CORRUPT JUDGES


 

Revolting Judges

by Dr. Carl Bernofsky

Fearful of a growing backlash from the public against arbitrary, prejudiced, and even malicious judgments that are protected by judicial immunity, judges have banded together under government sponsorship to devise means of defending themselves from aggrieved and increasingly militant pro-se litigants.

 
Continuing Education Credit Prejudices Judges
JUNE WISNIEWSKI
     My name is June Wisniewski. I live in Reno, Nevada, about two miles from the National Judicial College, the non-profit organization that trains judges, and grew up in Linden, New Jersey.
     Here is John Boyle, the judge who went on Fox News twice and talked about my case,In the Matter of Joseph Wisniewski, Sr., Docket No. J-1733. Judge John Boyle called me a quack, a loser, and a mental case, but admitted that I had money due and owning me in a civil case.
     On another videotape, Boyle stated that his father introduced him to the Mafia when he was twelve years old, and made sure that he did not have his picture taken with any Mafia leader. Boyle went into detail on how money was confiscated from poor persons, and stated that the Mafia was all about the money, and not about the fellowship.
     Judge John M. Boyle accepted a bribe in the case, In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Wisniewski, Sr., and fradulently concealed over $140,000 improperly paid to the attorney, Walter A. Kipp, of Rutherford, NJ. Boyle arranged with the Administrator of the estate, Joe Wisniewski, Jr., of McLean, VA, and his attorney, Kipp, to substitute $250,000 worth of bogus, bankrupt, junk bonds that were not part of my father’s estate instead of cash or actual assets. The State of New Jersey supports the fradulent concealment of estate assets in selected cases.http://judicialterrorism.blogspot.com/2009/07/here-is-judge-who-went-on-fox-news.html
      This book, along with Dealing With Common Law Courts: A Model Curriculum for Judges and Court Staff, published in 1997 by NCSC, was developed from an Institute for Course Management (ICM) course on dealing with common law courts, held in Scottsdale, Arizona, February 5-7, 1997.

     The curriculum and manuals for this course were prepared with a grant from the State Justice Institute: Award No. SJI-96-02B-B-159, “The Rise of Common Law Courts in the United States: An Examination of the Movement, the Potential Impact on the Judiciary, and How the States Could Respond.

     The State Justice Institute (SJI) is a non-profit, 501C(3) corporation that was started in 1986 and funded by Congress to develop courses and training manuals for state courts and judicial training organizations.This course and training manuals were developed by a group of 27 judges, court clerks, court administrators, and prosecutors in Arizona who examined the history and procedures of the Common Law Court Movement (CLC) and created the training curriculum and responses that courts, judges, and court administrators can use when dealing with common law courts in their own jurisdictions.

     My contact at the conference said that one of its goals was to identify ways the courts can make preemptive strikes against the CLC movement.Some of the keynote speakers who helped produce the CLC course in Arizona were Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of Columbus, Ohio, T.C. Brown of Columbus, Ohio (a reporter for theCleveland Plain Dealer), and Jonathan Mozzochi, Executive Director of the Coalition for Human Dignity in Seattle, Washington. Mozzochi, who distributed Guns and Gavels, a publication of the Coalition, was listed as “a nationally recognized expert on militias and hate group activity.”

     The Coalition is like a west coast version of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC).I originally found out about this course by watching a videotaped session of the 1996 combined conference of the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA), held in Nashville, Tennessee in the summer of 1996 and called “Impact of the Common Law Court Movement on the Courts.”

     More than 50 state supreme court justices and state court administrators attended the Tennessee conference. The CLC session was taped with a grant from SJI. Keynote speakers were Michael Reynolds, senior intelligence analyst for the SPLC, and James Reynolds, chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, U.S. Department of Justice.

     The panel discussion included Susan Hansen, senior reporter with American Lawyer, Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Moyer (past president of CCJ), Utah Supreme Court Justice Michael Zimmerman, and Judges Jeffrey Langton and Gregory Mohr from Montana.

     The taped session was more than three hours long. At the end of the session, one of the speakers mentioned that there was funding for additional CLC conferences. I immediately called ICM, located at NCSC in Virginia, and asked about the additional CLC conferences. My contact told me that a Scottsdale conference was going to take place in about three days. Since those two conferences, there have been additional conferences sponsored by SJI with other organizations.

     SJI sponsored a conference with the American Judicature Society in Scottsdale, Arizona in November, 1999 that was closed to the public and the press. There will also be an ICM course in Orlando, Florida on February 5-7, 2001 called “Increasing Access to Justice for pro-se Litigants,” with that organization’s perception of what “access” means.

     “Constitutionalists in Court” was held in the St. Paul-Minneapolis, Minnesota area in the summer of 2000 by the National Judicial College (NJC) of Reno, Nevada, and the same course was held again November 13-14, 2000, also at NJC in Reno. This course discusses the history of protest movements affecting the judiciary, identifies typical challenges and ways to handle them, anticipates courtroom security needs, and plans solutions and strategies.

     NJC, together with the University of Nevada, Reno (UNR), conducted a survey, developed material for their courses from SJI materials and grants, and published a brief report called “Right-Wing Extremist Challenges to the Authority and Jurisdiction of the Court” in 1998.

     This course and report contains a preemptive plan against pro-se litigants and others who may disagree with the court, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Native American protest groups, religious organizations, and anyone else who may take issue with a court decision. The information from NJC is so controversial that NJC has banned its course and conference materials from the public, but their library and the SJI repository is open to the public.

     I originally started researching judicial training organizations in 1996 after I was denied an inheritance by the New Jersey court system when my parents died and was also denied entrance to a conference and course materials at NJC in May, 1996, called “The National Conference on the Media and the Courts: Working Together to Serve the American People.”

     The media conference was closed to the public. Only one New Jersey judge, Martin Kravarick, attended that conference. Judge Kravarick was elected president of the American Judges Association (AJA), a judge’s organization under NCSC. AJA publishes a quarterly journal called Court Review, available in your local law library, by subscription, or through interlibrary loan.

     I first found out about the judicial movement against pro-se litigants and the CLC movement by reading Kravarick’s “President’s Message” in the Fall, 1996 issue of Court Review. I called Judge Kravarick for more information on what the CLC movement was all about, and he gave me some additional contact information. I called Mike Reynolds of SPLC, and he told me there were four conference proceedings and that the conference was taped.

      I waited over three months to get a copy of the tape, “Impact of the Common Law Movement on the Courts.” That tape is available through interlibrary loan from NCSC along with the training manuals mentioned above.Each state has an SJI repository for all publications put out by the organizations they have funded. For example, the repository in Nevada is at NJC in Reno.

     In New Jersey, the SJI repository is at the New Jersey State Library in Trenton. You can check out these training manuals with a New Jersey library card. You can also find out where your SJI repository is by looking it up on the Internet at http://www.statejustice.org, by calling SJI at 703-684-6100, or by writing to the State Justice Institute, 1650 King street, Alexandria, VA 22314.SJI is funded by Congress with your tax dollars.

     If you don’t like the courses and materials they are funding, you can write to your senator or congressman, or directly to SJI and ask them to stop funding these materials. SJI gets very few letters from the public, and I’m sure they would love to hear from you. When you get to their Web site, read and download the newsletters. Most of their new grants are in their newsletters.The National Center for State Courts is an umbrella organization for several judges’ organizations such as the National College of Probate judges (NCPJ), AJA, CCJ, COSCA, ICM and others.

      I have been a member of NCPJ since 1996 and have attended four judges’ conferences. The most controversial and harmful material against the public is coming from NJC and NCSC materials, two agencies that compete with each other for SJI and federal government funding.In the training manuals mentioned above, there are two sections in each book where the writers advise judges and court personnel such as court clerks and guards on how to handle pro-se litigants using a step-by-step process. The writers of these manuals reveal a court that is biased and has a dangerous point of view about justice and equal access in the court system.

Copyright © 2001 June Wisniewski

The Author:  June Wisniewski is a legal researcher and journalist in Reno, Nevada, and can be reached at renojune@judicialterrorism.com.  She has written a number of articles on judicial subjects and is author of the book, The Coffin Chasers: An Aggrieved Litigant’s Journey Through the Corrupt World of Probate The source of this article is the January 5, 2001 issue of the Idaho Observer (http://proliberty.com/observer/20010105.htm)

The text has been modified by reformating and other nonconsequential editing and is noted as such at the request of the author.  The subject matter is the basis of another book by Wisniewski, Unequal Justice: The Inside Story of the National Judicial College.Note 1:  The vulnerability of pro se’s to the hostility of judges is exemplified by the fate of Elena Sassower in 2004.  See also: Sherman Skolnick’s Big Court Fix.

Note 2:  In 2006, the American Bar Association issued a manual, Countering the Critics; Q&E Guide [PDF], that instructs judges on how to respond to complaints about the lack of accountability and other “hot-button” issues they are likely encounter from critics of the American court system.

Note 3:  On March 11, 2008 the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted a new set of rules for processing misconduct complaints against federal judges [PDF].  This document also contains instructions for filing complaints against judges.

Hellman, Arthur D., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules: Comments and Suggestions (January 23, 2015).

Hearing Before the Judicial Conference of the United States — Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, October 30, 2014; U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-10. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554596

Proposed Amendments to the Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules: Comments and Suggestions


Arthur D. Hell man


University of Pittsburgh

January 23, 2015

Hearing Before the Judicial Conference of the United States — Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, October 30, 2014
U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-10
Abstract:     

     In 2008, the Judicial Conference of the United States – the administrative policy-making body of the federal judiciary – approved a revised set of rules for handling complaints of misconduct or disability on the part of federal judges. Moving away from the decentralizing approach of the pre-2008 Illustrative Rules, the new rules were made binding on all of the federal judicial circuits.
     On September 2, 2014, the Conference’s Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability (Conduct Committee) issued a set of draft amendments to the Rules. The announcement invited comments on the proposed amendments. This statement was submitted in response to that invitation. The statement is in four parts. Part I provides some background. Part II discusses the policy changes proposed by the Committee. Part III addresses the special problems raised by “high-visibility” complaints. Part IV suggests some additional modest revisions in the Rules and flags issues that warrant the Committee’s attention in the future.

     Most of the amendments in the published draft involve clarification or emphasis. But I have identified six revisions that do reflect changes of policy from the 2008 Rules. Five of the six reflect sound policy; they will serve to enhance transparency and strengthen procedural regularity. However, one proposed revision – an amendment that would allow tie votes in the Conduct Committee on petitions for review – is unwise. I urge the Committee to reconsider it.

     Part IV addresses a variety of issues raised by the proposed draft and the Rules as originally adopted. These include: the chief judge’s obligation to “identify” a complaint based on public reports suggesting that a judge may have engaged in misconduct; judicial council authority to impose sanctions on complainants who abuse the process; disqualification of judges from proceedings under the 1980 Act; and making the Rules more user-friendly. The most detailed discussion involves two issues raised by the misconduct complaint against former District Judge Richard Cebull of Montana: judicial-council authority to conclude a proceeding and disclosure of judicial-council orders that have been vacated or modified.

Click on   http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554596

Keywords: Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes, Breyer Committee Report, Judicial Conduct, Judicial Misconduct, Federal Judges, Judicial Ethics, National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, Rulemaking, United States Code Chapter 16, Reform, Judicial System, Federal Courts, Judicial Discipline

 

Code of Conduct for United States Judges

http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges

The Code of Conduct for United States Judges includes the ethical canons that apply to federal judges and provides guidance on their performance of official duties and engagement in a variety of outside activities.

Introduction
Canon 1: A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
Canon 2: A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities
Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, Impartially and Diligently
Canon 4: A Judge May Engage in Extrajudicial Activities That are Consistent With the Obligations of Judicial Office
Canon 5: A Judge Should Refrain From Political Activity
Compliance with the Code of Conduct
Applicable Date of Compliance

Introduction

The Code of Conduct for United States Judges was initially adopted by the Judicial Conference on April 5, 1973, and was known as the “Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges.”

See: JCUS-APR 73, pp. 9-11. Since then, the Judicial Conference has made the following changes to the Code:

  • March 1987: deleted the word “Judicial” from the name of the Code;
  • September 1992: adopted substantial revisions to the Code;
  • March 1996: revised part C of the Compliance section, immediately following the Code;
  • September 1996: revised Canons 3C(3)(a) and 5C(4);
  • September 1999: revised Canon 3C(1)(c);
  • September 2000: clarified the Compliance section;
  • March 2009: adopted substantial revisions to the Code.
  • March 2014: revised part C of the Compliance section, which appears below, immediately following the Code. 

     This Code applies to United States circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of      Federal Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.

     Certain provisions of this Code apply to special masters and commissioners as indicated in the “Compliance” section.

     The Tax Court, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have adopted this Code.

The Judicial Conference has authorized its Committee on Codes of Conduct to render advisory opinions about this Code only when requested by a judge to whom this Code applies.

     Requests for opinions and other questions concerning this Code and its applicability should be addressed to the Chair of the Committee on Codes of Conduct by email or as follows:

Chair, Committee on Codes of Conduct
c/o General Counsel
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
202-502-1100

Procedural questions may be addressed to:

Office of the General Counsel
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
202-502-1100

Canon 1: A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary

     An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should maintain and enforce high standards of conduct and should personally observe those standards, so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.

COMMENTARY

     Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends on public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges.

     The integrity and independence of judges depend in turn on their acting without fear or favor. Although judges should be independent, they must comply with the law and should comply with this Code. Adherence to this responsibility helps to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and injures our system of government under law.

The Canons are rules of reason. They should be applied consistently with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules and decisional law, and in the context of all relevant circumstances.

     The Code is to be construed so it does not impinge on the essential independence of judges in making judicial decisions.

     The Code is designed to provide guidance to judges and nominees for judicial office.

     It may also provide standards of conduct for application in proceedings under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(1), 351-364).

     Not every violation of the Code should lead to disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline, should be determined through a reasonable application of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the improper activity, the intent of the judge, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.

      Many of the restrictions in the Code are necessarily cast in general terms, and judges may reasonably differ in their interpretation. Furthermore, the Code is not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. Finally, the Code is not intended to be used for tactical advantage.

Canon 2: A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in all Activities

(A)      Respect for Law. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

(B)      Outside Influence.

     A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.

     A judge should neither lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

     A judge should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.

(C)      Nondiscriminatory Membership.

     A judge should not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.

COMMENTARY

Canon 2A.

     An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge’s honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. This prohibition applies to both professional and personal conduct.

     A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny and accept freely and willingly restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

     Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the prohibition is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code.

     Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules, or other specific provisions of this Code.

Canon 2B.  Testimony as a character witness injects the prestige of the judicial office into the proceeding in which the judge testifies and may be perceived as an official testimonial.

     A judge should discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a character witness except in unusual circumstances when the demands of justice require.

     This Canon does not create a privilege against testifying in response to an official summons.

     A judge should avoid lending the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.

      For example, a judge should not use the judge’s judicial position or title to gain advantage in litigation involving a friend or a member of the judge’s family.

     In contracts for publication of a judge’s writings, a judge should retain control over the advertising to avoid exploitation of the judge’s office.

     A judge should be sensitive to possible abuse of the prestige of office.

