusal case.  Like Zahl, recusal requires ruling on a motion—a judicial act.
In both cases the courts found what they (incorrectly) identified as “jurisdiction” based on statutes authorizing judges—as well as non-judge administrators—to assign cases.  Statutory empowerment goes to Sparkman’s second “within the jurisdiction” element of the immunity test—but is insufficient to satisfy the first, “judicial act” element.  Sparkman, supra.[8]  Judge Knutson repeats the error.  Knutson Brf. at 29-30 (citations to Billingsley and Duty).
Judge Knutson’s reliance on Hardy v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., No. 93 C 1348, 1993 WL 85750, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1993) is misplaced.  Hardy erroneously analyzed judicial acts under the test for prosecutorial immunity.  Hardy cited Imbler v. Pachtman, applying the “intimately related with the judicial phase of the criminal process” standard.  Id. at *2.  Hardy failed to cite or analyze under judicial immunity precedents including Sparkman, Pierson, Bradley, or Randall.  Judges do not perform prosecutorial function, and thus the immunity of a judge is lost if she performs such functions.   Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1236 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding judge performing functions of a prosecutor not entitled to either judicial or prosecutorial immunity).
Finally, none of the authority relied on by Judge Knutson analyzed the critical test—whether the function of assigning cases was a judicial act at 1871 common law.  Absent such analysis, the authority is error.  Rehberg, supra.

 

A Judge Working with a Psychologist in Child Custody Proceedings Is Not Performing a “Judicial Act” and is Thus Not Immune

Judge Knutson followed the modern trend of Family Court judges to wander far afield from traditional judicial functions—in his case performing what he called a “listening session” to “further” the children’s psychotherapy.  It was because of Judge Knutson’s harsh commands at the “listening session” that the Grazzini-Rucki children ran away.  California Coalition assisted Ms. MacDonald in formulating arguments that disproved Judge Knutson’s claim to immunity for working with a psychologist in the custody setting.  From the brief:

Judge Knutson’s “Listening” Psychotherapy Session with the Grazzini-Rucki Children is Not a Judicial Act

 Judge Knutson concedes he conducted a “listening session” with the five Grazzini-Rucki children “for the sole purpose” of facilitating psychotherapy of the children —complying with a “request from a court-appointed therapist for a structured family meeting.”[9]  During this psychotherapy session Judge Knutson harshly reprimanded and the children.  Days later two of them ran away from their home and have not been seen since.[10]
Following Rehberg, the district court should have analyzed whether the function of psychotherapy performed at the “listening session” was an immune function at 1871 common law.  Rehberg at 1503. The district court’s failure conduct this historical inquiry is error sufficient to reverse.  Scheuer at 249-50 (1974).
If the district court had conducted appropriate inquiry, it would find no tradition for psychotherapy function at 1871 common law.  Given that psychotherapy is a function developed in the twentieth century, and is only legally performed by licensed psychologists,[11] it would seem unlikely that Judge Knutson could identify an 1871 common law immunity for his psychotherapy behavior.
Other courts considering the question have found no immunity for psychologists (Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no “firmly rooted tradition” of immunity for functions performed by private psychiatrists employed by prison)).  See also Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under § 1983.  This all assumes, of course, that “social workers” (at least as we now understand the term) even existed in 1871. If that assumption is false, the argument for granting absolute immunity becomes (at least) more difficult to maintain.”).
Further, the history of psychologists in the divorce industry demonstrates such functions are late twentieth century innovations.  “Family Courts” are a creation of the 1970s after the 1966 California Report on the Governor’s Commission on the Family.  L. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective 63 Or. L. Rev. 649, 667 (1984).  The function of “psychologist-as-judge” custody evaluator was unknown to a divorce courtroom until the mid-1990s “as the supply of psychologists continued to increase and stricter third-party payer regimens were imposed for mental health treatment (Gould, 2006). [C]ustody evaluation services generally are neither highly regulated nor institutionalized, but rather may be characterized as a cottage industry (Schepard, 2005).” Robert F. Kelly, Sarah H. Ramsey, Child Custody Evaluations: The Need for Systems-Level Outcome Assessments, 47 Fam. Ct. Rev. 286, 291 (2009).
Finally, it is unlikely that the district court could have identified any function of a family court—including “listening sessions,” “therapy”, “reconciliation,” custody evaluations, or otherwise—existed at 1871 common law because in 1871 no civil judicial tribunal possessed jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, or child custody.  “It is elementary that in the early history of jurisprudence in England the common law courts exercised no jurisdiction over divorce cases, jurisdiction in such matters resting entirely with the ecclesiastical courts of the realm.” Peterson v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 239, 246 (1918).  See also Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law and Contemp. Prob. 226, 234 (1975).

 

 Modern Family Court Jurisdiction Is Inferior; If It Has Immunity It is Extremely Narrow

 Knutson’s Brief speciously asserts that general jurisdiction includes jurisdiction over “family law matters.” [12]Family court jurisdiction is incontrovertibly inferior because it is specific.  Minn. Stat. 518.  Many courts recognize family courts as inferior tribunals.  Family Court “in a dissolution proceeding is a court of limited jurisdiction.”  King v. State Educ. Dep’t, 182 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.1999); People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Family Court not a “court of competent jurisdiction” for Rooker-Feldman analysis).
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868) describes the limited scope of immunity for “inferior courts”: Judges exercising limited jurisdiction were immune for acts within the limited jurisdiction, and could be liable for civil damages for acts in excess of their jurisdiction, and for acts done “maliciously or corruptly.”  Randall at 531. [13]  While Judge Knuston bears the burden of demonstrating modern family court functions enjoyed any immunity at 1871 common law, in no case will he achieve an immunity scope greater than an 1871 inferior court; for judicial acts within their jurisdiction not done “maliciously or corruptly.”  Id.
Judge Knutson’s Assertion of Broad Immunity Lacks Authority
Judge Knutson asserts: “Acts and orders related to overseeing a family law case, including orders requiring therapy and efforts to facilitate it, are acts inherently judicial in nature.”  Knutson Brf. p. 35.  His authority does not support this proposition.
Judge Knutson cites Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1448 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated by Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991).  Myers was the first case in this Circuit to consider the 1976 decision of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).  Imbler was the seminal Supreme Court case extending prosecutorial immunity under Section 1983 to acts of “the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State.”  Id. at 431 n. 33.  The Court recognized that its general description was broad, and could potentially encompass administrative acts as well as prosecutorial acts, yet declined to provide a more precise definition:  “At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them.”  Id.
Myers picked up where Imbler left off, analyzing several acts by Scott County Prosecuting Attorney R. Kathleen Morris which fell within Imbler’s broad range of potentially-immune acts.  Meyers at 1449.  Myers extended a generous scope of immunity to every function of Ms. Morris that plaintiffs accused, including “her role in the initiation of criminal proceedings against them and her handling of evidentiary material.”  Id.  These several functions included investigation, advising police, interviewing children, and advocacy for the state during the criminal proceeding.  Id. at 1446-1452.
Meyers’ limited immunity incorrectly, drawing a line between pre-charging and post-charging phases.  Today post-charging investigative, administrative, administrative, and enforcement functions are not immune.  See, e.g, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).  Myers correctly limited prosecutorial immunity to criminal proceedings.  Meyers at 1452.  Myers also recognized that absolute immunity would not extend to enforcement or investigative functions in “approv[ing] or direct[ing] the removal of children from their homes upon the arrest of one or both parents.”  Id. at n. 11.[14]
Judge Knutson claim Myers immunizes “family law judges to work with experts to determine the care provided to children in custody and applying judicial immunity to that work.”  Knutson Brf. at 35.  This is incorrect.  Myers involved a criminal prosecution, not “family law judges.”  Myers at 1452 .  Myers did not involve Minnesota laws regarding “best interests,” nor a judge or psychologist determining “best interests”—but criminal prosecution.  Moreover, Myers expressly recognized that investigative functions such as the “listening session” in which Dr. Gilbertson and Judge Knutson “the session was held for the sole purpose of facilitating therapy…” are not prosecutorial. [15] Myers did not extend immunity to psychotherapy.
Judge Knutson finally claims—citing no authority—that “sealing the transcript of the session” was a judicial act.  The record indicates the opposite—that Judge Knutson was not undertaking the listening session pursuant to any order.  Having no relationship to any judicial act, the transcript—and its sealing—cannot be converted into one.

 

 The District Court’s “Judicial Capacity” Scope Relied on Elements Not Relevant To Judicial Immunity

The district judge’s sweeping analysis of the dozens of acts accused focused on a single fact that Judge Knutsen interacted with Grazinni-Rucki inside of his courtroom.  Order at 33.  Judge Knutson repeats the error.  Knutson Brf. p. 31.
The location of an accused act is not relevant to Sparkman’s two-factor test, which focusses on function regardless of location.  For example, Sparkman favorably cited Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974), which held that physically evicting a litigant from a courtroom is not an act “of a judicial nature.”  Sparkman at 370, fn. 10.  Justice White also cited a Sixth Circuit decision, Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970), holding that a county judge who had a plaintiff “forcibly removed” from a “fiscal court” and jailed was not immune.  Id.  See also Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981) (child support enforcement proceeding inside of courtroom and chambers not immune); Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (physical assault outside of courtroom held immune).  Location of the act was one of the four-factor “debris” elements from McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972) which Justice White “cast aside” in distilling Sparkman’s “cogent two-part test.”  Harper at 857.[16]

 

 The District Court’s Reliance on Pierson v. Ray and Stump v. Sparkman Was Error

 Section 1983 Does Not Require Proof of Malicious or Corrupt Intent
The district court cited the seminal judicial immunity case, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), in connection with its holding that Judge Knutson is immune even if he acted “maliciously or corruptly.”  Order at 33.  Appellant did not—and need not—assert that Judge Knutson acted “maliciously or corruptly.”  Appellant asserts merely that he acted to deprive of constitutional rights.   Section 1983 does not require an allegation of specific intent, including malice or corruption, but only general intent to perform the act causing the deprivation of a constitutional right.  Monell at 685; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 232 (1970).  Malice and corruption were relevant in defeating common law immunities for common law torts.  Section 1983 was enacted to supplement common law tort liability—it turns on a “strict liability” standard, requiring no proof of intent.  IdSee also n. 22, infra (comment of Representative David A. Clark).
Pierson and Sparkman Erroneously Extended Common Law Immunity to Civil Rights Liability
 Pierson and Sparkman stand in error for exceeding the judicial power vested in United States courts under Article III of the United States Constitution.  In deciding Pierson and Sparkman, the Supreme Court construed Section 1983 to find an immunity which is not present on—and entirely inconsistent with—the face of the strict liability statute.   Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665-94 (1978)  Yet Section 1983 is not a subject for statutory interpretation; clearer language has likely never emerged from Congress.  Id.; see also Monroe at 185-191.
Instead of examining the unambiguous statute, Chief Justice Warren in Pierson instructs us to examine congressional intent, which Chief Justice Warren claims does not indicate an intent to abrogate the common law immunities of a judge.  “The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities . . . .  The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established [as the speech and debate privilege], and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.”  Pierson at 554-555 (1967).
The “presumption” is as worthy as any speculation.  It overlooks the most obvious evidence of congressional intent—the unambiguous language of the statute itself.  Moreover, actual analysis of the congressional record, and history of judicial immunity reveals Chief Justice Warren’s presumption is simply wrong.
Pierson Incorrectly Analyzed Legislative Privilege Rather Than Judicial Immunity
In Pierson Chief Justice Warren “presumed” that “the immunity of judges” was “equally well established” as the legislative privilege.  Remarkably, in presuming, he failed to conduct analysis of the common law of judicial immunity—citing only to Bradley’s (post-Civil Rights Act) holding and Scott v. Stansfield, 3 Law Reports, Exchequer, 220.[17]   Pierson at 554.  Despite having on hand the meticulous historical analysis of nineteenth century common law and the 42nd Congress’ legislative intent provided by Justice Douglas in 1961’s Monroe v. Pape decision, Chief Justice Warren’s 1967 opinion ignored it.
Dissenting, Justice Douglas—the author of Monroe—did draw from his prior historical analysis of common law and the congressional record to the Civil Rights Act, reaching a forceful conclusion: “The Court’s ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions.”  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Similar rich analyses and enlivened opinions are evident in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665-94 (1978); Pulliam at 529-544; Sparkman at 368 (Stewart, J., Powell, J., dissenting), Dykes v. Hoseman, 776 F.2d 942, 954 (11th Cir.  1985) (Hatchett, J, dissenting) (“[T]he en banc court holds that judicial immunity is complete, unqualified, and without exception . . .  As the majority concedes, no precedent, Supreme Court or otherwise, requires such a broad definition and application of the judicial immunity doctrine.  [N]o policy considerations justify such a result. . . .  Judges . . . will be able to deal willy nilly with the rights of citizens without having to account for willful unconstitutional actions.”).
Instead of analyzing judicial immunity, Justice Warren adopted analysis of legislative privilege from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).  In Tenney Justice Frankfurter considered whether a California legislative committee conducting a contempt proceeding against a man circulating a flyer protesting the committee was immune from an action under Section 1983.  Id. at 377.   The question was whether a common law “speech or debate” privilege protecting lawmaking activity could be extended to a lawmaker’s behavior in conducting the contempt hearing.  Id.
Justice Frankfurter traced the history of English common law preserving legislative speech or debate privilege as derivative of liberty—an extension of the voters’ freedom of speech and conscience.  Id. at 372-73.  Protection of “speech or debate” was necessary to prohibit the English King and his aristocracy from persecuting members of Parliament making laws unfavorable to the then-ruling class.  Justice Frankfurter aligned the English speech liberty with the federal “speech or debate” analog in the United States Constitution at Article I, Sec. 6, cl. 1.[18] Like Chief Justice Warren, Justice Frankfurter presumed—analyzing no legislative history—that the 42nd Congress would not have intended to limit any state’s legislative activity in enacting the 1871 Civil Rights Act because Congress was itself a “staunch advocate of legislative freedom.”  Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
Tenney justified extending the speech or debate liberty to the committee hearing function because legislators are directly-elected and immediately accountable to voters.  Id. at 378.  Tenney also held the narrow immunity was lost if “there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.”  Id.
Judicial Immunity is the Opposite of Legislative Privilege—Judges Are Sovereigns Possessing Not “Rights” but Delegated Authority
 Judicial authority and legislative freedom are night and day.  Judges exercise jurisdiction as sovereigns—not liberties from sovereigns.  While judges have all the rights of any citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge possesses no rights.  “First and Fourteenth Amendments restrain “only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).  “[T]he censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). There is no need for a judge to express opinions, experiences, or desires of her own or those she represents to create law—he/she is given law.  [19]Other than necessary for faithful adjudication, a judge’s “freedom of conscience” is irrelevant to judicial function—relevant “conscience” is given in the form of law that has matured through free debate elsewhere. County Judges do not function as a body, and (should) have no one to “debate.”  The United States and State of Minnesota constitutions do not extend a speech or debate privilege to the judiciary because courts are not empowered to speak or debate.  The function of a judge is to adjudicate—apply the given law to properly-admitted facts.  Judges are not representatives of voters, but independent of electoral will, passion, and accountability. There is no need to protect a judge’s “speech” other than to preserve the judge’s ability to pronounce adjudication—merely a “substantial state interest”[20] that must yield to Minnesota’s “fundamental law”—citizen rights such as remedy,[21] due process, equal protection, speech, and association.  See Theide v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 226-27, 14 NW 2d 400, 406 (1944) (forcibly removing woman and children from their home in sub-zero weather by the town sheriff and forced to return to their “legal settlement” in another town for the purpose of obtaining poor relief violated “fundamental law”[22] despite consistency with state law.).  Minnesota courts may not construe statutes contrary to citizen rights under the “fundamental law.”  See T. Flemming, J. Norby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist, 7 Hamline L.Rev. 194 (1984).
 The long history of preservation of legislative speech and debate—a fundamental liberty—is entirely absent from the history of judicial immunity.  See Monell at 665-94; Pierson (Douglas, J. dissenting); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (“Indeed, as the Court also indicated in Monroe v. Pape, supra, the legislative history indicates that there is no absolute immunity”); Pulliam at 540 (1984) (“every Member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be liable under § 1983”).  There being no “judicial speech” liberty in 1871, there is no reason to “presume” that the 1871 Congress would have seen need to expressly abrogate a tradition that has never existed.
Far from tradition, the “hoary doctrine of judicial immunity”[23] is expropriation.  Tenney’s “presumption” was a modest stretch of liberty over the border with sovereignty to protect the functions of elected representatives of the people.  Pierson’s adoption of Tenney’s stretch to protect sovereigns of the people was a full-force embezzlement of liberty.  Deployed today to exonerate sovereign county judges in their oppression of those in whom liberty is vested by the fundamental law, Pierson’s manufacture of judicial immunity is—in perspective—nothing short of a third American revolution.
Congress Expressly Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity
            Nor can Chief Justice Warren’s “presumption” withstand the incontrovertible record—The 1871 Congress repeatedly expressed intent that the Civil Rights Act would abrogate judicial immunity.  Congress adopted the language of Section 1983 from its criminal analog—the 1866 Civil Rights Act, today codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).[24]  Section 1983 was introduced by Ohio Representative Shellabarger, who explained his bill on the House floor by referencing Section 2 of the 1866 Act: “that section provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for . . . ”[25]  The Acts thus “must be construed as in pari materia”—any construction of the 1871 Act must admit congressional intent in enacting the 1866 Act.  Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
On that record it is incontrovertible that the 42nd Congress affirmatively rejected common law judicial immunity.
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the States than permit it to invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded.
 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (1866) (remarks of Representative Lawrence).  The 1866 Act was vetoed by President Johnson because it abrogated common law judicial immunity.[26]  In the fight to defeat the veto, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Trumbull expressed revulsion at the entire concept of judicial immunity: “It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched.”[27]
            Section 1 of the 1871 Act (now Section 1983) passed rapidly through Congress because debate wasn’t necessary—Congress recognized Section 1 as merely “adding” a civil remedy to the 1866 Act.  Debate instead focused on section 2 of the bill (modernly Section 1985) because of concerns over federalism and regulation of private behavior.  Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
            The recorded debate demonstrates unequivocally that Congress intended to abrogate common law judicial immunity:
[T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out the demands of the legislature which elected them-powers which, almost without exception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard to law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous violations, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscrupulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of parties in this country or any other.
 Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1871) (remarks of Representative Platt).
What is to be the case of a judge? . . . Is that State judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in an action?  … It is the language of the bill: for there is no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be used.
Id. (remarks of Senator Thurman).
“[T]he judge of a State court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in the Federal Court and subject to damages for his decision against a suitor, however honest and conscientious that decision may be . . .”
Id. (remarks of Representative Lewis).  Representative Arthur recognized the law would be a drastic reversal of common law immunity:
Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts …. Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability . . . .  Under the provisions of this section every judge in the State court. . . will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him . . .”
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) 365-366.[28]
Courts considering parallel questions have deferred to this vivid record.  See, e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) (“But the privilege as we have stated was a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to wipe it out. We think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the Civil Rights Act sub judice intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated by that act and in fact did so . . . .  The statute must be deemed to include members of the state judiciary acting in official capacity.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 643 (1980) (“Nowhere in the debates, however, is there a suggestion that the common law excused a city from liability on account of the good faith of its authorized agents, much less an indication of a congressional intent to incorporate such an immunity into the Civil Rights Act”); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543 (1984).
Far from an intent to incorporate common law judicial immunity, Congress in passing both Acts specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the monumental evil of state-sponsored oppression jeopardizing our nation’s existence by precipitating civil warfare.[29]

 

“The devastation caused by Minnesota Family Courts may be even more abominable than what we have  seen in California, Florida, Connecticut, and throughout the nation” says Colbern Stuart, President of California Coalition.  “Ms. Grazzin-Rucki’s family was so severely abused by Minnesota Family Courts that the children simply couldn’t withstand the turmoil.  Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s and her children’s tragedy shows how atrociously incompetent and downright criminal American Family Courts have become despite handling delicate family matters, and why Family Court must immediately cease its disastrous experiment with family well-being” says Stuart.