     A judge should not initiate communications to a sentencing judge or a probation or corrections officer but may provide information to such persons in response to a formal request.

      Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating with appointing authorities and screening committees seeking names for consideration and by responding to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship.

Canon 2C. Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimination gives rise to perceptions that the judge’s impartiality is impaired.

      Canon 2C refers to the current practices of the organization. Whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question to which judges should be sensitive.

     The answer cannot be determined from a mere examination of an organization’s current membership rolls but rather depends on how the organization selects members and other relevant factors, such as that the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members, or that it is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited. See New York State Club Ass’n. Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 101 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1984).

     Other relevant factors include the size and nature of the organization and the diversity of persons in the locale who might reasonably be considered potential members.

      Thus the mere absence of diverse membership does not by itself demonstrate a violation unless reasonable persons with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances would expect that the membership would be diverse in the absence of invidious discrimination.

     Absent such factors, an organization is generally said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin persons who would otherwise be admitted to membership.

     Although Canon 2C relates only to membership in organizations that invidiously discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin, a judge’s membership in an organization that engages in any invidiously discriminatory membership practices prohibited by applicable law violates Canons 2 and 2A and gives the appearance of impropriety.

     In addition, it would be a violation of Canons 2 and 2A for a judge to arrange a meeting at a club that the judge knows practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin in its membership or other policies, or for the judge to use such a club regularly.

      Moreover, public manifestation by a judge of the judge’s knowing approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety under Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A.

      When a judge determines that an organization to which the judge belongs engages in invidious discrimination that would preclude membership under Canon 2C or under Canons 2 and 2A, the judge is permitted, in lieu of resigning, to make immediate and continuous efforts to have the organization discontinue its invidiously discriminatory practices.

     If the organization fails to discontinue its invidiously discriminatory practices as promptly as possible (and in all events within two years of the judge’s first learning of the practices), the judge should resign immediately from the organization.

Canon 3:      A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, Impartially and Diligently

     The duties of judicial office take precedence over all other activities. In performing the duties prescribed by law, the judge should adhere to the following standards:

(A)      Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1)      A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in, the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

(2)      A judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified, and should maintain order and decorum in all judicial proceedings.

(3)      A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.

     A judge should require similar conduct of those subject to the judge’s control, including lawyers to the extent consistent with their role in the adversary process.

(4)     A judge should accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, and that person’s lawyer, the full right to be heard according to law.

     Except as set out below, a judge should not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications or consider other communications concerning a pending or impending matter that are made outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers.

     If a judge receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing on the substance of a matter, the judge should promptly notify the parties of the subject matter of the communication and allow the parties an opportunity to respond, if requested.

A judge may:

     (a)      initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications as authorized by law;

     (b)      when circumstances require it, permit ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, but only if the ex parte communication does not address substantive matters and the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication;

     (c)       obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law, but only after giving advance notice to the parties of the person to be consulted and the subject matter of the advice and affording the parties reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received; or

     (d)      with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their counsel in an effort to mediate or settle pending matters.

(5)       A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.

(6)      A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court.

     A judge should require similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control.

      The prohibition on public comment on the merits does not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge’s official duties, to explanations of court procedures, or to scholarly presentations made for purposes of legal education.

(B)      Administrative Responsibilities.

(1)      A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court personnel.

(2)      A judge should not direct court personnel to engage in conduct on the judge’s behalf or as the judge’s representative when that conduct would contravene the Code if undertaken by the judge.

(3)      A judge should exercise the power of appointment fairly and only on the basis of merit, avoiding unnecessary appointments, nepotism, and favoritism. A judge should not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.

(4)      A judge with supervisory authority over other judges should take reasonable measures to ensure that they perform their duties timely and effectively.

(5)      A judge should take appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood that a judge’s conduct contravened this Code or a lawyer violated applicable rules of professional conduct.

(C)      Disqualification.

(1)      A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which:

     (a)      the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

     (b)      the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or lawyer has been a material witness;

     (c)      the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s spouse or minor child residing in the judge’s household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding;

     (d)      the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person related to either within the third degree of relationship, or the spouse of such a person is:

           (i)      a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;

           (ii)      acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

          (iii)      known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or

          (iv)      to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding;

     (e)     the judge has served in governmental employment and in that capacity participated as a judge (in a previous judicial position), counsel, advisor, or material witness concerning the proceeding or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.

(2)      A judge should keep informed about the judge’s personal and fiduciary financial interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal financial interests of the judge’s spouse and minor children residing in the judge’s household.

(3)      For the purposes of this section:

     (a)       the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system; the following relatives are within the third degree of relationship: parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, great grandparent, great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew; the listed relatives include whole and half blood relatives and most step relatives;

     (b) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

(c) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

          ( i)      ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

           (ii)      an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

          (iii)      the proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, or a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

          (iv)      ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities;

     (d)      “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation.

(4)      Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Canon, if a judge would be disqualified because of a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the judge (or the judge’s spouse or minor child) divests the interest that provides the grounds for disqualification.

(D) Remittal of Disqualification.

     Instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, a judge disqualified by Canon 3C(1) may, except in the circumstances specifically set out in subsections (a) through (e), disclose on the record the basis of disqualification.

     The judge may participate in the proceeding if, after that disclosure, the parties and their lawyers have an opportunity to confer outside the presence of the judge, all agree in writing or on the record that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate.

The agreement should be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.

COMMENTARY

Canon 3A(3).

     The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court.

      Courts can be efficient and businesslike while being patient and deliberate.

     The duty under Canon 2 to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary applies to all the judge’s activities, including the discharge of the judge’s adjudicative and administrative responsibilities.

     The duty to be respectful includes the responsibility to avoid comment or behavior that could reasonably be interpreted as harassment, prejudice or bias.

Canon 3A(4).

     The restriction on ex parte communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and others who are not participants in the proceeding.

     A judge may consult with other judges or with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out adjudicative responsibilities.

      A judge should make reasonable efforts to ensure that law clerks and other court personnel comply with this provision.

     A judge may encourage and seek to facilitate settlement but should not act in a manner that coerces any party into surrendering the right to have the controversy resolved by the courts.

Canon 3A(5).    

      In disposing of matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay.

     A judge should monitor and supervise cases to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs.

     Prompt disposition of the court’s business requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to take reasonable measures to ensure that court personnel, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end.

Canon 3A(6).      

     The admonition against public comment about the merits of a pending or impending matter continues until the appellate process is complete.

     If the public comment involves a case from the judge’s own court, the judge should take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality, which would violate Canon 2A.

     A judge may comment publicly on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but not on mandamus proceedings when the judge is a litigant in an official capacity (but the judge may respond in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)).https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/rule_21 (Rule 21 (b))

Canon 3B(3).      

     A judge’s appointees include assigned counsel, officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers, guardians, and personnel such as law clerks, secretaries, and judicial assistants. Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge of the obligation prescribed by this subsection.

Canon 3B(5).   

      Appropriate action may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer, other direct action if available, reporting the conduct to the appropriate authorities, or, when the judge believes that a judge’s or lawyer’s conduct is caused by drugs, alcohol, or a medical condition, making a confidential referral to an assistance program.

     Appropriate action may also include responding to a subpoena to testify or otherwise participating in judicial or lawyer disciplinary proceedings; a judge should be candid and honest with disciplinary authorities.

Canon 3C.

     Recusal considerations applicable to a judge’s spouse should also be considered with respect to a person other than a spouse with whom the judge maintains both a household and an intimate relationship.

Canon 3C(1)(c).

      In a criminal proceeding, a victim entitled to restitution is not, within the meaning of this Canon, a party to the proceeding or the subject matter in controversy.

      A judge who has a financial interest in the victim of a crime is not required by Canon 3C(1)(c) to disqualify from the criminal proceeding, but the judge must do so if the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under Canon 3C(1) or if the judge has an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding under Canon 3C(1)(d)(iii).

Canon 3C(1)(d)(ii).

     The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge.

     However, if “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” under Canon 3C(1), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be “substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding” under Canon 3C(1)(d)(iii), the judge’s disqualification is required.

Canon 4:      A Judge May Engage in Extrajudicial Activities that are Consistent with the Obligations of Judicial Office 

     A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including law-related pursuits and civic, charitable, educational, religious, social, financial, fiduciary, and governmental activities, and may speak, write, lecture, and teach on both law-related and nonlegal subjects.

      However, a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that detract from the dignity of the judge’s office, interfere with the performance of the judge’s official duties, reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, lead to frequent disqualification, or violate the limitations set forth below.

(A)      Law-related Activities.

(1)      Speaking, Writing, and Teaching.

     A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice

(2)      Consultation.   

       A judge may consult with or appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body or official:

     (a)     on matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice;

     (b)     to the extent that it would generally be perceived that a judge’s judicial experience provides special expertise in the area; or

     (c)     when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving the judge or the judge’s interest.

(3)      Organizations.

     A judge may participate in and serve as a member, officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a nonprofit organization devoted to the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice and may assist such an organization in the management and investment of funds.

      A judge may make recommendations to public and private fund-granting agencies about projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.

(4)      Arbitration and Mediation.

      A judge should not act as an arbitrator or mediator or otherwise perform judicial functions apart from the judge’s official duties unless expressly authorized by law.

(5)      Practice of Law.

     A judge should not practice law and should not serve as a family member’s lawyer in any forum.

     A judge may, however, act pro se and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judge’s family.

(B)      Civic and Charitable ActivitiesA judge may participate in and serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a nonprofit civic, charitable, educational, religious, or social organization, subject to the following limitations:

(1)     A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will either be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.

(2)     A judge should not give investment advice to such an organization but may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.

(C)      Fund Raising. A judge may assist nonprofit law-related, civic, charitable, educational, religious, or social organizations in planning fund-raising activities and may be listed as an officer, director, or trustee. A judge may solicit funds for such an organization from judges over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority and from members of the judge’s family. Otherwise, a judge should not personally participate in fund-raising activities, solicit funds for any organization, or use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for that purpose. A judge should not personally participate in membership solicitation if the solicitation might reasonably be perceived as coercive or is essentially a fund-raising mechanism.

(D)     Financial Activities.

(1)       A judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity, but should refrain from financial and business dealings that exploit the judicial position or involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves.

(2)      A judge may serve as an officer, director, active partner, manager, advisor, or employee of a business only if the business is closely held and controlled by members of the judge’s family. For this purpose, “members of the judge’s family” means persons related to the judge or the judge’s spouse within the third degree of relationship as defined in Canon 3C(3)(a), any other relative with whom the judge or the judge’s spouse maintains a close familial relationship, and the spouse of any of the foregoing.

(3)      As soon as the judge can do so without serious financial detriment, the judge should divest investments and other financial interests that might require frequent disqualification.

(4)      A judge should comply with the restrictions on acceptance of gifts and the prohibition on solicitation of gifts set forth in the Judicial Conference Gift Regulations.

     A judge should endeavor to prevent any member of the judge’s family residing in the household from soliciting or accepting a gift except to the extent that a judge would be permitted to do so by the Judicial Conference Gift Regulations.

     A “member of the judge’s family” means any relative of a judge by blood, adoption, or marriage, or any person treated by a judge as a member of the judge’s family.

(5)      A judge should not disclose or use nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity for any purpose unrelated to the judge’s official duties.

(E)      Fiduciary Activities.

      A judge may serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary only for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the judge’s family as defined in Canon 4D(4).

As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to the following restrictions:

(1)      The judge should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary the judge would be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or if the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which the judge serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.

(2)      While acting as a fiduciary, a judge is subject to the same restrictions on financial activities that apply to the judge in a personal capacity.

(F)      Governmental Appointments.

      A judge may accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position only if it is one that concerns the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, or if appointment of a judge is required by federal statute.

     A judge should not, in any event, accept such an appointment if the judge’s governmental duties would tend to undermine the public confidence in the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the judiciary. A judge may represent the judge’s country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cultural activities.

(G)      Chambers, Resources, and Staff.     

     A judge should not to any substantial degree use judicial chambers, resources, or staff to engage in extrajudicial activities permitted by this Canon.

(H)      Compensation, Reimbursement, and Financial Reporting.

 A judge may accept compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the law-related and extrajudicial activities permitted by this Code if the source of the payments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge in the judge’s judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety, subject to the following restrictions:

(1)      Compensation should not exceed a reasonable amount nor should it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.

(2)      Expense reimbursement should be limited to the actual costs of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by the judge’s spouse or relative. Any additional payment is compensation.

(3)      A judge should make required financial disclosures, including disclosures of gifts and other things of value, in compliance with applicable statutes and Judicial Conference regulations and directives.

COMMENTARY

Canon 4.

     Complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the society in which the judge lives. As a judicial officer and a person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including revising substantive and procedural law and improving criminal and juvenile justice.

      To the extent that the judge’s time permits and impartiality is not compromised, the judge is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other organization dedicated to the law. Subject to the same limitations, judges may also engage in a wide range of non-law-related activities.

     Within the boundaries of applicable law (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 953) a judge may express opposition to the persecution of lawyers and judges anywhere in the world if the judge has ascertained, after reasonable inquiry, that the persecution is occasioned by conflict between the professional responsibilities of the persecuted judge or lawyer and the policies or practices of the relevant government.

     A person other than a spouse with whom the judge maintains both a household and an intimate relationship should be considered a member of the judge’s family for purposes of legal assistance under Canon 4A(5), fund raising under Canon 4C, and family business activities under Canon 4D(2).

Canon 4A.    

      Teaching and serving on the board of a law school are permissible, but in the case of a for-profit law school, board service is limited to a non-governing advisory board.

     Consistent with this Canon, a judge may encourage lawyers to provide pro bono legal services.

Canon 4A(4)

     This Canon generally prohibits a judge from mediating a state court matter, except in unusual circumstances (e.g., when a judge is mediating a federal matter that cannot be resolved effectively without addressing the related state court matter).

Canon 4A(5).

      A judge may act pro se in all legal matters, including matters involving litigation and matters involving appearances before or other dealings with governmental bodies.

      In so doing, a judge must not abuse the prestige of office to advance the interests of the judge or the judge’s family.

Canon 4B.

      The changing nature of some organizations and their exposure to litigation make it necessary for a judge regularly to reexamine the activities of each organization with which the judge is affiliated to determine if the judge’s continued association is appropriate.

For example, in many jurisdictions, charitable hospitals are in court more often now than in the past.

Canon 4C

     A judge may attend fund-raising events of law-related and other organizations although the judge may not be a speaker, a guest of honor, or featured on the program of such an event. Use of a judge’s name, position in the organization, and judicial designation on an organization’s letterhead, including when used for fund raising or soliciting members, does not violate Canon 4C if comparable information and designations are listed for others.

Canon 4D(1), (2), and (3)

     Canon 3 requires disqualification of a judge in any proceeding in which the judge has a financial interest, however small. Canon 4D requires a judge to refrain from engaging in business and from financial activities that might interfere with the impartial performance of the judge’s judicial duties. Canon 4H requires a judge to report compensation received for activities outside the judicial office.