California Coalition is passing along Ms. Grazzini-Rucki’s and Ms. MacDonald’s request to assist in locating the Grazzini-Rucki children–if you have any information about their whereabouts, please visit www.Missingkids.com to learn how to help.

With briefing on these critical family court immunity issues now ongoing in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, Family Courts are facing more pressure than they’ve ever before experienced.  WeightierMatter will be posting regular updates of both cases.

 

Footnotes:

[1] Sparkman at 368 (Stewart, J. dissenting).

[2]  “[T]o no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”  Magna Carta (1215); “[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (quoting William M. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *23).

[3] Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365 (2011)

[4] “Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action.” Bradley at 348.

[5] Similar historical analyses are apparent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-85 (1961); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 703 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-62 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under § 1983; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).  See also Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no “firmly rooted tradition” of immunity for function of a private psychiatrist employed by prison).

[6] Martinez is abrogated law “mooted” by abandonment of the appeal.  Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986).

[7]  Rheuark relied on Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (5th Cir.) opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled by Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Under Texas [statutory] law trial judges select their court reporters, who thereafter serve during the pleasure of the judge.”  Sparks affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision denying immunity to co-conspirators.  Dissenters in the Sparks en banc decision relied heavily on Slavin.  The Supreme Court’s affirmation in Sparks abrogates Slavin.

[8] A simple example is that the Chief Justice of the United States is authorized by law to serve as the Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.  20 U.S.C. § 76cc. Such authorization does not convert such service to a judicial act.  See, e.g., Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (1970) (“A judge does not cease to be a judge when he undertakes to chair a PTA meeting, but, of course, he does not bring judicial immunity to that forum, either.”)  Id. at 820 (cited favorably in Sparkman at 370 n. 10).

[9] Opening Brief of Appellant’s, APP 124

[10] APP COA -291

[11] Minn. Stat 148.88, Psychology Practice Act. Also see Minn. Admin. Rules 7200

[12] Knutson’s Brief page 21

[13] This distinction was recognized in Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978), fn. 7.  See also Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1868) (“In reference to judges of limited and inferior authority, it has been held that they are protected only when they act within their jurisdiction.”); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson 282, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) 1810 WL 1044, aff’d, 1811 WL 1445 (1811) (“[T]he judges of the king’s superior courts of general jurisdiction were not liable to answer personally for their errors in judgment. . . .  [W]ith respect to the inferior courts, it was only while they act within their jurisdiction.”); Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315, 327 (1804).  See also 1871 comments of Representative Arthur, infra, describing common law immunity: “Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts …. Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability . . . .  “

[14] Specific to family issues, the Meyers plaintiffs accused “us[ing] the interviews [of children] to coerce perjured statements from young and vulnerable witnesses” in a criminal investigation and “initiat[ing] neglect proceedings in the family court on behalf of the Scott County Human Services Department [and] sign[ing] and approv[ing] the neglect petitions.”  Id. at 1450.  Because these functions are “functionally comparable to prosecutor’s initiation of the judicial process,” this Court extended absolute immunity.  Id. at 1452.

[15] Appellants’ Brf, APP 125

[16] All of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuit authority derived from McAlester’s four-part test is error after Sparkman.  See, e.g., Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir.  1985); Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1985); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986), and dozens of authority-in-error relying thereon.

[17] Analyzed in Bradley at n. 16.  “[A] judge of a county court was sued for slander, and he put in a plea that the words complained of were spoken by him in his capacity as such judge, while sitting in his court, and trying a cause in which the plaintiff was defendant.”

[18] That privilege is narrow: “The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”  The privilege is against arrest—not civil liability—does not extend to felonies or treason, or “breach of the peace”— a misdemeanor.  Arrest outside of “Session” is permitted, and members maybe “questioned” for activity other than “speech or debate.”  Tenney at 377 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (false imprisonment not privileged); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).  Even so limited Jefferson was fearful of the power it gave legislators.  Tenney at 375.  Hamilton was not so fearful of “the least dangerous branch”—because it exercised no similar liberty. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (1788).

[19] See Separation of powers Minn. Const. Art 3, sec 1.

[20] Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991).

[21] Minnesota Constitution, Article 1. sec. 8 provides:

Redress of injuries or wrongs.

Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.

[22] “The entire social and political structure of America rests upon the cornerstone that all men have certain rights which are inherent and inalienable.  Among these are the right to be protected in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the right to acquire, possess and enjoy property; and the right to establish a home and family relations—all under equal and impartial laws which govern the whole community and each member thereof… The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific enumeration thereof in State Constitutions.”  Theide at 226-27, 14 NW 2d at 406.

[23] See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 337 (1969) (“Yale Note”).

[24] See also Yale Note at 327-328.

[25] Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871); Yale Note at 327.

[26] Yale Note at 327.

[27] Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull); Yale Note at 328.

[28] See also Yale Note at 328 and references to additional consistent comments in n. 38.  “On three occasions during the debates, legislators explicitly stated that judges would be liable under the [1871] Act.  No one denied the statements.”  “In sum, the question of congressional intent seems relatively clear: there was no universal acceptance of the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only legislative history available supports the proposition that Congress intended Section 1983 to cover judges.”  Yale Note at 328. Yale Note’s 1969 author left open the door that “the legislative history does not preclude entirely the Court’s construction of the statute if the policy reasons for judicial immunity are sufficiently persuasive.”  That “policy reasons” door was closed eleven years later in Malley.

[29] Congress’ intent to hold judges accountable is recorded as recently as 1979 by the 96th Congress:

[Section 1983] is an essential element of an extraordinary series of congressional enactments that transformed the relationship between the Federal Government and its constituent parts.  [T]he very purpose of the 1983 was to interpose the Federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s Federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of State law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.

Statement of Representative David A. Clarke, Chairperson, Committee on Judiciary, Government of the District of Columbia on the  Act of Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284, PL 170 LH, 1st Sess. (Dec. 29, 1979) (emphasis added).

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CENSORSHIP IS A CRIME, AND SO IS THE “AS IS PHILOSOPHY” THAT ANYONE WOULD USE TO JUSTIFY IT IN COMMITTING SUCH A CRIME AND HIGH TREASON, AMONG OTHER THINGS.

1) CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS BLOG AND AUTHOR IS NOT A LAWYER, ATTORNEY, PARALEGAL, LEGAL PRACTITIONER, OR ADVOCATE, THUS, NONE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS POST COULD POSSIBLY BE USED AS LEGAL ADVICE.  IT IS EXPLICITLY NOT THE INTENT.  ONE WOULD, HYPOTHETICALLY, USE AT ONE’S OWN RISK AND PERIL IN REALITY.

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Emily Joy Lake: Interstate Child Protective Services Fraud and Abuse Case


Educate-Yourself
The Freedom of Knowledge, The Power of Thought ©

Emily Joy Lake:
Interstate Child Protective Services Fraud and Abuse CaseBy Susan Detlefsen <motherinterrupted@motherinterrupted.us>
http://educate-yourself.org/cn/susandetlefsenupdatesonemilylake20agu05.shtml
August 20, 2005http://www.motherinterrupted.us/Emily.htmOn Wednesday, August 17, Portland Judge Nan G. Waller (Nan.G.Waller@state.or.us) ordered Emily Lake to be sent to Michigan citing the uniform commercial code (UCC) which proves, does it not, that Emily is an item for income?Someone pointed out UCC refers rather to the uniform child protection act, but I’m not sure of that yet. Anyway, the point is, Emily was ordered sent back to Michigan. However, I just spoke with Roger Weidner who says Judge Waller has not yet signed the order, and that Lynnae Lake stayed down in Salem last night to keep fighting for her daughter through the Oregon Supreme Court.In spite of irrefutable evidence of fraud, collusion and outright lies, Portland Judge Nan Waller, without ever hearing from Emily Lake, ordered her to be turned over to Michigan authorities.Emily’s mother, Lynnae Lake <annewhite2005@hotmail.com>, had a visit with Emily on Monday, and stated, for the record, that her daughter told her she had been asked to withhold information about the CPS strategy from her mother, that she had been offered various gifts for her cooperation. In spite of this, Emily told her mother that she had been crying for her and asked when she could come home to her mother.

Emily told her mother during the Monday visit that her eyes were hurting her, but that DHS refused to take her to the hospital or to see a doctor.

Emily’s so-called attorney Lynn Haxton declined to speak on Emily’s behalf, and since Emily was not there, I asked Judge Waller if I could read a letter from Emily. “I object” was the only thing I heard Paxton say during the hearing. She objected to anyone communicating anything from Emily to the court. Why? Because she is involved in criminal racketeering, fraud and child exploitation.

One of the court watchers present today agreed to be the principal plaintiff in a lawsuit against Ms. Paxton for failure to represent Emily Lake, and for violating her right to safety and to a permanent home, with the mother she has lived with since birth, except for the period when Emily was 4 years old and she had been snatched and put in foster care by Michigan CPS–which is the reason Emily and her mom left Michigan in the first place.

“Dear Susan, My name is MJ (Emily apparently became aware of the underground nature of her existence here in Oregon and made up a name for herself, as her mother had done). I am a child between the age of 7 and 10. CPS is chasing us. We had to leave our home. I heard you are trying to stop CPS. Please help us too by telling people we want to go home. I want this to end. Love, MJ” This was the letter I received from Emily back in February when I started getting to know her and her mom, whom I knew as “Anne”. The letter, as well as some of Emily’s artwork, were left with Judge Waller to go into Emily Lake’s Oregon file.

Lisa Kaufman, Ms. Lake’s court-appointed attorney, did a pretty good job arguing her case, and fighting to have Emily released. She pointed out the community Emily had developed around her since moving to Oregon, as evidenced by the number of Emily’s supporters present in the courtroom. She cited various statutes pointing to the court’s obligation to look at Emily’s current situation and needs, and that the Michigan petition was not valid, since at the time it was served in Oregon, it was outdated.

In spite of all this, and overwhelming evidence, that no one in charge of Emily’s custody here, neither the attorney general (or district attorney) Springer, nor Emily’s caseworker, JD Devros, nor the girl’s own attorney, Lynn Haxton, have done anything to protect this child from abuse by Portland Police or medical neglect, in failing to have Emily seen by a doctor since she has been complaining about the pepper mace sprayed in her eyes.

Lynnae Lake left the Portland Juvenile Courthouse today for the federal building to try to get an injunction on Emily’s extradition back to Michigan.

August 17, 2005

Dear Emily,

I wanted you to know that [my daughter} and I came to try to say goodbye to you tonight. You were a bright light in my life while you were in Portland. I will never forget our trip to Mt. Hood, the Oregon Coast and the hike up to Multnomah Falls, and the evening I did all those different hairdos on you. I think I have photos of that somewhere.

I have your paintings, which are so precious to me. Thank you for leaving them with me.

Emily, if you don’t want me to have photos or paintings by you on my MotherInterrupted Web site, just tell me, and I will take them down. I want to hear that from you though, because many times I have received emails from CPS workers claiming to be “child x” wanting me to take down their Web page, then later I find out that the kid did not even know about the Web site until the state worker coerced them into agreeing to cooperate with scolding me about exposing their story. I am telling you this because you are old enough and smart enough to figure out what CPS is really all about, right?

I put this Web site up to let the world know what CPS is doing to all you kids, but your privacy is very important, so just let me know. I would need to hear directly from you before I take anything down, ok?

So many people are talking about you and your mom. I just got off the phone with Roger Brown, a renowned sociologist who has taken great interest in your case. He has proof that CPS is hurting kids like you by taking them from their parents.

You will be so proud of your mother someday. I wish you could have heard her today, and last Monday, taking on DHS, CPS, the district attorney and even the judge, in her fight to get them to let go of you. Your mother is still working on paperwork, right now. She is down in Salem, filing motions with the Oregon Supreme Court to try to get you back. She reminded me of a mama lion–and a very smart lion–going after a predator.

Alas, CPS is a very powerful institution, and it will take a good hard fight to get them to lay off the kids. My dream is to free the children someday of CPS.

I tried to leave a special teddy bear from Oregon for you to take back to Michigan, and one of your paintings I thought you might want to take with you as a souvenir of your time here in Portland. Of course, your captors would have nothing to do with me and ordered me to leave the building immediately. They don’t like me because I am telling the truth about what they are doing to kids and families.

Emily, I will miss you, little angel. Send me an email sometime.

Your friend forever,
MotherInterrupted
Emily in Oregon, February 2005, with “Sgt Pepper”.

See how “endangered” she was while in the custody of her mother in Oregon?

Emily is an artist. When she came to our house, Emily loved to use my water colors. I eventually gave her some water colors of her own. Here is my favorite painting by Emily.

One of my other favorites is the “pear people” painting, which is hanging across from my own giant pear painting, which I painted myself with a friend a couple years ago.

In February of 2005, Emily Lake and her mother “Anne” moved to Oregon to avoid being destroyed by Michigan CPS. I did not know the full details of their story until they were apprehended last Wednesday, August 10, 2005.

Monday, August 15, 2005: Emily finally gets a visit with her mom. Details of the visit are being kept confidential for now, so as not to compromise Emily and her mother’s case.

Monday, August 15, 2005: Lynae Lake challenges Michigan jurisdiction and makes a record of abuses against her and her daughter in Portland, Oregon

Today, at 1 p.m., after much confusion about whether or not there was going to be a hearing, Judge Nan Waller was put on speaker phone in Multnomah County Juvenile Court. Lynae Lake, aka Anne White, gave the most outstanding courtroom performance I have witnessed to date. I hope to put a full transcript of the hearing on my Web site.

Laying out the fraud behind the Michigan petition to take 9 year old Emily, and the pattern of retaliation against her for being an outspoken advocate for children’s rights in Michigan, Lynae Lake convinced those present that she is a loving, protective mother, and that she and her daughter were brutalized, on groundless charges and a groundless pick-up order for Emily, by Portland Police on August 10, 2005.

“You are violating my right to due process and you’re violating my daughter’s rights. Where is Emily? Why is she not here to speak for herself?”

95 year old Frances Weidner, mother of former prosecutor Roger Weidner, who had to be in Bend today and missed Emily’s hearing, spoke on behalf of Emily. “Where’s my Emily, where’s my princess?” Mrs. Weidner has been asking since Emily was violently kidnapped last Wednesday from the Weidner residence by Portland Police Sgt Charlie Brown. When she got up to the speaker phone, Mrs. Weidner addressed Judge Waller and all of us in the courtroom: “I told Emily, you’re going to be the Rose Festival Princess someday if you stay in Portland”.

When Emily’s mom pointed out that, until last Wednesday, Emily, who has been a resident of Oregon for over 6 months now, was leading a happy healthy life here in Portland and that she has many friends here, those of us there supporting the family spontaneously broke out in applause and cheers for Emily. We were clearly in contempt of court, though Judge Waller did nothing but listen. The court clerk, however, a nasty-tempered bureaucrat, apparently felt it necessary at that point to bring the guards in.

When it became clear that Judge Waller had apparently already made a decision about Emily prior to the hearing, Lynae protested: “this is just a play isn’t it? The script has already been written. This no hearing”. Judge Waller hesitated, then asked to have one of the attorneys look at the pick-up order for Emily. She asked for the expiration date, which stated “June 2005”. So, the only documentation that anyone had justifying anything that had happened to Emily and her mom since August 10, was expired.

Judge Waller set another hearing, for this Wednesday, August 17, at 11:00 a.m. to find out whether or not Michigan can renew their petition (which was based on fraud in the first place, as Lynae has already shown). Only Emily’s testimony can corroborate what the mother is saying.

For anyone reading this, please urge Judge Waller (Nan.G.Waller@state.or.us) to bring Emily into court Wednesday to speak on her own behalf.

When I questioned Emily’s attorney, Haxton, about this, she refused to answer any questions, and quickly stole out of the courtroom.

Dave Nyhoff is making calls to Michigan authorities to urge them not to renew any pick up order on this child

Before leaving the courtroom, Lynae Lake insisted Judge Waller set up a visit for her and her daughter. The visit was to take place this afternoon in Portland. This was a relief as some had been told Emily might have already been sent back to Michigan.

Please attend Emily’s next hearing this Wednesday:

Emily Joy Lake Hearing
August 17, 11 a.m.
Juvenile Court
1401 NE 68th
Portland, Oregon

August 15: Calls from Portland Police Complaint Department

I received several calls today from Officer Hess regarding reports of police brutality against 9 year old Emily Lake. He said so many people have called to complain, that a special investigator has been assigned. Please address your complaints regarding the August 10 brutalization of Emily Joy Lake to:

Judy Taylor, Portland Police, 503-823-0905

If you don’t feel that pepper spraying and threatening with attack dogs is a good way to “protect” children and keep them “safe” as DHS says they are doing when they have the police go take kids like Emily away from the parents who love and protect them naturally, let Ms. Taylor know about it.

Please read synopsis by Nancy Luckhurst, President of Children’s Rights Foundation from Michigan, and personal friend to Emily Lake and her mother:

“Right now I am in such shock and mental anguish over this I am going to have to get my barings a bit. This one is very personal to me. I know the story and it is not pretty and it was all started several years ago by the oldest daughter who wanted to live move in with a boyfriend. She got a case started and the children were put in the care of the father who never had any interest in them. He dumped them on an aunt. The abuses in that home were horrendous. The little one was only 5 at the time. The children in that home were allowed to torture that child. She loved to pretend she was a dog or cat as so many children of that age do. The family allowed the other children to put a dog collar and leash on her and force her to eat dog food out of a dish on the floor. That was only part of it. The mother won the children back. In the process she made worker Dan Rogalny of Midland Co look like the ass he is on the stand as I understand it. He has had it in for her ever since. When she left there was no order in place to pick up the children there was no warrant. CPS in Midland Co had made no contact with this mother what so ever prior to her leaving. I am getting information coming in I am going to be making contact with the people she was living with and make arrangements to get her computer. I know there is tons of information that is needed there to show these turkeys for what they are. Will Gaston has agreed to help with this endeavor. If you do not know who he is get Randy’s survivor Flyer and see his picture. Go on the net and read his story. It was is late wife who wrote the book so many in this advocacy work swear by, Sui Juris. Oh and as a note. I had an occasion to talk with little Emmy. She had met Will. She told me she had just met the “real Santa Claus”. When you see the picture you will understand.”
August 16 Letter from C Myrick of Vermont

Reading of how Emily Lake and her mother were treated is very distressing. It unsettles me to know that there are so many actors out there just “doing their job” for the corrupt who seem to run the show. How is this allowed to happen? There aren’t many actors in our government with any decency, morality and sense of justice–and where are they who “protect and serve”? They have their priorities mixed up, it is US they are to protect and serve, not corruption.