     A judge has the rights of an ordinary citizen with respect to financial affairs, except for limitations required to safeguard the proper performance of the judge’s duties. A judge’s participation in a closely held family business, while generally permissible, may be prohibited if it takes too much time or involves misuse of judicial prestige or if the business is likely to come before the court on which the judge serves. Owning and receiving income from investments do not as such affect the performance of a judge’s duties.

Canon 4D(5)

     The restriction on using nonpublic information is not intended to affect a judge’s ability to act on information as necessary to protect the health or safety of the judge or a member of a judge’s family, court personnel, or other judicial officers if consistent with other provisions of this Code.

Canon 4E

     Mere residence in the judge’s household does not by itself make a person a member of the judge’s family for purposes of this Canon.

The person must be treated by the judge as a member of the judge’s family.

     The Applicable Date of Compliance provision of this Code addresses continued service as a fiduciary.

     A judge’s obligation under this Code and the judge’s obligation as a fiduciary may come into conflict.

      For example, a judge should resign as a trustee if it would result in detriment to the trust to divest holdings whose retention would require frequent disqualification of the judge in violation of Canon 4D(3).

Canon 4F

     The appropriateness of accepting extrajudicial assignments must be assessed in light of the demands on judicial resources and the need to protect the courts from involvement in matters that may prove to be controversial.

     Judges should not accept governmental appointments that could interfere with the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, interfere with the performance of the judge’s judicial responsibilities, or tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.

Canon 4H.

      A judge is not required by this Code to disclose income, debts, or investments, except as provided in this Canon. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 and implementing regulations promulgated by the Judicial Conference impose additional restrictions on judges’ receipt of compensation.

     That Act and those regulations should be consulted before a judge enters into any arrangement involving the receipt of compensation.

     The restrictions so imposed include but are not limited to:

(1)      a prohibition against receiving “honoraria” (defined as anything of value received for a speech, appearance, or article),

(2)      a prohibition against receiving compensation for service as a director, trustee, or officer of a profit or nonprofit organization, (3) a requirement that compensated teaching activities receive prior approval, and (4) a limitation on the receipt of “outside earned income.”

Canon 5: A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity

(A) General Prohibitions. A judge should not:

(1) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;

(2) make speeches for a political organization or candidate, or publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office; or

(3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, or attend or purchase a ticket for a dinner or other event sponsored by a political organization or candidate.

(B) Resignation upon Candidacy. A judge should resign the judicial office if the judge becomes a candidate in a primary or general election for any office.

(C) Other Political Activity. A judge should not engage in any other political activity. This provision does not prevent a judge from engaging in activities described in Canon 4.

COMMENTARY

The term “political organization” refers to a political party, a group affiliated with a political party or candidate for public office, or an entity whose principal purpose is to advocate for or against political candidates or parties in connection with elections for public office.

Compliance with the Code of Conduct

Anyone who is an officer of the federal judicial system authorized to perform judicial functions is a judge for the purpose of this Code.

All judges should comply with this Code except as provided below.

(A)      Part-time Judge

     A part-time judge is a judge who serves part-time, whether continuously or periodically, but is permitted by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and whose compensation for that reason is less than that of a full-time judge.

A part-time judge:

(1)      is not required to comply with Canons 4A(4), 4A(5), 4D(2), 4E, 4F, or 4H(3);
(2)      except as provided in the Conflict-of-Interest Rules for Part-time Magistrate Judges, should not practice law in the court on which the judge serves or in any court subject to that court’s appellate jurisdiction, or act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge has served as a judge or in any related proceeding.

(B)      Judge Pro Tempore

     A judge pro tempore is a person who is appointed to act temporarily as a judge or as a special master.

(1) While acting in this capacity, a judge pro tempore is not required to comply with Canons 4A(4), 4A(5), 4D(2), 4D(3), 4E, 4F, or 4H(3); further, one who acts solely as a special master is not required to comply with Canons 4A(3), 4B, 4C, 4D(4), or 5.

(2)      A person who has been a judge pro tempore should not act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge has served as a judge or in any related proceeding.

(C)      Retired Judge

     A judge who is retired under 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) or § 372(a) (applicable to Article III judges), or who is subject to recall under § 178(d) (applicable to judges on the Court of Federal Claims), or who is recalled to judicial service, should comply with all the provisions of this Code except Canon 4F, but the judge should refrain from judicial service during the period of extrajudicial appointment not sanctioned by Canon 4F.

     All other retired judges who are eligible for recall to judicial service (except those in U.S. territories and possessions) should comply with the provisions of this Code governing part-time judges.

     However, bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges who are eligible for recall but who have notified the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that they will not consent to recall are not obligated to comply with the provisions of this Code governing part-time judges.

     Such notification may be made at any time after retirement, and is irrevocable. A senior judge in the territories and possessions must comply with this Code as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 373(c)(5) and (d).

COMMENTARY

     The 2014 amendment to the Compliance section, regarding retired bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges and exempting those judges from compliance with the Code as part-time judges if they notify the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that they will not consent to recall, was not intended to alter those judges’ statutory entitlements to annuities, cost-of-living adjustments, or any other retirement benefits.

Applicable Date of Compliance

     Persons to whom this Code applies should arrange their financial and fiduciary affairs as soon as reasonably possible to comply with it and should do so in any event within one year after appointment.

     If, however, the demands on the person’s time and the possibility of conflicts of interest are not substantial, such a person may continue to act, without compensation, as an executor, administrator, trustee, or other fiduciary for the estate or person of one who is not a member of the person’s family if terminating the relationship would unnecessarily jeopardize any substantial interest of the estate or person and if the judicial council of the circuit approves.

Last revised (Transmittal 02-016) March 20, 2014

http://www.tulanelink.com/tulanelink/revoltingjudges_03a.htm

 

Interviews with Dr. Bernofsky on…

Inns of Court

attorneyhttp://www.tulanelink.com/tulanelink/innsofcourt_box.htm

Conservative talk show host of The Justice Hour, Florida attorneyLisa Macci, spoke with Dr. Bernofsky about the Inns of Court, his case against Tulane University, and his experience with the civil justice system. 

The program, which also featured her fellow attorney Elizabeth Case, was broadcast live over WPBR 1340 AM radio at 9:00 a.m., eastern standard time, on June 26, 2006.  The audio clip presented here runs about 38 minutes and has no commercial breaks.Carl Bernofsky, 2006

Carl Bernofsky

http://www.tulanelink.com/audio/macci_06a.swf

Lisa Macci may be contacted by email at: lisamacci@msn.com.

Her Web site is at:  http://www.lisamacci.com.


 

Judicial Conflict of Interest

Social activist and talk show host of Late Night with D’Anne, Illinois investigative reporter D’Anne Burley spoke with Dr. Bernofsky about judicial conflict of interest, his case against Tulane University, and his experience with the civil justice system.  The program was broadcast live over the Internet by the Republic Broadcasting Network (http://www.rbnlive.com) at 10:00 p.m., central standard time, on July 29, 2006.  The audio clip presented here runs about 41 minutes and has no commercial breaks.

http://www.tulanelink.com/audio/burley_06A.swf
D’Anne Burley may be contacted at: (630) 477-0860 or (630) 441-0548. 

Her Web site is at: http://danneburley.blogspot.com.  Broadcast archives are available at:http://www.rbnlive.com/archiveindex.html.


 

No Justice Here

Watch video, Carl Bernofsky, 2008

See video about Dr. Bernofsky’s case against Tulane University.  Click on image.

 

Special Rules for Special Cases,

for Example, in  Rule 26A.015

     Disqualification of justice or judge of the Court of Justice, or master commissioner.

(1)      For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated: (a) “Proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation; (b) “Fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, conservator, trustee, and guardian; (c) “Financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

1.      Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities, or a proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, or ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

2.      An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization.

(2)      Any justice or judge of the Court of Justice or master commissioner shall disqualify himself in any proceeding:

     (a)      Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding;

     (b)      Where in private practice or government service he served as a lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter in controversy, or the judge, master commissioner or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning the matter in controversy;

     (c)      Where he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding;

     (d)      Where he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

1. Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;

2.      Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding and the disqualification is not waived by stipulation of counsel in the proceeding filed therein;

3.      Is known by the judge or master commissioner to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

4.      Is to the knowledge of the judge or master commissioner likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

      (e)      Where he has knowledge of any other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(3) (a)      Any justice or judge of the Court of Justice disqualified under the provisions of this section shall be replaced by the Chief Justice.

     (b)      Any master commissioner disqualified under the provisions of this section or unable to discharge the duties of his office for any other reason shall be replaced by a special commissioner who shall be appointed by the judge of the court before whom the action is pending.

     The special commissioner shall meet the same qualifications as a master commissioner and shall take an oath and execute a bond as the regular commissioner is required to do.

Effective:     July 1, 1982 History: Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 141, sec. 41, effective July 1, 1982. — Created 1976 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 22, sec. 4. Note: 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 396, sec. 44 would have amended this section effective July 1, 1982. However, 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 396 was repealed by 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 141, sec. 146, also effective July 1, 1982.

 

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Author of this blog, Dedicated to the Real Mommies and Daddies of the Real America, and our Children Who Want to Come Home, and Especially to My Little Julian, is not a lawyer, attorney, or legal practitioner, therefore, no information contained herein this post and/or blog could be (mis)construed as “legal advice.”  Anyone who exercises he/r rights, and private property sometimes called “child” for deceptive, possibly malicious or retaliatory, and profiteering/privateering and in the “best interests” . . . of the “state” Texas General and other Funds at one’s own peril, risk, and/ or self-fulfillment.  The choice is yours.

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  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and/or requirement/demand, then contact Author of this blog immediately as fair notice and due diligence requires so that Author shall act lawfully and reasonably with expedience pursuant to any supplemental knowledge.

 


 

Tutt Case, Texas CPS Steals Another


As usual, the only media or press allowed against Department of Family and Protective Services and the local CPS County Boards responsible for unconstitutional, illegal, and completely irrational “child” kidnappings–“removals”–supports the Texas General Fund.  Thus, another adoption/foster care fraud case, among others of the family court fraud and R.I.C.O. scam genre plaguing this nation engaged in a silent war follows, below:

RE-Blogged, Below

The Tutt Case, Texas Home School Association article, letter link below

http://www.thsc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014-01-27-tutt-dfps.pdf

Tutt Case – Call to Action

JANUARY 28, 2014 BY TIM LAMBERT

The Tutt case continues, so we are issuing this update and a call to action. While some of the Tutts’ children have been returned to their home, they have been traumatized by their removal. Some of them were told while in CPS custody that they could not refer to their adopted parents as “mom and dad” but only by their first names. The children are still in public school, and the academic assessment of the children ordered by the judge has not been done, nor has the order to psychologically examine Mrs. Tutt been scheduled. Another child remains in foster care. Three weeks after the order by the judge, and nothing has been done! It appears that no one in the judicial or CPS system is interested in bringing this family back together.

THSC has written a letter to the Texas commissioner of the Department of Family and Protective Services, the department that oversees CPS, and is demanding an investigation into the caseworker and her supervisor who facilitated this travesty. You can read that DPS letter here. We are asking for those who would like to help the Tutts get all their children back and be allowed to resume their home education to help us by contacting Governor Perry’s office and the Texas legislators who make up theSenate Health and Human Services Committee and the House Human Services Committee, committees which oversee CPS. Urge them to contact DFPS and to launch an immediate investigation of the CPS caseworker (Ms. Shan Robinson) and her supervisor (Ms. Diana Etheridge).

These CPS officials facilitated the illegal removal of the Tutt children. For background, see my previous posts on the Tutt case. The bottom line is that a CPS worker investigated an incident and initially said all was well but a month later demanded a psychological evaluation and parenting classes. When Mrs. Tutt pointed out that classes had been taken and that she had a certificate from her physician noting she was physically and mentally fit to care for children, the caseworker said she would consult with her supervisor to see if that would be sufficient.

With no further communication with the family, the caseworker sought a court order to force Mrs. Tutt to have a psychological evaluation. This evaluation was sought in a November 15, 2013, ex parte hearing, of which the family was not notified nor represented and at which the caseworker was not present.

The caseworker stated that Judge Graciela Olvera refused to sign the order and “recommended that the children be removed from the home and placed in custody due to neglectful supervision and also the pattern of CPS referrals during the year.” She also stated, “Judge Olvera expressed concern about the mental state of the parents.”

In other words, the judge who professed to be “concerned about the mental state of the parents” refused to sign an order requiring a psychological evaluation but did sign an order to remove the children based on two of the children wandering away briefly and also on a pattern of CPS allegations, all of which had been ruled unfounded.

The caseworker stated in the presence of Mrs. Tutt and her 25 year-old daughter that she knew there was no cause for removal but that she had to come up with something to satisfy the judge who had issued the order for removal.

This is judicial abuse that was facilitated by CPS officials, and they must be held accountable. Please call Governor Perry’s office at (512) 463-2000 as well as the legislators who oversee CPS (listed in the links above) and demand an investigation into the CPS officials who followed the illegal ruling of Judge Olvera.

THSC will be hosting a press conference to publicize this issue and to demand an investigation into CPS and Judge Olvera on January 29 at 1:30 p.m. at the Dallas County Courthouse. Please join us and friends of the family in support of the Tutts as we publicly call for justice for this family and the return of their children and their freedom to resume home schooling. It is important that we have as many people as possible there in order to draw attention to this travesty. Please spread the word and join us in Dallas on Wednesday at 1:30 p.m. at the Dallas County Courthouse. Old Red Courthouse building at 100 S. Houston Street, Dallas, TX 75202

Call The Governor and Texas Legislators

Governor Rick Perry – (512) 463-2000 – Main Switchboard
Send a message.

Senate Committee on Health and Human Services

Committee Chair:
Jane Nelson
(817) 424-3446 – Grapevine
Send an email.

Vice Chair:
Bob Deuell
(972) 279-1800 – Mesquite
(903) 450-9797 – Greenville
Send an email.

Committee Members:
Joan Huffman
(281) 980-3500 – Houston
Send an email.

Robert Nichols
(903) 589-3003 – Jacksonville
(936) 588-7391 – Montgomery
(936) 564-4252 – Nacogdoches
(936) 699-4988 – Lufkin
Send an email.

Charles Schwertner
(979) 776-0222
(512) 863-8456
Send an email.

Larry Taylor
(281) 485-9800 – Pearland
(281) 332-0003 – League City
Send an email.

Carlos I. Uresti
(210) 932-2568 – San Antonio
(830) 758-0294 – Eagle Pass
(432) 447-0270 – Pecos
Send an email.

Royce West
(214) 467-0123 – Dallas
(214) 741-0123 – Dallas
Send an email.

Judith Zaffirini
(956) 722-2293 – Laredo
Send an email.

House Human Services Committee

Committee Chair:
Richard Peña
(956) 753-7722 – Laredo
Send an email.

Vice Chair:
Naomi Gonzalez
(915) 775-9937 – El Paso
Send an email.

Committee Members:
Pat Fallon
(469) 362-0500 – Little Elm
Send an email.

Stephanie Klick
(817)281-0079 – North Richland Hills
Send an email.

Elliott Naishtat
(512) 463-0668 – Austin
Send an email.

Toni Rose
(214) 371-3300 – Dallas
Send an email.