Do the right thing, protect this little girl and her mom. No matter what instigated this event, there is no excuse whatsoever to treat fellow human beings in this manner. Disgusting! Evil. Bring charges against all who played a part in this travesty. Reunite Lynnae and Emily at once.

For the future, we need to unite and agree to never, NEVER, elect members of the bar to legislative or executive branches of government (boycott lawyers from public office); don’t keep reelecting anyone but put new blood in offices, and most important–hold accountable the judiciary, visit http://www.jail4judges.org for further information.

C. Myrick
Vermont JIC

*****

August 14 Message from Will Gaston, A Voice for Children:

http://educate-yourself.org/cn/portalndpolicegestaporaid14aug05.shtml

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August 15: Letter to Portland Mayor Tom Potter from Charles Stewart

Mr Potter;

You seem possibly an honorable man. I do not say this to many public servants in our area. I read about you in the news-paper. You do seem to have a rare functional conscience.

My un-orthodox legal skills might be of assistance in your battles with the un-thinking robots. If his is of interest to you; please contact me. There is getting less middle-ground for the fence-sitters. Those who truly seek the betterment of the common people must learn to work together against those who subvert our fundamental state & national system of constitutional government. Otherwise all will be lost. The enemy is simply to powerful.

This is a copy of a complain I lodged to your Portland police bureau. I believe it is with-in your power to do something about these abuses.

Sincerely,

Charles Bruce, Stewart

*****

On behalf of: Emily Joy,Lake; Leanne Lake; Roger Weidner; & the People of the State of Oregon; State-Ex-Rel/Quo-Warranto Felony Kinaping & Assault Criminal-Complaint.

I do not know these officers names. I believe you-all know the case I am speaking of. My complaint is for criminal assault & kidnapping by these officers & all attorney bar-members who conspired to proceeded with lawless force against this mother & child.

From the testimony before me of these honorable people, I believe that these officers acted beyond their constitutionally-lawful authority to abuse this child & her mother.

I used to run the “Multnomah County Common-Law Court”; as Elected “Chief Justice” there-in.

Our court was shut down in large part by lawless cointelpro-style abuses from the rico/babylonian-whore bar-monopoly attorneys & judges & the seeming mk-ultra mind-controlled police-officers robotically enforcing constitutionally-lawless malum-prohibitum based codes & regulations. Your officers physically beat one of our juror/judges, one James Bleakley; & harassed us in many other ways; all under the conspiratorial direction of these private criminally syndicated bar monopoly members.

We were no threat to you. We need good constitutionally-recognizable “Law Enforcement” Officers; if you still have any.

But we were a threat tho that constitutionally-lawless rico lawyers bar monopoly. If the common people can break that monopoly on the administration of justice, those social parasites will have to go out & find honest work. There will be very little use for their statutory-schooled law-school education. Like vampires in the daylight, they will dry up and wither away.

From the testimony of trusted friends, I believe this complaint is well-founded, & i am trying to add extra weight to already registered complaints similar to this. I do this because i know there is much corruption on your offices; & I fear if I & others do not speak, it will get shuffled away & this will just be another abuse similar to Kesandra James Murder by the satanically-lawless criminal syndicate members whom I believe infest & terrorize your ranks.

Also; I live in fear that these abuses can happen to me or anyone. This is Not a Nazi Police-State where Goons with Guns & Badges can lawlessly abuse the rights of common peaceable people.

Roger Weidner or Wilbur Gaston can provide more details. I am assisting all of these people in trying to being Conscionable Justice & Constitutional Law (same thing) to this matter.

We all proceed in the name of & on behalf of the common -people of this state; as is our recognized right under Oregon’s Constitution at Article 1 Section 10 & in ORS 30.510; State-Ex-Rel/Quo-Warranto. A crime against one, is a crime against all. We are an organic body-politic. We fell the pain of our fellow patriotic constitutionalists; in every abuse you hurl against us.

Since you-all terrorized us into shutting down our common-law court; please ask the Multnomah County Court Administrator for a Courtroom where “We the People” can assemble a Jury with Functional Consciences & the brains to follow the fundamental principles under-lying constitutional “Due-Process of Law”; to lawfully adjudicate this Kidnapping & Assault complaint against your nazi goons; & to Lawfully resolve any lingering entanglements concerning this mother & daughter.

Surprise the common people of Oregon. Show some respect for Constitutionally-Recognizable “Law” for a crying change.

Your form demanded a zip code. We know the nazi judges take star-chamber style “silent judicial notice” that zip-code use means we have consented to be slaves. Take notice, we do Not “consent to be slaves”.

Call or email if you desire more details. Email is very good.

Charles Bruce; Stewart

*****

August 13: Letter from Nancy Luckhurst to Judge Waller

Dear Judge Waller.

I am writing this in support for Emily Lake and her mother Lynnae Lake. This mom is a one of the most dedicated Mom’s I have ever seen. Emily is such a delightful little girl, so bright and loving. The devotion they have for each other is so apparent to any one who spends any time with them at all. This story is long and all you are going to get here is a short synopsis but it should tell you there is something that does not meet the eye. Every I have seen the documentation and I know that as a former Real Estate agent I am personally taking the documentation of wrong doing by this ag toain the Michigan licensing board on Monday morning. This woman is scum. I know this story is going to look and sound really bizarre but don’t ever forget that old saying truth can be stranger than fiction. And this is definitely one of those cases. There is going to be a complete legislative investigation into the actions of people in the Midland Co DHS office and the adult daughters who conspired with a DHS worker just to mention a couple.

Lynnae’s only concern is her daughters well being and safety. She would literally give up her own life to keep this child safe. That little girls is so close to her mother it would be a horrible travesty of justice to separate them. There are children out here in this world who are being abused in so many on Godly ways. Emily Lake is not one of them by any stretch of the imagination.

As President of the Foundation for Children’s Rights our advocates work everyday with families who have been falsely accused of child abuse. The one thing we demand before an consideration to advocate for anyone is we must be given absolute documentation by the client to show they are not guilty of what they have been accused of. I know Ms. Lake has been protrayed as some kind of vicious child beating lunatic. Nothing could be farther from the truth in this case. I ask you as not only as an advocate but as the mother of 8 and the grandmother of 18 search your heart and look into the eyes of this little girl and please don’t run to judgment in this case. Please do not send Emily back to the State of Michigan where we know she was abused while in the care of the state in the prior case. I am sure you know how manipulative a teenager can be when they decide they want to do something not in their best interest. It is a parent’s duty to guide and prevent them from doing something harmful to themselves. If this is a crime then that is the crime for which this mother is guilty certainly not of abusing this angel child you have in the custody in Oregon.

Please read the synopsis that follows and search your heart and mind on this case.

Thank you so much for your time and concern in this very delicate matter.

Nancy Luckhurst
(989) 261-1200

Lynnae Lake, the mom, called me today from the Multnomah Co jail in OR. She informed me they did not resist when the police came. She was beaten unmercifully and chunks of hair were yanked out of her head. This happened after arriving at the Jail. The officer said if she didn’t like that he could rip her head off. She thinks her foot is broken. Both she and the child were pepper sprayed twice and the little girl Emily got the worst of it. The Portland city police took attack dogs with them. She has not to this moment been given her rights. She has not been arraigned. She has not been officially arrested. She has requested a prisoners handbook and a complaint form and has been refused both. She has not had any medical treatment for her wounds. Are they waiting for the bruises to go away first.

She was told they were not going to hold her she was going to be let go no charges. Oh but wait then the Judge in Midland Co Michigan decided he wanted her held on a fugitive warrant.

This woman left this state one year ago with her daughter had not been contacted by DHS/CPS prior to leaving. There was not a case open that she knew of, there was no warrant. The worker entered a private school without a warrant, without a court order and interview her older daughter against orders left with the school office and placed in the school records. This has already been tested in the Federal courts it is a big NO NO. The mother arrived to pick her children up on the last day of school and was warned by a school employee that CPS was interviewing her teen age daughter. It falls under the 4th ammendment of our little used U.S. Constitution. Also there is a another amendment not often used by our the various states DHS offices it is called the 14th ammendment which covers due process. Oh but there is so much more.

There is so much more to this mother’s story. Her oldest daughter now married made a CPS complaint 4 years ago. The children were removed and were place with the father who left them with an aunt. The children there in that house tortured poor little Emily. They were allowed to put a dog collar on her and force her to eat dog food out of a dish on the floor. When Mom was again awarded custody of her family she was one child short. You see the oldest had been placed in Independent living in an apartment with her boyfriend. That is exactly what the Mom had been arguing about with this kid. Ok the kid got her way paid for by the state of Michigan with Federal Title IV funds. In other words the State of Michigan sanctioned a minor living with a member of the opposite sex against the mother’s wishes. Isn’t that special. Fast forward 3 years to 2004 and the exact same thing happened. This was the second in line a 17 year old who had met some guy online she has never met and is going to move in with him and live happily ever after. We have the e-mails to prove this folks. So over a 3-5 month period the oldest daughter who is by now married and the middle sister have decided to cook up a story and don’t forget they now know how to play the system. So after planning this, oh and did I forget to mention in these e-mails back and forth between the sisters there is mentioned a Dan R who is the worker who works for Midland Co CPS who is coaching them in how to put the story together so it will fly so he can take the the middle girl and the youngest girl, our little angel Emily.