Scott Sanford
(972) 548-7500 – McKinney
Send an email.

Scott Turner
(972) 722-7887 – Rockwall County
(972) 987-1447 – Collin County
Send an email.

John Zerwas
(281) 533-9042 – Simonton
Send an email.

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Related Posts:

  1. PRESS RELEASE: THSC CALLS ON CPS TO INVESTIGATE CASEWORKER IN TUTT CASE
  2. Tutt Case Update
  3. Tutt Case – Partial Victory
  4. Tutt Case Press Conference

FILED UNDER: PARENTAL RIGHTSTUTT FAMILY

About Tim Lambert

Tim Lambert, president of Texas Home School Coalition (the state home school support organization since 1986), has been involved in home school leadership in Texas since 1984. He and his wife Lyndsay taught their four now-grown children at home for 16 years, graduating the last two in 2000. As the head of the organization for the leading home school state in the country, Tim is recognized as an authority on home education issues in Texas. In this capacity, he has testified before numerous Texas legislative committees on issues related to home schooling. He often deals with state government agencies, including the Texas Education Agency and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, on home education issues and has served as an expert witness on home education in a number of court cases. He has also addressed such conferences as the Texas Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissi

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ons Officers on the topic.

Tim holds a B.A. in political science from Texas Tech University and is active in the political arena, having served eight years as Republican National Committeeman for Texas. He is committed to serving the home schooling community and to protecting parents’ right to choose the method of education of their children.

MORE FAMILY COURT FRAUD: Murphy v. MurphyI


Judge Quillian A. Baldwin.Michelle Murphy Case.Coweta County.GA.Newnan.Free Jack and Thomas

CHIEF JUDGE QUILLAIN A. BALDWIN,  credit to author of MURPHY V. MURPHY; Newnan, GA (Coweta County Superior Court)

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF GEORGIA Case No. ___________
Nancy Michelle Murphy and Millard Farmer, Petitioners
vs.
John Harold Murphy, Respondent
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia The Court of Appeals Decision is Case No. A14A1137
Millard Farmer Georgia Bar No. 255300
P.O. Box 1728 Atlanta, GA 30301-1728
(404) 688-8116 millardfarmer@millardfarmer.com
Counsel for Nancy Michelle Murphy and Millard Farmer
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Questions Presented
Question One.
     Whether the Court of Appeals, as did the trial court, without any evidence to support an indirect contempt conviction, could, by shifting the burden of proof and using an illegal standard of proof, affirm the trial court’s adjudication of Nancy Michelle Murphy of civil indirect contempt for violating the trial court’s August 23, 2013 Order directing that, “[e]ach party and the Children shall fully cooperate with the custody evaluator” that the guardian ad litem selected and the Court designated.
 Question Two.
      Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court could, without violating the protections accorded Millard Farmer by the United States Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection provisions and the corresponding protections of the Georgia Constitution, the laws and Rules of Court of Georgia and the holdings of the appellate courts of Georgia, uphold the criminal indirect contempt conviction of Millard Farmer, adjudicate him in absentia, without evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, under the following fatal, legal infirmities with the criminal conviction:
1.      When, in a case with two jointly participating lawyers, the charging document only identified the charged individual, as “defendant’s lawyer” [singular, with no further identity]. 
2.      When the August 23, 2013 Order (R. V11 p. 2192) placed a restriction upon the “parties” discussing matters with the children except for implementing the August 23, 2014 Order or the final decree that was used as the basis of the criminal contempt conviction of Millard Farmer.
     The restriction provided, in its entirety, as follows. Neither party shall discuss any of the issues, allegations or claims in this case with the Children, unless such discussions are necessary to implement the terms of this Order or the terms of the Final Decree.
3.      When the restriction was written in the August 23, 2013 Order by the Prosecutors/Plaintiff’s attorneys and when they charged the alleged illegal conduct relating to this “don’t discuss” restriction in their September 27, 2013 Amended motion for contempt, (R. V14, p. 2781) they stated that the charge was that “Neither party shall discuss.”
     This restriction applies only to the “Parties” and certainly cannot be used as the basis for a criminal conviction for anyone other than a “Party.” Millard Farmer was not a “Party.”
     The “Parties” were identified sixteen (16) times in the August 23, 2013 Order, that clearly identified the parties to be only the parents. In another segment of the Order, where the lawyers were intended to be included, the lawyers were identified as the “Parties’ lawyers.”
     There was no restraint placed upon Millard Farmer by the August 23, 2013 Order drafted and presented with an ex parte, hand delivered letter to Judge Baldwin by a Glover & Davis lawyer in order to have 2 the August 23, 2013 Order executed by Judge Baldwin with information never supported by oath or any other form of admissible evidence. (R. V11, p. 2214)
     The August 23, 2013 Order, sought to be enforced with criminal contempt charges, resulted from the wealth of the Plaintiff and his current wife to engage in habitual, litigious efforts to capture Jack and Thomas from these Children’s mother with unnecessary, expensive to defend, schemes that only these wealthy litigants could afford to successfully litigate with their judge-shopped jurist.
4.      When this criminal contempt action was based upon the August 23, 2013 Order that, in part, held and reaffirmed as follows:
     On July 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint and requested this Court have a temporary hearing to determine whether circumstances exist which support a temporary change in the physical custody of the Children * * *
     Pursuant to the terms of the Final Decree, Defendant was awarded physical custody of the Children. . . . The Final Decree specifies the parties have joint legal custody of the Children but it is silent as to which parent has “final decision making authority” on legal custody issues. * * *
Conclusions of Law
     It would not be in the best interests of the Children for temporary custody to be changed.  
Order
     The physical custody of the Children shall not be changed at this time.
     The parties shall continue to exercise the parenting time with the Children as detailed in the Final Decree. 
5.      When, albeit that Millard Farmer was not legally charged, noticed, or that the August 23, 2013 Order was not applicable to Millard Farmer and that Millard Farmer was convicted in absentia, without any admissible evidence showing that he was engaged in any type of discussion that was not a necessity to implement the terms of the August 23, 2013 Order, or the Final Decree.
6.      When there was no evidence supporting the following finding of fact identifying Millard Farmer.
     Based upon the Court’s review of two affidavits signed by the children and filed by Defendant on September 23, 2013 in support of her Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt, the Court further finds that Defendant and Millard Farmer, one of her lawyers, are discussing the issues, allegations, and claims in this case with the children and that such discussions are not necessary to implement the terms of the August Order.

The affidavits (R. V14, pp. 2761, 2768) do not in any manner provide evidence that even if discussions took place the discussions were not due to the professional obligation of the lawyer for Michelle Murphy in order to implement Michelle Murphy’s rights under the August 23, 2013 Order.
     The court only found that defendant’s counsel, Millard Farmer, was found to be in contempt of the provision of the August Order prohibiting “parties” from discussing this case — that would be the professional obligation of an attorney in a case where the client was charged with criminal contempt, as was Michelle Murphy, who was charged with contempt.
     The children had the 4 recorded statement that proved John Harold Murphy swore falsely (R. V14, p.2721) in the contempt charging papers. Millard Farmer was not convicted of anything relating to the final decree.
 7.      When the burden of proof was upon the Prosecutors/Plaintiff in this criminal case to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the communications took place and thereafter that the communications were not necessary to implement the terms of the August 23, 2013 Order, and the prosecutors proved neither.
8.      When the prosecutors did not even carry their burden of proving that there were communications about the case or the August 23, 2013 Order.
     And they never presented any information that there was not a necessity to discuss the numerous changes relating to visitation in the August 23, 2013 Order that were necessary to implement that Order.
9.      When the Court, failing to convict Millard Farmer of anything relating to the final decree, which eliminated the issues regarding the final decree, as this would be an acquittal of that criminal charge due the absence of a conviction of that charge.
The criminally charged violation segment of the August 23, 2913 Order follows:
Neither party shall discuss any of the issues, allegations or claims in this case with the children unless such claims are necessary were not to implement the terms of the [August 23, 3013] Order (R. V11, p. 2192)
5      Millard Farmer was criminally convicted of indirect criminal contempt as follows with language not contained in the Order alleged to be violated, supported or noticed in the criminal charging document, unsupported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
     Defendant’s counsel Millard Farmer is hereby found to be in contempt of the provisions of the August Order prohibiting Defendant or her attorneys from discussing this case or the issues raised herein with the Children.
     Mr. Farmer further is found in to be in contempt of this Court because of Defendant’s failure to appear at the duly noticed contempt hearing on October13 Mr. Farmer shall be immediately incarcerated in the Coweta County, Georgia jail for a period of 20 days or until he pays One Thousand Dollars.(“$1,000) to the Court. (R. V17, p. 3628)
     The prosecuting attorneys falsely stated above in the Order that they drafted and Judge Baldwin signed, “…the provisions of the August Order prohibiting Defendant or her attorneys…”
10.      When the Order adjudicating Millard Farmer omits adjudication of the exempting part of the discussing restriction, i.e., unless such claims are necessary to implement the terms of this Order.
     The segments of the criminal charging document that were used as the basis for the criminal conviction of Millard Farmer for indirect contempt of court are as follows.
7.      The Order also provides the following: Neither party shall discuss any of the issues, allegations or claims in this case with the children, unless such claims are necessary to implement the terms of this Order, or 6 the terms of the Final Decree.
8.      Since the entry of the Order, [August 23, 2013] the Children have made several comments to Plaintiff that clearly indicate Defendant and her lawyer have allowed the Children to read the hearing transcript from the August 13 hearing.
     Furthermore, it is evident Defendant and her lawyer have discussed the issues and allegations in this case with the Children since the entry of the Order. (R. V14, p. 2781)
Question Three
     Whether Judge Baldwin was disqualified from adjudicating any of the November 19, 2013 indirect contempt adjudications after January 1, 2013, when the Clerk of Coweta Superior Court, pursuant to the authority of Coweta Judicial Circuit’s long mandated, but only recently enacted, Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1 case management plan, administratively assigned this case to Superior Court Judge Dennis Blackmon, as confirmed to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of Georgia by letter (R. V7, p. 1435) that the Coweta Clerk entered into the record of this case, as also confirmed by Judge Blackmon, who, without adjudicating the pending not adjudicated disqualification motions against Judge Baldwin, illegally attempted to transfer the case back to Judge Baldwin (R. V8, p. 1670 and R. V7, p. 1503), as both judges had illegally failed to act upon and comply with the intent of USCR 25.3 and the constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection protections afforded the accused. See, Horn v. Shepherd, 294 Ga. 468, 470 (2014).
     Judge Baldwin is further disqualified, based upon the unadjudicated disqualification motions pending against him at the time that he adjudicated the contempt motions (R.V14, p. 2941) and for his personal bias against Millard Farmer, Larry King, Michelle Murphy and “defendant’s lawyer” (singular, not otherwise identified). (R. V10, pp.1913, 1918, 1927, R. V12, p. 2327; R. V14, pp.2732-2733, 2812, 2898, 2905, 2929; R. V16, pp. 3377, 3379; R.V17, pp. 3652, 3654; Tr. Oct 13, 2013, pp. 17-18, passim)
     The following unadjudicated motions to disqualify Judge Baldwin were pending and not referred to an independent judge for adjudication as mandated by Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1 at the time that Larry King identified his plea to the personal jurisdiction of Judge Baldwin and was placed in custody for identifying the disqualification motions in the packed courtroom awaiting the calendar call.
  State v. Hargis 294 Ga. 818 doctrine Record Cite June 13, 2012 No USCR 3.1 case management plan confirmed by Clerk of Court (R. V3, p.437)
July 2, 2012
     Order appointing Elizabeth F. Harwell as Guardian ad Litem at the request of Elizabeth Griffis, disq. Co-Sponsor with Glover&Davis (R. V3, 503) August 19,2013 not allowing evidence, on granting GAL illegal authority to modify custody without Ct, approval and for modification of full Court Standing Order to allow Plaintiff to remove children from jurisdiction of Court. (R. V10 p.1914)
August 28, 2013
     Judge Baldwin’s threat to put Michelle Murphy in jail if she doesn’t physically force children to visit their father (R. V11 p.2195)
Sept. 13, 2013 for continuously violation of USCR 25.3 mandate to cease to act upon the merits of the matter” (R. V12 p.2321)
8      Judge Baldwin denied numerous requests for certificates for immediate review.
     The illegal standard that Judge Baldwin maintained for disregarding his disqualification, as stated many time was as follows.
     So the — on the motion to recuse, I’ll just right now tell you, I find that that motion was not timely filed. I have been in this case for over a year.
     One of the things you have to have is showing that — that has to be filed within — I forget what it is — so many days after you find out who the judge is, stating what the causes are.
     I’ve been in this thing for over a year. You have already tried to recuse me one time, and the Court of Appeals did not uphold your efforts to recuse me, and so my finding is, is it was not timely filed, and that you had already been denied a motion to recuse once before.
     And I don’t believe you can continue, as you go through a case, every time you don’t like some order that the judge has given, that you can try to recuse, and recuse, and recuse him. So that’s my ruling on that. Tr. Oct 3, 2013, p. 39, line 18 – p. 40, line 9
 Question Four
     Whether the trial court, acting as the trier of fact and the law, used an illegal and unconstitutional standard of law in adjudicating the pending Motions to disqualify him, to proceed at both the contempt hearing and in adjudicating each of the contempts. (Tr. Oct 3, 2013, p. 5, l. 23 – p. 6, l. 18)
Question Five
     Whether the court erred in holding Michelle Murphy in contempt for not cooperating, within the time provided by the Court, with the expert witness, Nancy McGarrah, the custody evaluator, who presented an illegal condition for Michelle Murphy to perform in order to “cooperate” by requiring that Michelle 9 Murphy execute this psychologist’s contract (R. V17 p.3627), when, even if Michelle Murphy violated any directive of the custody evaluator, it placed an illegal condition upon Michelle Murphy that would have subjected Michelle Murphy to additional expensive litigation for relief from the following, illegal conditions: Michelle Murphy was required to execute a contract that is void against the public policy of the State of Georgia, in that:
(a)     the contract which Michelle Murphy was ordered to sign in order to be released from jail required Michelle Murphy to grant the psychologist expert witness full immunity from liability (R. V17, p. 3785), (see, OCGA § 13-8-2 (a)(1); Unami v. Roshan, 290 Ga. App. 317 (2008); (see also, fraud issues pending before this Court in Hoard v. Beveridge, S15D0360); not just immunity from liability provided by statute that exempts immunity to a custody evaluator resulting from her bad faith;
(b)      the contract required that Michelle Murphy become financially liable for fees that she cannot afford, as it requires that she pay expensive fees to obtain discovery and production, testimony at trial, or be deprived of this expert witnesses’ evidence that could be necessary to her defense of the expert witness psychologist’s findings or for use by her as evidence against the plaintiff;
(c)      the contract provides that the psychologist be paid 18% interest for late payments of fees (R. V16, p. 3461);
(d)      unless Michelle Murphy executed the contract, the psychologist would not inform her counsel of the method to be used for the “custody evaluation,” and would not provide other information about the scope 10 of the investigation of John Harold Murphy and Renee L. Haugerud that would be conducted before rendering an opinion to the Court;
(e)      unless Michelle Murphy executed the contract, the expert witness psychologist stated that she would not talk to Michelle Murphy’s counsel or Michelle Murphy;
(f)      Michelle Murphy would have been subjected to a psychologist who was selected by the guardian ad litem, who was exposed by Michelle Murphy’s counsel for converting to her personal use trust funds provided to her in the case, in violation of USCR 24.9 (8)(g) and exposed for engaging in other illegal conduct that was similar to some of the illegal conduct of John Harold Murphy (R. V12, p. 2326); and,
(g)      the Order appointing the expert witness psychologist stated that “[a]t the final hearing in this case, the Court shall decide whether to allocate the costs of this evaluation between the parties” (R. V11, p. 2192) that could subject Michelle Murphy to having no assets to provide for her children, as the modification of custody litigation has been used to divest Michelle Murphy of her assets with costs a hair stylist cannot afford.
Question Six
     Whether the Court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss the charges of contempt (Tr. Oct 13, p. 113) as requested by Larry King.
     The charges did not set forth a cause of action against Millard Farmer or Michelle Murphy relating to the charged conduct, as Judge Baldwin did not have personal jurisdiction of the case with the numerous motions to disqualify him pending that he had not 11 adjudicated, or forwarded to another jurist for adjudicating.
     The charges against Millard Farmer were an abuse of the criminal process designed to weaken the legal representation of Michelle Murphy and thereby also create unnecessary legal cost to Michelle Murphy that these lawyers knew their hand selected jurist would never award to Michelle Murphy, as this jurist has actively participated in attempting to drain the personal assets of Michelle Murphy and made threats that he would not provide her attorney fees. (R. V16, pp. 3648, 3652) In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667 (1985)
Question Seven
     Whether the Court erred in adjudicating attorney fees against Michelle Murphy in an attempted criminal contempt case against her and her attorney under OCGA § 19-9-3, without specificity of the basis for the amount, or consideration of the disparity of the financial assets of the parties.
     The award of the attorney fees was as follows. (R. V17, p. 3627) Findings of Fact In addition to the $6,400 Plaintiff previously paid in connection with the custody evaluation, Plaintiff also has incurred substantial and unnecessary attorney’s fees in seeking to compel Defendant’s compliance with the August Order and in bringing Defendant’s contempt to the Court’s attention.
Conclusions of Law
     Defendant Michelle Murphy shall pay the amount of $5,000 to Plaintiff John Murphy within 30 days of the date of this Order.
     This amount is awarded pursuant of OCGA 19-9-3 and is based on, inter alia the attorney’s fees Plaintiff incurred in seeking to compel Defendant’s compliance with the August Order an in bringing Defendant’s contempt to the Court’s attention. 12 (R. V17, p. 3628)
Additional Reasons in Support of Granting the Petition upon the Questions Presented, i.e., Enumerations of Error
     The grant of the Writ is of great concern and importance to the public required to be subjected to examination by expert witnesses who require full immunity from prosecution as a condition of their service, and to lawyers whose reputations are affected by criminal convictions resulting from an abuse of the criminal process by opposing parties and lawyers seeking criminal convictions and financial assets from the opposing counsel and party after selecting a judge, trier of fact, in a court without a mandated case management plan.
     The “custody evaluator” scheme in no more than the “expert witness” scheme once used in medical malpractice case well-funded medical groups obtained legislative and judicial branch protection. is no such protection for the litigant with less financial resources in a domestic relations case. The choice is, as it was for Michelle Murphy, take it or go to jail and lose by that choice.
Introduction
     This Mother, with sole physical custody of two children, initially with the father’s absence from the family and thereafter by the incorporation of an Settlement Agreement into a 2006 Divorce Decree has successfully raised Jack and Thomas since the children were physically abandoned by their father when they were toddlers, Jack Murphy, age 16, and Thomas Murphy, who will be 14 on January 1, 2015, are legally and constitutionally deserving of due 13 process rights that this hair stylist can afford.
     There have been a barrage of financial attacks upon Michelle Murphy and her counsel, as they have sought to obtain a constitutional forum in which the issues relating to Jack and Thomas can be resolved.
     This fair and equitable forum has not included that of the current jurist, who was obtained by counsel for the Plaintiff’s judge shopping.
     Michelle Murphy obtained counsel without any judicial political connection, as her lawyers had earlier successfully assisted her in recovering for a part of the malpractice by her divorce lawyer that prevented a fair distribution of the marriage assets of the Plaintiff, long before he married his current wife, who is an enormously wealthy hedge fund operator. (R. V14, p. 2925)
     The divorce proceeding, under the absence of a Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1 mandated case management plan, shifted Michelle Murphy’s case among five (5) judges, with each picking up a fresh file upon their selection, as judge shopping is prevalent in such a system. (R. V14, p. 2927)
     The absence of a Rule 3.1 case management plan is extremely detrimental to the litigant who does not have a lawyer with judicial political associations.
     Attempting to correct this illegal system has been detrimental to Michelle Murphy, as her lawyers’ only strength was to provide Michelle Murphy and her children statutory and constitutional protections that resulted in a liability to this family, as John Harold Murphy engaged the politically connected Glover & Davis law firm at the suggestion of 14 Judge Louis Jack Kirby, another Coweta Judicial Circuit Judge. (RV10, p. 1919)
     Once the judge-shopped judge was in place, the house of cards begins to tumble with the judge’s selection of the guardian ad litem, who selects the custody evaluator experts favorable to the lawyer who so successfully judge shopped.
     The representation of John Harold Murphy, once the case began with a designated appellate panel, expanded his representation from the three Glover & Davis lawyers to the assistance of the must larger, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, law firm with its cadre of corporate lawyers, whose briefs before the Court of Appeals panel frequently cite to Christopher J. McFadden, et al., Georgia Appellate Practice.
     This petition, with only reliance upon the law and constitutional protections, seeks this Court’s protection that has offered the only glimmer of legal respite for unconstitutional and illegal treatment of Michelle Murphy and the disabling of her counsel.
     The underlying modification of custody action was initiated after Michelle Murphy and the Children chose not to succumb to the threat of John Harold Murphy to be subjected to a modification action if the family did not move from Newnan, GA to Chattanooga, TN in order to live near the Lookout Mountain mansion of Renee L. Haugerud, an extremely wealthy hedge fund operator now married to John Harold Murphy and wanted the children. (R. V10, p. 1919)
15      In this case, the Superior Court of Coweta County never implemented a mandated case management plan until after sustained challenges by Michelle Murphy’s counsel (R. V2, p. 310, R. V17, p. 3649) and until this day, Chief Judge Baldwin has not complied with the mandates of Superior Court Rule 25 et seq. (Recusal) and particularly by not complying with Rule 25 (3.l) of presenting his disqualifying motions to another jurist.
     Judge Baldwin will not allow another jurist to review any of the numerous disqualification motions that enumerate his disqualifying conduct within the required five (5) day of the conduct occurring.
     Judge Baldwin’s unconstitutional application of the law, often expressed as expressed to Larry King at the beginning of the day that these contempt matters were adjudicated, is as follows.
Question Presented One (E of E One)
     The Court of Appeals, as did the trial court, without any evidence in support of Michelle Murphy being held in civil contempt, ordered her to pay John Harold Murphy $5,000 in attorney fees under OCGA §19-9-3 “based on inter alia, the attorney’s fees Plaintiff incurred in seeking to compel Defendant’s compliance with the August Order and in bringing Defendant’s contempt to the Court’s attention” (R. V17, p. 3637) without these lawyers bringing supporting testimony, for what amounts to a failed, illegal attempt to have Michelle Murphy held in criminal contempt for visitation issuesthat even the Court would not accept (R. V17, p. 3627).
16       Michelle Murphy was ordered to pay $5,000 to learn of the treatment of her lawyer, Larry King, for offering to call Judge Baldwin’s attention to legal documents and for not making Michelle Murphy come to Court, and to further learn that her other lawyer, at that time, would be criminally convicted, in absentia, and fined for no legal reason and for no practical reason but to diminish the legal representation of Michelle Murphy and the best interest of Jack and Thomas.
     Malicious abuse of the criminal process, an actionable tort, is one of the detrimental results of judge shopping that occurs when the protections of the Uniform Superior Court Rules are not allowed to protect the politically and financially weak in our society.
     During the attempt at the hearing to have Michelle Murphy held in indirect civil contempt, in absentia, Judge Baldwin, on several occasions warned the Glover & Davis lawyer that he had not presented any admissible evidence to support that Michelle Murphy had not complied with the August Order relating to the expert witness, custody evaluator.
     On one occasion, Judge Baldwin warned the Glover & Davis lawyer as follows. (Tr. Oct 3, 2013 p. 56, l. 8)
THE COURT:      You know, let me tell y’all, I want — One of the problems in this case is, is really to get in the information y’all want to get in, we really need the evaluator, and we really need the driver.
     You know, I’ll let him [John Harold Murphy] go so far as trying to tell things, but a lot of this stuff you just can’t get in because it’s hearsay, and 17 I just — you know, I don’t understand why those folks are not here. I understand the evaluator may cost money and may, you know, have other things to do, but, shoot, I think — you know, I think we need to get them here.
     On the other occasion, Judge Baldwin had held Larry King in direct contempt and ordered him held in custody until he paid a $1000 for attempting to notice the Court of a plea to the personal jurisdiction of Judge Baldwin.
     The affidavit of Larry King in support of the Response to the Amended Motion for Contempt, which the Court of Appeals used at another segment of its opinion, states as follows (R. V14, p. 2910):
17.      During John Harold Murphy’s testimony, Judge Baldwin stated that he wished to talk to counsel in chambers. The court reporter did not proceed to chambers, or take down the communications that occurred in chambers.
17.1      As counsel walked down the hallway with Judge Baldwin to his chambers, he stated, “I did not want to embarrass anyone out there, but I can’t do anything about the failure to cooperate with the evaluator unless I hear from her.” (meaning the Custody Evaluator).
     The Glover and Davis lawyer did not present the custody evaluator or anyone who fulfilled the burden of proof. Judge Baldwin finally reasoned as follows:
The Court:     Okay. It appears to me that just like the situation in a woman getting up and saying, “He hasn’t paid my child support,” it’s necessary for that guy to be in court and refute what was being said. And, of course, his – the plaintiff’s testimony, I believe is sufficient to 18 show that she’s not cooperating with this deal. Tr. Oct 3, 2013, p. 110.
Judge Baldwin did not make the legal distinction that it was not failure to cooperate with John Harold Murphy that was at issue. Judge Baldwin issued the following Order, prepared by the Glover & Davis lawyers. (R. V17, p. 3627)
     Defendant Michelle Murphy is hereby found to be in contempt of the custody evaluation provision of this Court’s August Order. Defendant shall be immediately incarcerated in the Coweta County, Georgia jail until she complies with the August Order by signing the document previously submitted to her by Dr. Nancy McGarrah’s office.
     The reasoning of the Court of Appeals for upholding the contempt conviction of Michelle Murphy is equally fallacious as that of Judge Baldwin. The Court of Appeals opined as follows.
     And, in a response to the amended motion for contempt which she filed on October 22, 2013, [that was not due or filed until after the October 3, 2013 hearing] Nancy Michelle Murphy expressly defied the August 23 order and declared herself justified in refusing to sign the documents that were a prerequisite to the custody evaluation.
The trial court was therefore authorized to conclude that she had not signed those documents. See OCGA § 24-8-821 (“Without offering the same in evidence, either party may avail himself or herself of allegations or admissions made in the pleadings of the other.”). Murphy v. Murphy, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 760, 18-19 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2014)
19      Counsel for Michelle Murphy was entitled to offer a defense to the criminal contempt conviction that the Glover & Davis lawyer sought, which Judge Baldwin did not impose, and was entitled to present alternative defenses in a brief, as any litigant is entitled to present in any civil case.
     The information that the Court of Appeals claims supported the infirm, indirect civil contempt adjudication was as follows, in Michelle Murphy’s response to the contempt motion prepared by counsel, beginning at R. V16, p. 3459:
     The Conduct of Judge Baldwin on October 3, 2013 is a Part of the Pattern of Obstruction of Justice in the Case