Folks there is so much more to this story that you would not believe. There is the mysterious circumstances surrounding the sequestering of this woman’s terminally ill mother by a half sister and not letting other family members know where she was. Right after this happened the Will which covered a Million dollar estate was amended. Then the mother was placed on hospice with the half sister who just happens to be a nurse being the care taker. Upon the mother’s death the mother’s body is taken to a funeral home in South Haven MI with strict orders to the Director that no one is allowed to see the body. Anne was not supposed to be notified of her mother’s death. She did find out and called the funeral home and the Director told her he would let her and her sister and brother see the body if they would like to. The went to be with their mother.

After Anne left with her little girl Emily. She had asked her fiancee to please stay and care for her house. But all of a sudden he is served with eviction papers from a real estate woman Dana K. Maier, who had by the way bought several of the mother’s pieces of property in the past. She listed herself as Agent for the landlord and listed as reasons for the eviction he owed $10800 in back rent. And the house was inhabitable, but she was not the agent for anyone. In fact the statements were all lies. Anne had nothing to do with this woman. But her half sister Eileen Pearson of 1422 Homecrest in Kalamazoo did lots of business with this woman as administrator of her mothers affairs.

On December 7th 2004 Eileen Pearson the half sister contacted the Midland city assessors office and some how got them to change the address on the tax statement for Anne’s house to come to her address in Kalamazoo. When someone checked on this fact with the assessor’s office just recently it was found the address had been changed back (again by Eileen Pearson) but the website did not reflect that. How ever when Anne checked the website in April the address for the tax statement was hers. So that is a real puzzle. HMMM did the Midland City assessor back date that for some reason? oh yes that’s right this would nulify anne’s homestead property tax exemption wouldn’t it causing her taxes to be much higher and she would lose her house to the state of Michigan if she can’t pay the taxes. Gee is the loving half sister planning a little hostile take over of her home. Let’s see it has been reported by people looking after the house that a window in the front door has been broken out and now boarded up. the window next to that was then broken out and lights left on. But mysteriously now in the last few weeks it is discovered there is not electricity on but Consumers didn’t turn it off. And all the fuses are fine. This has just happened. Three lawnmowers have been stolen out of a shed one is a rider and the little girls trampoline is no longer there. Someone is still dumping junk and other materials on the land across the street in the flood plain and wetlands with no permit that has been an ongoing problem for years. This has been turned in by the way to DEQ in Lansing. This property is prime bottom land of the Tittibawassee River. The City of Midland has wanted it for years. The City along with Pomranky Construction has tried to get her off that land for about 20 years. She has been told she should give it to the City and she just needs to go away. It is all the poor woman got out of a Million dollar estate for God’s sake. The house is worth nothing but the land is worth a ton to the City or Pomranky who want to excavate the topsoil from it to sell to the City. That is valuable land. Not done yet folks. Some time in March or April of 2003 Anne who was working for a non profit as a bookeeper discovered there was something wrong with some of the accounts. She discovered there was money missing from some of the accounts controlled by the Director of the organization. She had not yet determined how much but it was in the 1000s. She finally collared the Director and after a bit the woman admitted she had made “some private loans to some people” Anne turned this in to the Board of Directors and the Michgan AGs office. For her efforts she was fired just one week before the whole CPS mess came down. She says the AGs office was starting an investigation but they would probably not be able to finish it without her being able to give them pertinent information after she left. The Director is still the Director of this organization and Anne was warned by other people within the organization this woman would not be above turning her in to CPS with false allegations.

So now as Paul Harvey would say you have the rest of the story. OH one last thing Anne’s name is really Lynnae Lake. Loving mother of Emily Joy Lake a beautiful angel child, who has never ever been abused by her mother but she has been abused by the State of Michigan DHS/CPS.

Dear God in heaven wil someone please help this woman and that beautiful baby. The mother had taught her that our organization would always help if something ever happened to her and to call us. Yesterday she called. That tiny little frightened voice was pleading with me to please help them. Then the mother came on the line. She was petrified. She knew there were there for her and little Emmy. I could hear the child in the background as the police were banging on windows screaming for them to come out. They were cowering in the basement. Then the phone went dead. A little later the phone rang and a man asked if I was Nancy. I said yes. He said he had a rather plucky little girl there who was demanding that he take my number and call me. The man is J.D. Devros Supervisor for CPS in Multnomah County. He asked if I would talk to her. What a silly question. He set the phone on speaker. And there was that tiny frightened little voice again begging for my help. Well folks now I am begging for your help. Don’t allow this outrageous sham to go on any longer. Hold the people who are responsible for their actions now. Go to the following link and scroll down until you come upon the face of that little angel. Look at her and tell her NO you will not help right now to expose the corruption of what has happened in Midland County Michigan. She is alone in a foster home in Portland Oregon. Wondering if her mom is Ok and wondering if anyone is ever going to help her?

http://www.fcr4kids.org/

http://groups-beta.google.com/group/national_fcr

http://groups-beta.google.com/group/Indiana-Foundation-for-Childrens-Rights

http://groups-beta-google.com/group/Michigan-Foundation-for-Childrens-Rights

Permanent termination of parental rights has been described as “the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.” In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45, 54. Therefore, parents “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.” Id.

Advocates for those falsely accused of child abuse and neglect. Statistics show children are 10 times more likely to be abused and and neglected in foster care and 6 times more likely to die than in the general population. National Clearing House for Child Abuse and Neglect. Reform Child Protective Services NOW.

URGENT:UPDATE they have changed the hearing as of Friday 5 pm PST to Monday at 1 pm whether the attorneys can come or not

*****

August 13: Open Letter from Leonard Henderson on Emily and Lynae Lake:
http://familyrights.us/news/archive/2005/aug/lake/

August 12, 2005: Letter from Lynae Lake <annewhite2005@hotmail.com>

To all of you that know me as Anne I first want to thank each and everyone of you for your prayers. For those that came out to the hearing and especially ***************** as I know this must have been extremely painful for her to go into court once again. Please keep praying as Emily is still in custody and I have not been able to find a way to communicate with her.

The horror and trauma that poor girl went through while the police threatened us to get bit by the attack dogs and tasered. They never called out one name nor identified who they were after. They tried to snatch her while she was outside on her bike and I was inside making lunch.

There were 12 police officers here and I had at least 5 on me for most of the time that I was in their custody. Emily had a couple on her too. As you know Emily was sprayed not once but twice by the pepper spray which literally burns your skin off and can blind you. I turned a shower on immediately for her to rinse and the police kept turning it off. I cried out she was a child for God’s sake and then they sprayed us again.

However I was not ever placed under arrest nor given in any way shape or form my rights (Miranda) they had no charge until late yesterday and that was custodial interference. Once I arrived at jail they beat and threatened me numerous times one screaming obscenities at me while he was ripping out my hair. (I told them they were all under arrest – lot of good that did me but I did)

I can’t tell you any more about Emily except she was throwing up from the pepper spray. Screaming for them not to hurt me. Crying and crying for her mama. (the cops were mad because she told them they were police and she didn’t trust them) and of course made her watch as they dragged me to the car and drove off.

The 95 year old lady I take care of also had to witness all this. She has dementia but this has so traumatized her. She goes around saying “this is a nightmare I am living – why would the police take Emily” “something has to be done how do we get Emily back?”and calling out for Emily her princess. This is 3 days later so you tell me. She also is concerned that the police are coming for her next.

What I did find out Thursday was that Emily had been allowed to call Nancy Luckhurst President of Foundation for Children’s Rights. She is also supposed to be at the new shelter hearing on Wed.

I am covered with bruises. I was beaten severely in jail both men and women. Just on walking into the jail very peacefully the one officer said “oh she got pepper sprayed – we got lots more here”

Another officer thought it was cute to watch me go to the bathroom and even commented on he liked the show and didn’t take much to entertain him.

I was for almost 24 hours moved from isolation cell to isolation cell. I repeatedly asked for the inmate manual which is the rules that prisoners and officers must abide by. I requested medical treatment for the injuries but was only asked if I was on any current medication (I was asked that repeatedly like they were sure I was supposed to be on something!).

At about 1 pm Thursday 11, all of a sudden they got really nice saying I had only a $500 bond to post – but lied when I asked about it being paid by credit card. They said no cash or money order only. Then said the judge my bond me out on my own. Arrainment was set for sometime after 2PM – surprisngly the same time as the shelter hearing I was not noticed for.

My guess is they did not count on the people showing up for my arrainment or the 20 people that went to the shelter hearing and testified on behalf of Emily and I. I thank God for each and everyone of them.

While I was waiting I was suddenly told I was released there was no charges pending but it would take a couple of hours. Now understand they had just started the arrainments and the men go first. At 1:30 the officer said I am being released on a no-complaint. That means no charges – period. She told that to Nancy Luckhurst who I had just gotten on the phone.

It would take a couple of hours to process me out.

Well I asked about the shelter hearing – how could I have possibly have known about that I said there were people waiting upstairs for me and there were people waiting over for a hearing that I was not noticed for and that was illegal.