     There was a motion to disqualify Elizabeth “Lisa” F. Harwell (V3 p. 549) that Judge Baldwin denied in a one sentence Order. (V12 p. 2318)
    Elizabeth “Lisa” F. Harwell, the guardian ad litem, who is presently still serving, after being caught converting funds, has obtained counsel who has moved to prevent her deposition and inspection of subpoenaed documents, in part, relating to her conversion of trust funds to her personal use.
     This conduct by counsel for the guardian ad litem prevents further documentation of Elizabeth “Lisa” F. Harwell’s conversion of trust funds and her other illegal conduct that motivates her retaliation against Michelle Murphy and her counsel.
      The conduct of the guardian ad litem is relevant, as she alone selected a “custody evaluator” to continue the economic assault upon the meager income of Michelle Murphy.
     The contract that the “custody evaluator” requires Michelle Murphy to execute is void as against public policy when the party is ordered by a 20 Court to obtain the services of the “custody evaluator,” as the contract requires Michelle Murphy to waive not just the OCGA § 19-9-3 (a)(7) statutory immunity provided to the “custody evaluator,” but, additionally, to release the “custody evaluator” from all liability (Contract p. 9 XVII IMMUNITY; V15 p. 3318).
     The “custody evaluator” has communicated that she will not begin the evaluation until all the parties sign the contract, (V15, p. 3322) which requires Michelle Murphy to be responsible for a large amount of money subject to 18% interest for past due payments, which depletion of funds from this family would affect the best interests of the children.
     Michelle Murphy is a hair stylist against whom John Murphy and his now spouse, a hedge fund operator, have engaged over six lawyers to economically bully Michelle Murphy into surrendering the children to John Murphy for the sole reason that they can provide the children better economic benefits than Michelle Murphy.
     The Glover & Davis lawyers illegally and unconstitutionally prepared documents to have Michelle held in criminal contempt and civil contempt, without a subpoena or rule nisi to obtain either her presence or the presence of the designated custody evaluator, Nancy McGarrah, that they failed to support with any evidence.
     The trial court illegally required Michelle Murphy to pay attorney fees based upon OCGA §19-9-3 for what was no more than the failure of these prosecuting lawyers to properly notice and prepare their case, if they had one and were not just waiting for a judge-shopped gratuity (R. V17, p. 3627).
     In keeping with the Court of Appeals’ conduct of attempting to supply evidence from the response to the motion, the 21 affidavit of Larry King is again relevant on the absence of notice issue and on the issue of the bias of Judge Baldwin. Larry King swore as a part of the Response as follows. (R. V14, p. 2907)
14.      In response to the calendar call I was prepared to make my announcement in the following order
14.1      I wanted to provide Judge Baldwin of the dates of the pending disqualification motions that were awaiting a ruling by him and that Uniform Superior Court Rule 25 required Judge Baldwin to cease acting on the matter until he ruled upon the disqualification motions.
     The following documents relating to the disqualification of Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr. are pending and awaiting a ruling by Judge Baldwin or an independent judge assigned to hear the motions.
     These disqualification motions are summarily identified as follows.
July 2, 2012
     Consolidated Motions for Disqualification of Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr. Monday,
August 19, 2013
     Consolidated Motions for Disqualification of Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr., Constitutional Challenges to Uniform Superior Court Rule 25 et seq. and for Other Uses as Allowed by Law August 28, 2013:
Amendment to Monday, August 19, 2013
Consolidated Motions for Disqualification of Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr.,
Initiated with this Judge’s “I’ll Put You in Jail” Threats that Motivated John Murphy to Sic the Deputy Sheriff of Coweta County on the Mother of the Children whom She Raised Since John Murphy Abandoned the Family.
Friday, September 13, 2013
 Addendum to Wednesday, August 28, 2013 22
Amendment to the Monday, August 19, 2013
 Consolidated Motions for Disqualification of Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr.
14.2      After informing Judge Baldwin of the pending disqualification motions, I wanted to advise the Court that the required personal service and a Rule Nisi, had not been given and that the matter was not before the Court.
14.3      I wanted to advise the Court that it had no jurisdiction, as the Amended Motion for Contempt attempted to add what could be one of two parties, identified as the “lawyer” for Nancy Michelle Murphy.
     The adding of one of possible two new parties to the motion for contempt was a violation of the rights of the newly added party but was additionally prejudicial to Nancy Michelle Murphy, as such conduct is detrimental to Michelle Murphy to have Judge Baldwin allowing the Glover & Davis lawyers attacking her lawyer.
14.4      I wanted to advise the Court that the August 23, 2013 Order was on appeal and that any contempt of that Order was superseded by the appeal.
14.5      Additionally, I wanted to advise the Court that the September 27, 2013 motion was not noticed nor ripe for hearing on October 3, 2013.
15.      At some point during my monotone announcement of the above statements of what I felt to be an initial consideration, Judge Baldwin stated something like, “I hold you in contempt. I am tired of all this stuff you all are doing. I order you incarcerated until you pay $1000.00 attorney fees as a purge.”
     It was in this judicial environment that Larry King attempted to defend Michelle 23 Murphy, Millard Farmer, himself and “defendant’s lawyer.” (R. V14, p. 2942)
     The conviction of Michelle Murphy should not stand, as the trier of fact expressed his bias to her counsel for presenting constitutional and statutory defenses. “All parties before the court have the right to an impartial judicial officer.” Stephens v. Stephens, 249 Ga. 700, 702 (292 SE2d 689) (1982).
     The issue of judicial disqualification can rise to a constitutional level since “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (75 SC 623, 99 LE 942) (1955). See also Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (129 SC 2252, 173 LE2d 1208) (2009).
     Judicial integrity is “a state interest of the highest order” because the power and prerogative of a court to resolve disputes rests upon the respect accorded by citizens to a court’s judgments which, in turn, depends upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. Id. at 889.
     “If the public lacks confidence in the impartiality of judges, or worse, refuses to comply with judicial decisions voluntarily, the notion that ‘we are a government of laws’ would necessarily collapse.” Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 943, 968.
       It is vital to the functioning of the courts that the public believe in the absolute integrity and impartiality of its judges [see Smith v. Guest Pond Club, 277 Ga. 143, 146 (586 SE2d 623) (2003)], and judicial recusal serves as a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a court should be fair and impartial. 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev., supra, at 949. n 1
24      The commitments of Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114 (2012) are of no moment to Michelle Murphy, Millard Farmer and her children if she is retroactively shielded from the protections until the expiration of the illegal conduct of a judge and a person to whom the judge has illegally delegated his authority.
     The law books, Uniform Superior Court Rules and Constitutional protections toppled like a house of cards once Judge Baldwin was judge-shopped and initially made no pretense of fairness, by, over strong objection, signing without reading the appointment of the guardian ad litem who had co-sponsored with the Glover & Davis lawyer the night before, a judicial fundraiser attended by Judge Baldwin. (R. V14, p. 2722)
     The Order illegally delegated authority to the guardian ad litem to temporarily change custody of the children without approval of the Court, which Elizabeth Harwell attempted to use. (R. V16, p, 3371; R. V10, p. 2012)
Question Presented Two (E of E Two)
     The August 23, 2013 Order, criminally adjudicating Millard Farmer, and the charging document were each prepared by Taylor Drake of Glover & Davis PA and signed with express consent for Taylor Drake by Michael Warner.
     The August 23, 2013 Order and the charging document were also approved as to form by Elizabeth “Lisa” F. Harwell, the guardian ad litem.
     The Glover & Davis lawyers and the Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP lawyers for John Harold Murphy sought upholding of the criminal conviction of Millard Farmer in the Court of Appeals.
25      It is relevant to understand that each of the documents that used the criminal process to financially and otherwise diminish the ability of Michelle Murphy were initiated, prepared and attempted to be enforced by the lawyers attempting to deprive Jack and Thomas of their lives with their mother while enriching themselves with an enormous amount of attorney fees and depleting the financial resources of Michelle Murphy.
     There is no way to gently state that, with the assistance of Judge Baldwin, these lawyers and the guardian ad litem, who is a lawyer, have been compensated to maliciously abuse the criminal process by having Millard Farmer criminally convicted and immediately incarcerated until he pays $1,000, or expends many times over that to be relieved of the criminal conviction that the Court of Appeals has upheld, at their insistence.
     The Order was apparently hastily drafted on Friday, August 23, 2013 by an inexperienced drafter, if it was intended to pass muster for a criminal conviction.
     The Order was drafted to accommodate the social schedule of John Harold Murphy and Renee L. Haugerud as a priority to Thomas’s football jamboree that he had planned to attend if the visitation, alternating weekend schedule, had not been changed with the August 23, 2013 Order. (R. V14, p. 2770)
     Within five (5) days of obtaining the August 23, 2014 Order, the lawyers for John Harold Murphy filed a contempt action against Michelle Murphy based in part upon a false swearing by John Harold Murphy, evidence of which one of the children had 26 recorded after the child was informed that John Harold Murphy was no longer going to allow accommodation of the children’s local obligations and visitation as they desired. (R. V14, p. 2765)
     Anyone with teenaged children realizes that children that age do not hang around the house and visit with their parents, nor do they wish to sit in an expensive hotel room at some resort; instead, the children, as their mother well knew, wished to be with own social group around their school friends, as compensation for accomplishing their school work and behaving during the week.
     It is an unrealistic person and judge who yelled at Michelle Murphy as follows about the children not wishing to visit with John Harold Murphy, who made no attempt to participate with the children’s activities, but instead sent a chauffeur to pick up the children on their visitation weekends. Tr. Aug. 13, 2013, p. 259, lines 1 –15
[The Court] . . . I’m going to say that they have got to both go to visitations when they go.
     I am ordering you to make them go.I don’t care whether they jump up and down, scream and holler, lock themselves in their room. Whatever they do, you have got to make them go. Do you understand that?
MS. MURPHY:     Yes.
THE COURT:      And that’s going to be in the order. And I don’t -want you to — I don’t know how to say it any plainer than this, now. And this same thing is going to go for Mr. Murphy. If you don’t do what I tell you to do– and I’m telling you to see that they go; I’m not giving them the option and I’m telling them they’ve got to go. But if you don’t do that, I’ll put you in jail.And I’m not kidding with you.
      Okay?
27      Attempting to treat the children as commodities resulted in exposure of judicial misconduct that even illegal contempt Orders cannot suppress. On the day that Judge Baldwin adjudicated his contempt convictions from the bench, Larry King, one of the lawyers for Michelle Murphy who has now retired and is no longer in the case, was greeted by Judge Baldwin with a boisterous, “You are in contempt” as Larry King, in a crowded courtroom, attempted to announce his presence and to explain his plea to the personal jurisdiction of Judge Baldwin. (Tr. Oct 3, 2013, p. 7)
     Larry King was immediately taken into custody by the Deputy Sheriff and required to pay $1,000 in cash, as Judge Baldwin would not accept his check before he was loosened from the Deputy Sheriff. (R. V14, p. 2942)
     Later that morning, Judge Baldwin informed Larry King that he had been mad when he held him in contempt and would refund his money. (Tr. Oct 3, 2013, p. 19)
     At the end of the day, Judge Baldwin again summarily announced that he was finding Larry King in contempt for not having Michelle Murphy present in Court and again took his $1,000. (Tr. Oct 3, 2013, p. 112)
The Court of Appeals resolved the contempt of the lawyers’ “failure” to have Michelle Murphy present by overturning the conviction of both Larry King and Millard Farmer after an expensive appellate process that still left the contempt convictions of Millard Farmer and Michelle Murphy and required Michelle Murphy to pay John Harold Murphy’s attorney fees illegally based upon OCGA §19-9-3 for 28 the Glover & Davis lawyers’ illegal attempt to present evidence on alleged contempts.
     The point in describing the criminal action of Judge Baldwin against Larry King is to identify the depth of the vindictive hostility of Judge Baldwin to both of the lawyers representing Michelle Murphy.
     The prosecutors of the criminal contempt actions knew that they only need ask and Judge Baldwin would allow them to prepare and obtain the retaliatory criminal conviction against Millard Farmer, who Judge Baldwin accurately knew, brought the disqualification motions and other actions against him, in order to obtain a judge that on appellate review could obtain Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 310 Ga App. 878 (2011) approval.
     Counsel opposing Michelle Murphy were not naïve in expecting that the Glover & Davis lawyers could obtain the criminal conviction from Judge Baldwin that would please their paymasters.
     They knew that with Judge Baldwin, they could draft a criminal conviction Order on which they stood a good chance of obtaining treatment accorded them in Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson Cook Co., 310 Ga App. 878 (2011) with the Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP name on the appellate brief. The lawyers who initialized and attempted to enforce the criminal contempt action against Millard Farmer have adequate legal training in interpreting contracts, and even without criminal prosecuting experience understand the meaning of the charges that they used to obtain a criminal conviction.
29      The term “Defendant’s lawyer” (singular, without further identity) in a case involving two lawyers, both of whom were known personally by the prosecuting individuals, with neither lawyer served a rule nisi or subpoena, that was used to obtain the conviction of Millard Farmer, fails muster for a charging document and procedure seeking the option of obtaining a criminal conviction of either lawyer in the case.
     These lawyers knew that “party” as they used the word in the August 23, 2013 Order did not mean Millard Farmer or Larry King.
     The supporting argument and authority for Questions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 is contained in the question presented or in other argument, or authority, as we have reached that thirty (30) page red light. Request for Relief Nancy Michelle Murphy requests that the petition be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
/Millard Farmer Millard Farmer
Georgia Bar No. 255300
P.O. Box 1728
Atlanta, GA 30301-1728
(404) 688-8116
millardfarmer@millardfarmer.com
Counsel for Nancy Michelle Murphy and Millard Farmer
30 SECOND DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MCFADDEN and BOGGS, JJ.
NOTICE:
     Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
November 17, 2014
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A1137. MURPHY v. MURPHY.
MCFADDEN, Judge.
     Although this is our third opinion in this custody modification action, we are still not presented with a final order on the petition to modify. Instead we are presented with a series of rulings holding appellant Nancy Michelle Murphy and her attorneys, Millard Farmer and Larry King, in contempt of court. Farmer has been held in contempt of an earlier order that prohibited the parties from discussing the case with their children.
     As Farmer signed a brief to which he exhibited affidavits of the children echoing their mother’s anger at John Murphy, there is sufficient evidence to support that ruling; and we find that Farmer received sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before he was held in contempt.
    Nancy Michelle Murphy has been held in contempt of another provision of that order which Appendix 1, Page 1 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals required her to cooperate with a custody evaluator.
     Any insufficiency of the evidence presented on that charge at the contempt hearing was supplied by her own brief in opposition to the motion for contempt. In that brief she announced that she deemed herself to be entitled to defy the provision directing her to cooperate with the evaluator. And again we find sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.
    Finally Farmer and King have been held in contempt for failure to have Nancy Michelle Murphy present at the contempt hearing. But as she was not under subpoena and had not been ordered to appear in person, she was entitled to appear through counsel; so that ruling must be reversed. We therefore affirm the trial court’s contempt order in part and reverse it in part.
1. Prior appeals.
     Nancy Michelle Murphy and John Murphy were divorced in 2006. They have two children, born in November 1998 and January 2001.
     In April 2012, John Murphy filed this action, seeking to modify the child custody provisions of the divorce decree. Nancy Michelle Murphy has repeatedly moved to recuse the trial court judge.
Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829 (747 SE2d 21) (2013), her first appeal in this case, was a direct appeal from an interlocutory order denying one of her motions to 2 Appendix 1, Page 2 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals recuse.
     We dismissed on the basis the order was not appealable as a collateral order and was not appealable under the version of OC
GA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) adopted in 2013, which authorizes direct appeals from “judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders.”
     Our Supreme Court granted Nancy Michelle Murphy’s petition for certiorari to address whether we erred when we concluded that the 2013 amendment of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) applied retroactively.
     In Murphy v. Murphy, 295 Ga. 376 (761 SE2d 53) (2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the amendment did not apply retroactively but nonetheless affirmed the dismissal of Nancy Michelle Murphy’s appeal on the ground that, “even under the prior version of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), there was no right of direct appeal from the recusal order at issue.” Id. at 379.
In the meantime, on August 23, 2013, the trial court entered an order that, among other things, denied John Murphy’s motion to temporarily change physical custody of the children, directed the parties not to discuss the case with the children, ordered a custody evaluation, and directed the parties to cooperate with the custody evaluator. In Nancy Michelle Murphy’s second appeal to our court, Murphy v. Murphy, __ Ga. App. __ (759 SE2d 909) (2014), we affirmed that order.
     We imposed a frivolous appeal penalty against Nancy Michelle Murphy’s counsel, finding that the appeal was frivolous and dilatory and rife with violations of Court of Appeals Rule 10, which forbids oral or written personal remarks that are discourteous or disparaging to any judge, opposing counsel, or any court.
2. Facts underlying the present appeal.
     Six days after the August 23, 2013 order was entered, John Murphy filed a motion seeking to hold Nancy Michelle Murphy in contempt for violating its visitation provisions.
     In response Nancy Michelle Murphy filed affidavits from the children, testifying that the motion for contempt had been read to them in the presence of their mother, that their mother had not interfered with their father’s visitation as alleged in the motion for contempt, and that they were extremely angry at their father for not telling the truth to the court.
     John Murphy then amended his motion for contempt. He alleged that Nancy Michelle Murphy and “her lawyer” were in contempt of the order’s provision prohibiting the parties from discussing the case with the children.
     He also alleged that Nancy Michelle Murphy was violating the requirement of the August 23 order that she cooperate with the custody evaluator in that she had refused to complete the paperwork the custody evaluator required before beginning the evaluation.
     The trial court conducted a hearing on the contempt motion on October 3, 2013. Nancy Michelle Murphy and Farmer did not appear, but King did appear on behalf of Nancy Michelle Murphy.
     After hearing testimony from John Murphy and the driver hired to transport the children from Nancy Michelle Murphy’s residence to John Murphy’s residence, the trial court found Nancy Michelle Murphy, Farmer, and King to be in contempt.
     The trial court found Farmer to be in contempt for discussing the case with the children in violation of the August 23 order.
     It found Nancy Michelle Murphy to be in contempt for wilfully refusing to cooperate with the custody evaluator in violation of the August 23 order.
     And it found King and Farmer to be in contempt because of Nancy Michelle Murphy’s failure to appear at the contempt hearing. Nancy Michelle Murphy, Farmer, and King filed an application for discretionary appeal of the contempt order. We granted the application, and this latest appeal followed.
     We first address John Murphy’s motion to dismiss the appeal, then turn to the deficiencies in the appellants’ brief, and finally, address the merits of the challenges to the contempt order.
3.      Motion to dismiss the appeal. 5 Appendix 1, Page 5 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals
     Because this is an appeal from a contempt order, the appellants were not required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure. OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (2); Massey v. Massey, 294 Ga. 163, 164-165 (2) (751 SE2d 330) (2013) (citations omitted); see also OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) (making “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders” immediately appealable); OCGA § 5-6-37 (“Unless otherwise provided by law, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by filing with the clerk of the court wherein the case was determined a notice of appeal.”).
     Because they filed an application for discretionary appeal, we have jurisdiction regardless of whether or not they were entitled to follow the direct appeal procedure. OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). So we do not decide if they were so entitled, and we deny John Murphy’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
4. Deficiencies in the appellants’ brief.
     As a threshold matter, we address the deficiencies in the appellants’ brief. The Appellate Practice Act, at OCGA § 5-6-40, provides that enumerations of error are to be concise and “shall set out separately each error relied upon.”  “It is desirable that each enumeration be explicit, precise, intelligible, unambiguous,  unmistakable, and unequivocal.” MacDonald v. MacDonald, 156 Ga. App. 565, 569 (1) (d) (275 SE2d 142) (1980) (physical precedent).
     Our rules direct that, “[t]he sequence of arguments in the briefs shall follow the order of the enumeration of errors, and shall be numbered accordingly.” Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (1).
 