Then 2 hours goes by and I am called off to one side to be told there was good news and bad news I was not going to be charged but I was not going to be released, a fugitive warrant was NOW out for me. I think this was also done to see how I would react I said oh o k .

ALL bogus and after the fact. So there were not ever any charges, I was just being kidnapped which is what I told them.

Now I’m taken (after strip search – my how fun) to a real jail cell this one is covered in food and I am not allowed to clean it up.

This morning I got told there was no warrant and I would be out in a few hours. However prior to being let out I now need to talk to a psychiatrist. I think I have b been hoaxed again and am now going to be stuffed in the looney bin. Oh yes and now I am finally given complaint forms and the inmates manual that I have been asking for from the instant I got there.

So now I sit and stew for a few more hours wondering at what cruel joke is going to happen now. So I begin to read the manual. Of which a bunch of things were violated and I found out I had been lied to about the bail a credit card would have done it..

But I did get released.

I got home to find that there were some people in the house and they took everything of value that I had including the $75 that belonged to Emily because she earned it. Over the summer she had earned over $130 of which she was so proud.

Some of what is gone is all the computer equipment that had all my legal docs on and all of a particular website I had been working on.

The attorney I have been assigned is out until Monday. Now the hearing is Monday instead of Wednesday so guess who will not be able to speak with the attorney? Also the attorney assistant says Emily WILL be going back to MI – does this sound PRE-DETERMINED???

PLEASE KEEP US IN YOUR PRAYERS – WE NEED ALL OF THEM AT THIS TIME

Lynae Lake <annewhite2005@hotmail.com>

*****

August 12, 2005

Mom is out she is at the home she was taken from. She is not in very good shape and tonight they are taking videos of the injuries. She was never allowed medical treatment and in 48 hours they did not feed her. they did ask her this morning if she wanted anything. The conditions were so bad where she was at she said she would no have eaten anything in there.. This is just outrageous. The kept moving her from one islolation cell to another and each got worse. She was never advised of her rights she was never charged. Michigan says they are not going to pay to extradite her.

*****

August 12, 2005 Letter to Oregon Judge Nan Waller from Lynae Lake <annewhite2005@hotmail.com>

The hearing held on Thursday was held improperly. I have not been noticed as required by law. And continue to not be noticed as required by law.

The underhanded changing of a hearing set for Weds Aug 17 to Mon Aug 15 with NO NOTICE and no oportunity to meet with the child’s attorney or the attorney appointed to me.

Also I question the legality of any attorney representing me in my absence when it would be perfectly possible to have me present. My whereabouts were certainly known.

I was contacted 5:05PM on Friday Aug 12 after all offices and agency office would be closed to be told about the case after making repeated calls to an office of my supposed attorney.

The court is fully aware that this attorney can not be met with prior to the court hearing. The Court knows that there is no possible way that this case can be prepared for thereby denying Emily and I our due process rights.

Because the police refused to present any warrant of valid court order I question the legality of the home invasion and molestation of Emily and I where Emily was PEPPER SPRAYED 2x ,threatened by attack dogs and a taser. The show of force went so over and and above reason to execute a supposed pickup order on a 9 year old child that my child was placed in real danger of her life from the Portland City police. The mental anguish and pure terror was clearly exhibited by my child is inconsistent with the safety and best interest of the child.

Once the adrenalin rush of the attack got started it was mob rule and not the actions of a professional police force.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said it best, “The government’s interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse, but also protecting children’s interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents.”

Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999).

“There is something bad happening to our children in family courts today that is causing them more harm than drugs, more harm than crime and even more harm than child molestation.” Judge Watson L. White, Superior Court Judge, Cobb County , Georgia

The mere possibility or risk of danger does not constitute an emergency or exigent circumstance that would justify a forced warrantless entry and a warrantless seizure of a child. Hurlman v. Rice, (2nd Cir. 1991)

The decision of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found that this practice, i.e. the “no prior consent” interview of a child, will ordinarily constitute a “clear violation” of the constitutional rights of parents under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. According to the Court, the investigative interview of a child constitutes a “search and seizure” and, when conducted on private property without “consent, a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances,” such an interview is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the rights of the parent, child, and, possibly the owner of the private property

“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subject to the rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the law. It invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy. U.S. v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Justice Brandeis.

The forced separation of parent from child, even for a short time, represents a serious infringement upon the rights of both. J.B. v. Washington county, 10th Cir. (1997) Parent’s interest is of “the highest order.” And the court recognizes “the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials.” Thomason v. Scan Volunteer Services, Inc., 8th Cir. (1996)

Children have standing to sue for their removal after they reach the age of majority. Parents also have legal standing to sue if CPS violated their 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Children have a Constitutional right to live with their parents without government interference. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 7th Cir. (2000) A child has a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship and society of his or her parents. Ward v. San Jose, 9th Cir. (1992) State employees who withhold a child from her family infringe on the family’s liberty of familial association. K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 7th Cir. (1990)

The 95 year old woman that I care for has been so traumatized by the event and the loss of a 2 critical members of her home. She alternately looks for Emily who is her “princess” and talks about the police removing her. She can’t not stop talking about it and falling to her knees to pray. Her mental anguish is acute. As her caregiver this situation has caused severe mental abuse to a fragile and ill elderly woman.

Lynae Lake <annewhite2005@hotmail.com>

*****

Susan Detlefsen’s August 12, 2005 Letter to Judge Waller, et al

Judge Waller, Judge Allen, attorneys general, others concerned regarding
Emily Joy Lake, DOB 8/31/95:

Emily has been residing in Oregon 6 months, as of August 11, 2005. She is now a resident. Do not send Emily Lake to Michigan without a full hearing on the matter of residency, jurisdiction and parental fitness. Emily also has the right to have a voice in what is going to happen to her.

I understand the hearing which was set for next Wednesday has not been moved up to Monday, which does not give the mom enough time to prepare her case. The court is closed and so it is impossible to file any motions or paperwork.

I saw the recent photo of Emily sent by her mother. There are lots of photos, some videos, and artwork by Emily, which all demonstrate Emily’s well-being while in her mother’s care here. Do not run this little girl roughshod through your court. Give her a fair chance. She is very attached to her mother and, according to everything I ever heard Emily say, has no wish to live anywhere except with her mother. She is afraid of the police and CPS and of going back to foster care where she was abused.

I am the mother of *************, who, as Emily’s mom pointed out, was at Emily’s hearing Thursday. She also left a card for Emily with Mr. Devros, which I hope DHS will not be allowed to confiscate, as they often do with things that belong to children, but which might contradict their agenda of severing the child’s ties with those who care about him/her. I also left a card for Emily, letting her know that I, and others, are thinking of her and doing what we can to help her and her mother through this traumatic time.

Please protect Emily Lake by keeping her here in Oregon long enough for an investigation into what is truly in her best interest.

Susan Detlefsen
Amicus curiae for Emily Lake and Lynae Lake

*****

August 13, 2005 Letters to DHS Caseworker Jeremy Devros

Mr. Devros,

It is not like Emily not to contact her mother, or those she knows care about her and her mom. Have you given her the cards from myself and my daughter as you said you would, or are you keeping little Emily isolated from the outside world? We are watching, and I am forwarding this to the judge.

Susan Detlefsen 503-239-9901

——– Original Message ——–
Subject: RE: Emily Lake
From: “Anne White” <annewhite2005@hotmail.com>
Date: Sat, August 13, 2005 2:36 am
To: Jeremy.D.Devros@state.or.us

I accidently hit send without including the contact information again 503-232-6691

I want to repeat that I am gravely concerned for Emily’s well being. Also that she know how many people love her and are invovled for her. Tell her Mimi sends her love and misses her terribly. She has been unconsolable without her princess.

Of course it goes without saying that I want her to be given my love and that I am praying for her safety and her safe return to her mother where she belongs.

I will update this page as often as I can, hopefully once daily at least until Oregon case is settled. Email MotherInterrupted for more information on how to help this family.

Children’s Bill of Rights


Children’s Bill of Rights… for Real Americans

1.  CHildren deserve to see both their mommy and their daddy whenever they want;

 

2.  children should be able to call the parent who they are not with to hear their voice and to say i love you, and hear it back whenever they want in their free time in a peaceful manner, especially on holidays, birthdays, and on special occasions;

 

3.  children deserve to hear that they are loved by both parents every day, especially by the other parent, no matter what;

 

4.  children deserve to be free from stress inflicted onto one parent by the other, because it is contagious!;

5.  children deserve to have pictures of both of their parents and both families for comfort wherever they are, and to remind them that they are still a part of the other family;

 

6.  children should feel that their parents made them out of love, no matter what the situation;

 

7.  CHildren should never be made to feel like a burden on either parent or their families, and should feel at home with both of them without guilt, shame, or being told to choose sides by the other parent and/or his or her family;

 

8.  Children should always be told good things about the other parent because every child was made from both of them and deserves to feel good about who they are and where they come from;

 

9.  children should never be told that they have to forget about the other parent who they also love, or be forbidden to speak about the other parent and their family;

 

10.  children deserve to not be held hostage by one parent and kept away from the other parent;

11.  children deserve not to have the police and “protective” services called on one of their parents by another, and on the present and impressionable child, for the purposes of harassment and/or legal strategy and abuse, or to shame and humiliate the other parent in front of the child;

 

12.  Children deserve to be told the truth by both of their parents, and to also be encouraged to tell the truth and to never lie by omission, especially when someone could be harmed;

 

13.  children should be encouraged to develop their own special talents, even if they have them in common with one parent;

 

14.  children should not be treated as pawns in a chess game, but rather as the gifts from god that they are…a prayer not yet known that was answered until his or her parents met and helped to create he or she;

 