     As to each enumeration of error, an appellant is to specify how the error was preserved and to state concisely the applicable standard of review. Court of Appeals Rule 25 (a). Briefs and enumerations of errors that do not conform to those requirements hinder our ability to determine the basis and substance of an appellant’s appeal. Williams v. State, 318 Ga. App. 744, 744-745 (734 SE2d 745) (2012).
     Appellants’ brief does not conform to those requirements.
     Their brief and enumerations of error is rambling and difficult to follow; several enumerations contain multiple allegations of error.
     These deficiencies are illustrated by enumeration of error four, which is set out in the margin.
1 1      “Whether the court erred in holding Michelle Murphy in contempt for not cooperating, within the time provided by the Court, with the custody evaluator, who presented an illegal condition for Michelle Murphy to perform in order to “cooperate” by requiring that Michelle Murphy execute the psychologist’s contract. (V17 p.3627)
     The contempt adjudication was not supported with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Michelle Murphy’s violation of the Order.
     If proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Michelle Murphy violated any directive of the custody evaluator, the directive placed an illegal condition upon Michelle Murphy that is being appealed.
     In order to accomplish what Judge Baldwin ordered, Michelle Murphy would have had to be As to some of the issues that appellants attempt to raise, these deficiencies constitute abandonment.
     Appellants do not address each enumeration of error in the argument section of their brief, and their arguments in that section do not follow the order of the enumeration of errors.
     And many of the alleged errors referenced in the enumeration of errors, are not supported with arguments, citations to the record, or citations of authority.
Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) provides, “Any enumeration of error which is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may subjected to the following, illegal conditions: Michelle Murphy would have been required to execute a contract that is void against the public policy of the State of Georgia, in that:
(a)      the contract that requires Michelle Murphy to grant the psychologist full immunity from liability, not just the immunity from liability provided by statute that exempts immunity to the psychologist resulting from her bad faith;
(b)      the contract requires that Michelle Murphy become financially liable for fees that she cannot afford, as it requires that she pay expensive fees to obtain discovery and production, testimony at trial, or be deprived of this evidence that could be necessary to her defense of the psychologist’s findings or for use by her as evidence against the plaintiff;
c)      the contract provides that the psychologist be paid 18% interest for late payments of fees;
 (d)      unless Michelle Murphy executed the contract, the psychologist would not inform her counsel of the method to be used for the “custody evaluation,” and would not provide other information about the scope of the investigation of John Harold Murphy and Renee L. Haugerud that would be conducted before rendering an opinion to the Court;
(e)      unless Michelle Murphy executed the contract, the psychologist stated that she would not talk to counsel for Michelle Murphy or Michelle Murphy; and,
(f) Michelle Murphy would have been subjected to a psychologist who was selected by the guardian ad litem, who was exposed by counsel for Michelle Murphy for converting to her personal use trust funds provided to her in the case, in violation of USCR 24.9 (8)(g).”
      Appendix 1, Page 8 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals be deemed abandoned.” See also Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (i) (“Each enumerated error shall be supported in the brief by specific reference to the record or transcript. In the absence of such reference, the Court will not search for or consider such enumeration.”).
     In spite of these deficiencies, we will review the claims of error that we are authorized to reach to the extent that we can ascertain the appellants’ arguments, Williams, 318 Ga. App. at 744-745, and to the extent they have not abandoned them.
 5.      Claim that trial judge is disqualified.
     The appellants argue that the Honorable A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr. was disqualified from adjudicating the contempt motion for two reasons:
     because another judge’s transfer of the case to Judge Baldwin was illegal,
     and because unadjudicated disqualification motions were pending against Judge Baldwin at the time that he decided the contempt motion.
However, the appellants have cited no authority for the 
     Finally as noted above, our previous opinion rebuked appellants for repeated violations of Court of Appeals Rule 10 which provides, “Personal remarks, whether oral or written, which are discourteous or disparaging to any judge, opposing counsel, or any court, are strictly forbidden.” Murphy v. Murphy, __ Ga. App. __, __ (4) (759 SE2d 909) (2014).
     Their present brief is only somewhat better. It includes, for example, repeated unsupported and irrelevant assertions that a particular witness has substance abuse problems.
     We again rebuke appellants. This lack of professionalism does less than nothing to advance their cause. 9 Appendix 1, Page 9 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals proposition that the transfer of the case to Judge Baldwin was illegal.
On the contrary, Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.3 authorizes “an assigned judge [to] transfer an assigned action to another judge with the latter’s consent in which event the latter becomes the assigned judge.” And there are no unadjudicated disqualification motions.
     Judge Baldwin orally denied all such motions before hearing the contempt motion. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1 (“In no event shall the motion [for disqualification] be allowed to delay the trial or proceeding.”).
     The appellants argue that Judge Baldwin was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the contempt motion because the August 23 order was currently on appeal and subject to supersedeas.
     Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (e), however, when a party appeals an order granting nonmonetary relief in a child custody case, the order stands until reversed or modified by the reviewing court unless the trial court states otherwise in its judgment or order.
     The trial court did not state otherwise in the August 23 order, so that order stood and remained enforceable through contempt proceedings notwithstanding the pending appeal. See Walker v. Walker, 239 Ga. 175, 176 (236 SE2d 263) (1977) (custody award that is not subject to supersedeas is enforceable through contempt; decided before July 1, 2011 effective date of OCGA § 5-6-34 (e)).
6.      Contempt citations. 10 Appendix 1, Page 10 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals
     Having addressed these preliminary matters, we now turn to the trial court’s order finding Farmer to be in contempt for discussing the case with the children in violation of the August 23 order, finding Nancy Michelle Murphy to be in contempt for wilfully refusing to cooperate with the custody evaluator in violation of the August 23 order, and finding both attorneys to be in contempt because of Nancy Michelle Murphy’s failure to appear at the contempt hearing.
(a) Violation of the prohibition of discussing this case with the children.
     The trial court held attorney Farmer in contempt after finding that he was “discussing the issues, allegations, and claims in this case with the children and that such discussions are not necessary to implement the terms of the August Order.”
     The appellants argue that this judgment of contempt must be reversed because Farmer did not receive adequate notice and because the evidence does not support it.
(i) Notice.
     The appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that they had sufficient notice of the contempt allegations against them and the hearing on the contempt. We conclude that the notice was reasonable.
     Whether or not a party is entitled to notice of the charges of contempt and a hearing on those charges depends on the type of contempt he is charged with.
     “Acts 11 Appendix 1, Page 11 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals of contempt are either direct, meaning they are committed within the sensory perception of the judge, or they are indirect, meaning they occur outside the sensory perception of the judge.” In re Shook, 254 Ga. App. 706, 707 (563 SE2d 435) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted).
     When a party is charged with committing direct contempt, no advanced notice is required and due process is satisfied “by simply giving [the party charged] an opportunity to speak on her own behalf.” Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 33, 36 (2) (b) (572 SE2d 669) (2002) (citation omitted).
     When a party is charged with committing indirect contempt, the party is “entitled, among other things, to reasonable notice of the charges, to counsel of his own choosing, and to the opportunity to call witnesses.” Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 13, 16 (3) (608 SE2d 645) (2005).
     Farmer was charged with indirect contempt and therefore was entitled to reasonable notice of the allegations against him. “[T]he notice must be reasonably calculated to inform persons of the charges against them and their opportunity for a hearing at a specific time and place to present their objections.” Hedquist v. Hedquist, 275 Ga. 188, 189 (563 SE2d 854) (2002) (citation omitted). The notice here met those requirements.
 12      Appendix 1, Page 12 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals Appellants were adequately informed of the charges.
     The amended motion for contempt sufficiently specified the allegedly contumacious conduct.
     It sought to hold counsel in contempt for discussing the issues in the case with the parties’ children.
     The appellants argue that referring to “Defendant’s lawyer” instead of “Millard Farmer” rendered the motion insufficient.
     They cite no supporting authority for that argument, and we reject it.
     Appellants were adequately notified of their opportunity to be heard at a specific time and place.
     On September 12, 2014, counsel for John Murphy served upon counsel for Nancy Michelle Murphy a “Notice of Hearing” that specified the date, time, and location of a hearing before the trial court “in order for [the trial court] to consider the relief requested in Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt filed in the above captioned matter on August 29, 2013.”
     Counsel served that “Notice of Hearing” by United States mail and by email. Additionally the trial court issued a calendar to counsel for the parties, confirming that a hearing was scheduled for October 3, 2013.
     The appellants do not deny receiving the notice of hearing or the calendar. Counsel for John Murphy served the amended motion for contempt upon counsel for Nancy Michelle Murphy on September 27, 2013, six days before the scheduled hearing. Under these facts, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the
13       Appendix 1, Page 13 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals appellants received reasonable, sufficient notice. See Gibson v. Gibson, 234 Ga. 528, 529-530 (3) (216 SE2d 824) (1975) (notice less than five days before hearing, which appellant did not dispute receiving, was reasonable). Compare Hedquist, 275 Ga. at 190 (notice of hearing that did not specify that trial court would hear the contempt motions at pretrial conference was inadequate).
(ii) Sufficiency of the evidence.
     Farmer argues that the contempt must be reversed because the evidence does not support the finding of contempt. Our standard of review is dictated by the nature of the contempt, whether criminal or civil. In re Waitz, 255 Ga. App. 841, 842 (567 SE2d 87) (2002).
     The trial court sentenced Farmer to “be incarcerated in the Coweta County, Georgia jail for a period of 20 days or until he pa[id] One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to the Court.” Because he was sentenced to imprisonment for a specified, unconditional period, Farmer’s contempt was criminal. See In the Interest of J. D., 316 Ga. App. 19, 21 (1) (728 SE2d 698) (2012) (“If the contemnor is imprisoned for a specified unconditional period . . . the purpose is punishment and thus the contempt is criminal.”) (citation, footnote, and punctuation omitted).
“On appeal of a criminal contempt conviction the appropriate standard of appellate review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 14 Appendix 1, Page 14 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Waitz, 255 Ga. App. at 842 (citation and punctuation omitted).
     After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the trial court could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
     Farmer signed the brief to which the affidavits reflecting the children’s knowledge of the case were attached. Also attached to that brief is an affidavit of Farmer himself, notarized on the same day by the notary who notarized the children’s affidavits.
     To the extent Farmer argues that he cannot be held in contempt for violating a provision directed at the parties rather than himself, his argument is unavailing.
     The violation of a court’s order by one who was not a party to the proceedings can be punished as a contempt if the contemnor had actual notice of the order and is in privity with, aided and abetted, or acted in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order. The Bootery v. Cumberland Creek Props., 271 Ga. 271, 272 (2) (517 SE2d 68) (1999). It is undisputed that Farmer had actual notice of the order and acted as Nancy Michelle Murphy’s representative when obtaining the affidavits from the children.
(b)      Failure to cooperate with the custody evaluator. 15 Appendix 1, Page 15 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals The trial court held Nancy Michelle Murphy in contempt after finding that she had not cooperated with the custody evaluator. The appellants argue that this judgment of contempt must be reversed because Nancy Michelle Murphy did not receive adequate notice and because the evidence does not support it.
(i) Notice.
     Nancy Michelle Murphy was entitled to reasonable notice related to the allegations of indirect contempt for violating the August 23, 2013 court order.
     For the reasons discussed in Division 6 (a) (1), supra, we conclude that she received such notice.
(ii) Sufficiency of the evidence.
The trial court sentenced Nancy Michelle Murphy to incarceration “until she compli[ed] with the August Order by signing the documents previously submitted to her by [the custody evaluator’s] office.”
     This was a civil contempt. See In the Interest of J. D., 316 Ga. App. at 21-22 (1) (“If the contemnor is imprisoned only until he performs a specified act, the purpose is remedial and hence the contempt is civil.”) (citations omitted).
     In civil contempt appeals, if there is any evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that its order had been violated, we are without 16 Appendix 1, Page 16 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals power to disturb the judgment absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Waitz, 255 Ga. App. at 842 (citation omitted).
     We hold that some evidence supported the conclusion that Nancy Michelle Murphy violated the August 23 order by refusing to cooperate with the custody evaluator. The August 23 order set an October 15, 2013 deadline for completion of the custody evaluation. John Murphy testified that he had done everything the custody evaluator required in order to begin the evaluation, yet the evaluation had not proceeded.
     It is not disputed that as of November 19, 2013, the date of the trial court’s contempt order, that evaluation had not occurred.
     And, in a response to the amended motion for contempt which she filed on October 22, 2013, Nancy Michelle Murphy expressly defied the August 23 order and declared herself justified in refusing to sign the documents that were a prerequisite to the custody evaluation.
     The trial court was therefore authorized to conclude that she had not signed those documents. See OCGA § 24-8-821 (“Without offering the same in evidence, either party may avail himself or herself of allegations or admissions made in the pleadings of the other.”).
     This is sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court to conclude that Nancy Michelle Murphy violated the August 23 order by refusing to cooperate with the 17 Appendix 1, Page 17 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals custody evaluator. See Edwards v. Edwards, 254 Ga. App. 849, 854 (563 SE2d 888) (2002) (a person who simply ignores a court order that she believes is erroneous “does so at [her] own peril and must assume the risk of being held in contempt”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
(c)      Nancy Michelle Murphy’s failure to appear at the hearing. We agree with the appellants that the trial court erred in holding Farmer and King in contempt because of Nancy Michelle Murphy’s failure to appear at the contempt hearing.
      Absent a properly served subpoena or court order requiring a party to appear in person, a party may choose not to be present at the trial of the case and to be represented solely by counsel.
     This rule accords with the long-established principle that there is full power on the part of the counsel to represent the client, and it is just the same as if the client were there in person. In re Estate of Coutermarsh, 325 Ga. App. 288, 290 (1) (752 SE2d 448) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Masonry Standards v. UPS Truck Leasing, 257 Ga. 743, 743-744 (363 SE2d 553) (1988) (trial court erred in sanctioning defendant for failing to appear in person at trial).
     John Murphy has pointed to nothing that required Nancy Michelle Murphy to appear in person at the 18 Appendix 1, Page 18 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals contempt hearing.
     And because Nancy Michelle Murphy was not required to appear in person, Farmer and King could not be held in contempt for her failure to appear. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Doyle, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur. 19 Appendix 1, Pagge 19 of 19 Opinion of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta, December 04, 2014.
I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk.