15.  children should be free to discuss whatever they want to discuss without fearing the wrath of the other parent when the other parent is not questioning or interrogating them or using them as a messenger, but rather is truly interested in the child’s growth and development when not around;

 

16.  children should not have to fear going to the other parent’s home if the child got a bump or a scratch on the playground while roughhousing with other children or when he or she trips and falls in the ordinary course of play as a small child whose coordination is not yet fully developed because the other parent might take him or her to the doctor and blame the other parent;

 

17.  children deserve not to be taken to counselors to elicit false testimony  or enticed to aid and abet an angry and vindictive parent and his new family in their trouble-making against his or her own mommy or daddy;

 

18.  children deserve to make their own decision when they have reached maturity as to whether or not they want to “terminate parental rights” with either parent, which is not even possible since our lives our not ours to give and take away, anyway, as our rights are natural and divine, from our creator, our real father;

 

19.  children deserve to have both parents participate in their education and extra-curricular activities, and to have both parents be able to give them a hug them and tuck them into bed at night in their respective homes, and to be able to read them a story after bath time and to say prayers;

 

20.  children deserve to always have the door left open to having an affectionate bond and relationship with the other parent from whom they were born, as they need, not as the other parent controls or he himself (or herself)needs or desires for selfish reasons;

 

21.  children especially deserve, at the very minimum, not to be told that their other parent is bad or that something is wrong with them in actions or in words by the other parent and his or her family;

 

22.  all children deserve their real, natural mommies and daddies who love them more than anyone else ever could on this earth;

 

23.  children should never have to see their parent in a juvenile jail called “supervised ‘visitation,'” and should never be deprived of a parent who cannot afford to “pay” to see their own “child” whose physical property is his or her own child which was born from the mother’s womb, her fertility and pro-creativity manifested in the form of life,…the most fundamental and highest form of expression and divine privilege, for such a horrific situation would be child abuse and intentional degradation and stalking–violence–against the other parent, the child, and against the “peace and dignity of all involved and of the ‘state;'”

 

24.  children of divorce are entitled to be free from any sense of pressure from either parent or relatives to act as informants for the other parent or the other parent’s family (grandparents included);

 

25.  children are entitled to have both parents notified in the case of emergencies immediately;

 

26.  children are entitled to have both parents notified of important, commemorative events and milestones, games, tournaments, doctor’s and dentist’s appointments, and celebrations and vacations, and to be notified of accurate location and phone numbers if traveling far from home;

 

27.  children are entitled to both parents’ help with homework and special projects for school, church, or otherwise;

 

28.  children are entitled to both parents who refrain from forcing the child to take sides against another parent;

 

29.  children are entitled to send and receive (unopened) letters and correspondence  from both parents at their home;

 

30. children are entitled to give and to receive gifts and presents (including photographs, from both parents and both sides of the family, including pictures;

 

31.  children are entitled to attend special occasions with both parents such as weddings, family picnics/reunions, company picnics for families, birthday parties, anniversaries, award ceremonies to a reasonable degree without having the other parent negotiate or condition a “yes” upon that parent receiving something in return;

 

32. children and both parents are entitled to receive and preserve child’s artwork from school, especially in the primary school years;

 

33.  children are entitled to bring their toys and books, shoes, socks, pajamas, blankets, comfort items; any medication, sunblock, accessories, clothes, homework, and movies to both parents’ homes with the expectation that they will be consistently returned promptly with the child;

 

34.  children are entitled to send both parents birthday and christmas cards and school and sports pictures without the other parent sending them back marked “return to sender;”

 

35.  children are entitled to not have the government interfere in their’s or their parents’ lives when no crime or abuse has been committed;

 

36.  both children and their parents are entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy at all times, including from the other parent’s family, espionage, threat of spying or stalking, actual stalking, and private investigators and custody evaluators or counselors without the other parent’s full and sufficient informed and voluntary consent absent “punishment” being unconstitutional;

 

37. children are entitled to respect both parents and their values, morals, religious beliefs, habits, appearance, lifestyle, and schedules;

 

38.  children are entitled to be free from threats by one parent about another, including with regard to child support and jail time or police or protective services;

 

39.  children are entitled to regular nutritious meals within the budget of the parent with whom they are with at the time;

 

40.  children are entitled to not have another parent’s boyfriend or girlfriend or new spouse and/or their family forced upon them and told to lie to their other parent, or to lie by omission (even though not being interrogated by the other parent as children like to talk to their parents about their feelings and things they do and learn);

 

41.  children are entitled to be free from their parent’s money troubles should or when they exist;

 

42.  children are entitled to have both parents present for their birthdays (including the other parent’s family so long as they are not agitating or investigating in anticipation of vexatious and frivolous, harassing litigation and legal abuse);

 

43.  children are entitled not to have to watch their other parent be entrapped, coerced, or otherwise forced into uncomfortable situations involving unexpected and completely unknown parties or drivers;

 

44.  children are entitled to have parents who listen to one another’s concerns regarding the child’s health, quality of medical care and education, friends, choices, growth, development, personality, religious activities, and socialization;

 

45.  children are entitled to be returned to the other parent as regularly or previously scheduled, expected, and/or agreed upon at the agreed upon place and time absent private investigators, police officers, evaluators, unexpected guests to include hostile family members or “apaths,” process servers, counselors, or lawyers;

 

46.  children are entitled to drug and alcohol free environments with both parents (including visitors and spouses or paramours);

 

47.  children are entitled to have maximal time spent one-on-one and to be of quality and substance with both parents;

 

48. children are entitled to not have games or extra-curricular events or commitments scheduled during the other parent’s time with child;

 

49.  both children and their parents are entitled to reasonable and timely notice and confirmation if and when either parent will not be exercising “visitation” or will be exercising “visitation” if it has not been regular and consistent in a manner that is accessible to the parent and free of schemes or artifice to falsely document against the other parent things as they are not;

 

50.  children are entitled to not be secreted at the homes of one parent’s relatives or friends, and to not be left with babysitters during that parent’s quality time with child;

 

51.  children are entitled to choose to stay home with the parent who will be home instead of out socializing or attending business functions without the child;

 

52.  children are entitled to be able to call their friends with both parents, regardless of where their friends live (within reason and at reasonable times and hours);

 

53.  children are entitled to not be made to feel guilty about one parent’s actions or inactions on the other or of either parent;

 

54.  children are entitled to not be retaliated against by one parent for looking or acting more like the other parent or for talking about them in a positive manner;

 

55.  children are entitled to reasonable notice well in advance that either parent will be moving and to where, when, and with who, as are both parents of child;

 

56.  children are entitled to reasonable make-up time with both parents when parent(s) have mandatory work obligations that support child’s lifestyle and pays the bills for child during that parent’s “scheduled” “visitation;”

 

57.  children are entitled to not be around family members, relatives, friends, and/or spouses or girl/boy-friends with negative attitudes about the other parent, and to especially not hear derogatory comments made, implied, or assumed around child;

 

58.  children are entitled to have both parents at school functions at the same time, and to meet with the teacher to discuss issues that may affect child in both homes;

 

59.  children are entitled to not have one or both parents going behind the other’s back and slandering or colluding to harm or antagonize or make false reports of child abuse or neglect about the other parent;

 

60.  children are entitled to not be enticed against the other parent or living situation or interference with “visitation;”

 

61.  children are entitled to discuss their feelings about their health, mental or emotional state, activities, teachers, classes, friends, family members, grades, behavior, and appropriate reaction to parent’s relationship or non-relationship with both parents so long as they are not being solicited by one parent to use against the other;

 

62.  children are entitled to be free from the rage or open hostility of one parent regarding the other and the other side of the child’s family;

 

63.  children are entitled at least to frequent and continuing contact with both parents without one parent or both criticizing the other’s situation or manner of living or financial, work, social status, or personality even where different from the other parent;

 

64.  children are entitled to peace and quiet at both parent’s homes, and to not be bullied by other children in a home with a mixed or blended family;

 

65.  children are entitled to two consistently honest and trustworthy, reliable, supportive parents who will show them unconditional love and demonstrate civility and kindness and compassion for the other parent and his or her situation, financial or otherwise.

parents who disagree that this is ideal, whether it is the current situation or not, and no matter how far from it their current situation is, nevertheless, probably are the problem and the sociopath with narcissistic personality and control,  honesty, trust, cruel treatment, culturally disabled, personality-impaired, intellectually challenged, inferiority and superiority complexes, abuse, disciplinary, abnormal, marginal, criminal, malicious, retaliatory,  reliability, moral, Dietary, vanity, mental, emotional, dysfunctional, generally,  behavioral, familial, relationship-impaired, toxic, rage, chronic stress, maniacal, psychotic, antisocial, addictive, compulsive, self-loathing, self-sabotaging, self-destructive, co-dependent, smoking, avoidance-pattern, adrenal fatigue, low-testosterone, high-blood pressure, chronic pain, hypochondria, generally defective character, maladjusted, spoiled/indulged “Mamma’s boy” or “Daddy’s little princess” cognitive, perceptive, and sexually deviant, stubborn, over-sexed in one or both directions, or even multiple (?), overly-competitive, attachment, impulse-control, monogamy, adrenaline, vitamin or nutrient deficient, spiritually void, pain-pleasure fixated, ambition, ethical, drive states, hormonal, grandiose, intolerant, judgmental, linear, racial, obsession with conformity and acceptance, sleep, sports-addicted, video-game addicted, strip-club and related addictions, internet addictions, compulsive gambling, gaming,  confrontation, coping, low self-monitoring, non-actualized, identity, maturity, idealism, anger, self-esteem, selfish, and sobriety ISSUES!