 Court of Appeals of Georgia.

MURPHY v. MURPHY.

No. A13A0206.

Decided: July 12, 2013

     Nancy Michelle Murphy appeals an interlocutory order denying her motion to recuse the trial court judge in this change-of-custody case. Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

     Nancy Murphy and John Murphy were divorced in 2006. In 2012, John Murphy filed this action, seeking to modify the child custody provisions of the parties’ divorce decree.

      The case was assigned to Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr. Nancy Murphy moved to disqualify Judge Baldwin. Judge Baldwin denied the motion, and Nancy Murphy filed a notice of appeal. The case remains pending below.
     “This [c]ourt has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to entertain each appeal.” (Citation omitted.) Hammonds v. Parks, 319 Ga.App. 792, 793(2), 735 S.E.2d 801 (2012). Under the version of OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(11) in effect when Nancy Murphy filed her notice of appeal, a party could file a direct appeal from “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody․” See generally Collins v. Davis, 318 Ga.App. 265, 268–269 & n. 17(1), 733 S.E.2d 798 (2012) (holding that clear and unambiguous language of former OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(11) authorized direct appeal of any order in proceeding in which child’s legal custody, physical custody or visitation was an issue, and noting that it was for legislature to narrow scope of this right of direct appeal).
     Such orders were no longer subject to the interlocutory appeal procedures of OCGA § 5–6–34(b) or the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5–6–35(a)(2). See Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga.App. 45, 679 S.E.2d 80 (2009).
    Effective May 6, 2013, however, the legislature amended OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(11) to provide that a party can file a direct appeal from “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody․” SB 204 §§ 1, 2 (2013).
     The uncodified preamble to the amendment states that its purpose is “to limit the scope of judgments or orders in child custody cases which are subject to direct appeal.”
     And although laws that affect substantive rights apply prospectively only, procedural laws, which prescribe the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations, apply retroactively. Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 808–809(2), 654 S.E.2d 121 (2007). “[W]here a statute governs only procedure of the courts ․ it is to be given retroactive effect absent an expressed contrary intention.” Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55(2), 365 S.E.2d 273 (1988).
     Nancy Murphy filed her notice of appeal from the order denying her motion to recuse. That order does not award, refuse to change, or modify child custody.
     Consequently, the order is not appealable under OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(11), we lack jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. See Stevens v. State, 292 Ga. 218, 734 S.E.2d 743 (2012) (dismissing direct appeals from trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment due to an alleged constitutional speedy trial violation because eight days before, the Supreme Court had determined that such orders were no longer directly appealable but had to follow the interlocutory application procedures).
     To the extent that Nancy Murphy argues that we have jurisdiction over her appeal because orders denying motions to recuse are directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine, we disagree.
     The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a party who wants to appeal a pretrial ruling on a recusal motion has the option to seek an interlocutory appeal or to appeal directly after an adverse final judgment See White v. Lumpkin, 272 Ga. 398, 529 S.E.2d 879 (2000); Chandler v. Davis, 269 Ga. 727, 728, 504 S.E.2d 440 (1998).
     We, too, have held that the appeal of an interlocutory order denying a motion to recuse “requires compliance with the interlocutory appeal provisions of OCGA § 5–6–34(b).” (Citation omitted.) Ellis v. Stanford, 256 Ga.App. 294, 295(2), 568 S.E.2d 157 (2002). See also Rolleston v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 213 Ga.App. 552, 553, 445 S.E.2d 345 (1994); In re Booker, 186 Ga.App. 614, 367 S.E.2d 850 (1988).
     In fact, the interlocutory appeal provision of OCGA § 5–6–34(b) explicitly provides that:
     Where the trial judge in rendering an order, decision, or judgment, not otherwise subject to direct appeal, including but not limited to the denial of a defendant’s motion to recuse in a criminal case, certifies within ten days of entry thereof that the order, decision, or judgment is of such importance to the case that immediate review should be had, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may thereupon, in their respective discretions, permit an appeal to be taken from the order, decision, or judgment if application is made thereto within ten days after such certificate is granted.(Emphasis supplied.)
     Nonetheless, in Braddy v. State, 316 Ga.App. 292, 729 S.E.2d 461 (2012), without acknowledging the prior cases or the language of OCGA § 5–6–34(b), we held that an order denying a motion to recuse met the requirements for application of the collateral order doctrine because the ruling concern[ed] a matter wholly unrelated to the basic issues to be decided in the [underlying] case.
     Whether the trial judge could properly preside over the case would be unresolved if review had to await final judgment.
     Finally, the order resolve[d] the matter completely and nothing remain[ed] in the underlying case to affect it.Id. at 293(1), 729 S.E.2d 461.
     This holding misapplied the collateral order doctrine and directly conflicted with OCGA § 5–6–34(b)‘s explicit inclusion of “the denial of a defendant’s motion to recuse in a criminal case” in the category of orders needing a certificate of immediate review, thereby rendering the provision meaningless.
     In Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431–432(1)(c), 297 S.E.2d 469 (1982), our Supreme Court adopted the test from Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), for determining whether an order falls within the collateral order doctrine.
      Under that test, the collateral order doctrine applies if the order
(1)      completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that nothing in the underlying action can affect it;
(2)      resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues in the complaint; and
(3)      might result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, making the order effectively unreviewable on appeal. See Scroggins, 250 Ga. at 432(1), 297 S.E.2d 469(c).
     Braddy misapplied the “effectively unreviewable” prong of the test.In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stressed the stringency of the “effectively unreviewable” prong of the Cohen test:
     “To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged order must constitute a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection, of a claimed right where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever.” (Emphasis supplied; citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 376.
     In Braddy, we held that this prong was satisfied because “[w]hether the trial judge could properly preside over the case would be unresolved if review had to await final judgment.” Braddy, 316 Ga.App. at 293(1), 729 S.E.2d 461.
     But orders denying motions to recuse may be reviewed and relief afforded after the entry of final judgment. In Johnson v. State, 278 Ga. 344, 349(3), 602 S.E.2d 623 (2004), for example, the Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s convictions for felony murder and related crimes because the trial court should have granted her motion to recuse. In Gillis v. City of Waycross, 247 Ga.App. 119, 122, 543 S.E.2d 423 (2000), an appeal of a final judgment entered after a three-day trial, we remanded the case so that a different judge could consider the plaintiffs’ motion to recuse.
      Because review after entry of final judgment of orders denying motions to recuse can protect parties’ interests adequately, such orders are not appealable as collateral orders.
     And to hold otherwise ignores the explicit language of OCGA § 5–6–34(b). We therefore overrule Braddy, 316 Ga.App. at 292, 729 S.E.2d 461.
     Other courts that have considered the issue generally have held that the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule does not encompass an order denying a motion to recuse because the parties’ interests can be protected adequately in an appeal from a final judgment. See, e.g., In re Martinez–Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 217(II) (1st Cir.1997); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958, 960–961(I) (5th Cir.1980); State of Florida v. Countrywide Truck Ins. Agency, 270 Neb. 454, 703 N.W.2d 905 (Neb.2005); State v. Forte, 150 Vt. 654, 553 A.2d 564, 565 (Vt.1988); Kreig v. Krieg, 743 A.2d 509, 511 & n. 4 (Pa.Super.1999).
     In other words, because recusal questions are fully reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, the collateral order doctrine does not apply.
Appeal dismissed.
McFADDEN, Judge.PHIPPS, C.J., ANDREWS, P.J., BARNES, P.J., ELLINGTON, P.J., DOYLE, P.J., MILLER, DILLARD, BOGGS, RAY, BRANCH and McMILLIAN, JJ., concur.

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TROUP COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA

Nancy Michelle Murphy,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil Action No. 15-CV0109

     Nan Freeman and Freeman Reporting, Inc., Defendants [Only two Defendants remaining after Fulton Superior Court transfer] The Summary Judgment should be Denied and the Demand for a Jury Trial by twelve persons should be Granted Nancy Michelle Murphy’s Response to the Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.5 Theories of Recovery and Statement of Material Facts of Nan Freeman and Freeman Reporting, Inc.

     This case involves Nan Freeman, who is an official court reporter engaging in illegal conduct. Nancy Michelle Murphy (or “Michelle Murphy”) responds here to the Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.5, purported Theory of Recovery and purported Statement of Material Facts of Nan Freeman and Freeman Reporting, Inc. (or, “Nan Freeman,” collectively or individually).

       A substantial portion of Nan Freeman’s Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.5 purported Statement of Material Facts reflects the vindictiveness of those opposing Michelle Murphy for exposing the illegal conduct of Judge Baldwin and those, such as Nan Freeman, who attempted to conceal the illegal conduct of Judge Baldwin.

     This is to state that Nan Freeman is assisted by persons attempting to support the illegal conduct of Judge Baldwin, who have either benefited from the conduct of Judge Baldwin, or who seek to obtain future benefit derived from supporting Judge Baldwin and/or financial benefits derived from John Harold Murphy and Renee L. Haugerud.

     The information contained in the March 14, 2014 Motion to Disqualify Nan Freeman in Murphy v. Murphy, in the Superior Court of Coweta County, Civil Action No. 12V-413 (or, “Murphy v. Murphy”) is incorporated and made a part of this introduction, as Attachment 7.

      Nan Freeman’s Motion for Summary Judgment attempts to demean Michelle Murphy and to use the tactics of John Harold Murphy and Judge Baldwin in an attempt to defend Nan Freeman’s illegal conduct and the illegal conduct of Judge Baldwin in not adhering to the Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1 mandated case management plan.

     Nan Freeman’s Motion for Summary Judgment identifies, as much as anything, the bias of Nan Freeman and that the illegal conduct of Nan Freeman was not that of an innocent court reporter who made a few errors, but that of a person engaging in a pattern of illegal conduct allowing her to obtain illegal compensation and job security by protecting the conduct of Judge Baldwin,  whose judicial authority should have been vacated by the regulatory authorities.

     The e-mails copied and exchanged among those working in Judge Baldwin’s office and Nan Freeman using either the nickname, “Nanny” or “Nan” do not depict Nan Freeman as an independent, unbiased official court report covering matters relating to Judge Baldwin.

     These exchanges, produced in discovery after the deposition of Nan Freeman, are attached to the Affidavit of Kenneth Gordon as “Exhibit D,” and are incorporated here.

     When Judge Baldwin eventually recused himself after twenty or more attempts by Michelle Murphy to disqualify him by all legal means, Judge Baldwin obtained a position for Nan Freeman, as an official court reporter with the newly appointed Coweta Judicial Circuit Superior Court Judge W. Travis Sakrison, the son-in-law of Congressman Lynn Westmoreland.

     The recusal Orders of the judges in the Coweta Judicial Circuit in Murphy v. Murphy and the replacement judge are included as Attachment 8.

     No separate response is required to the Theory of Recovery of Nan Freeman and Freeman Reporting, Inc. (or, “Nan Freeman”, collectively or individually )

     The response of Michelle Murphy to Nan Freeman’s purported Statement of Rule 6.5 Facts Memorandum of Law is incorporated in the Introduction to the Response to Nan Freeman’s Theory of Recovery.

      Just as a heads up — counsel for Nan Freeman filed her motion for summary judgment before Michelle Murphy’s First Amended Complaint was filed and therefore Nan Freeman’s issues in her current motion for summary have become stale and mostly legally immaterial before the allotted time for Michelle Murphy to respond.

     An official court reporter, as was and is Nan Freeman, cannot legally design a template, as she did around 1996, and use it in each of her official court reporting’s contractual fulfilments until she is caught producing illegal transcripts with that template in 2014 and then creditably urge the defense of “mistake” — the law burdens Nan Freeman, as a condition of qualifying and being compensated, as an official court reporter, both to learn and to comply with the legally permissible fees and the legal requirements for the preparation of transcripts pursuant to the Fee Schedule mandated by the Judicial Council of Georgia and OCGA § 15-14- 5.

     Returning compensation which was illegally taken does not absolve one of the consequences of violating the law. Nan Freeman held a position of trust that required both her competence and integrity that she breached to the detriment of Michelle Murphy, that consumed Michelle Murphy’s financial resources and created an enhanced level of prejudice against Michelle Murphy’s effort to obtain custody of J. M. and T. M., her children.

     It is relevant to understand that Judge Baldwin was the exclusive trier of fact in Murphy v. Murphy.

     Michelle Murphy could not obtain a jury trial in that case The fees and the conditions upon which an official court reporter in the State of Georgia can obtain compensation is mandated by the Judicial Council of Georgia.

     Nan Freeman was required by law to charge only the Judicial Council of Georgia authorized fees to persons who wished, or were required, to purchase transcripts from her in her capacity as an official court reporter for the Coweta Judicial Circuit.

     The fees follow that were allowable for Nan Freeman to charge for legally prepared transcripts in the Superior Court of Coweta County case of Murphy v Murphy.

     Nan Freeman did not comply with the certificate requirements, which were legally imposed upon her by the OCGA § 15-14-5, Duty to transcribe statute — Nan Freeman used an abbreviated, incomplete version of the required certificate. OCGA § 15-14-5. Duty to transcribe; certificate.

     It shall be the duty of each court reporter to transcribe the evidence and other proceedings of which he has taken notes as provided by law whenever requested so to do by counsel for any party to such case and upon being paid the legal fees for such transcripts.

     The reporter, upon delivering the transcript to such counsel, shall affix thereto a certificate signed by him reciting that the transcript is true, complete, and correct.

     Subject only to the right of the trial judge to change or require the correction of the transcript, the transcript so certified shall  be presumed to be true, complete, and correct. emphasis supplied

     Nan Freeman, as a part and parcel of her habitual violations of the laws of Georgia, did not provide Michelle Murphy’s transcripts with an OCGA § 5-14-5 required certificate containing the certification that the transcript is “true, complete and correct” as required by OCGA § 5-14-5 — — The transcripts provided and paid for by Michelle Murphy were not true, complete or correct. Nan Freeman has never provided to Michelle Murphy, or other litigants, the required certificate that is an indication of the pattern of her illegal conduct.

     The habitual violations of the OCGA § 15-14-5 requirements and the authorized fees is relevant to identify that Nan Freeman did not just make a onetime error, but instead engaged in a pattern of illegal conduct, including overcharging and not including the required certificate.

     Nan Freeman was therefore not entitled to any compensation, as she prepared no transcript meeting the OCGA § 15-14-5 requirements. If she had complied, the following fees, with which she also did not comply, govern.

     Nan Freeman, by using a template that consistently produced a transcript that did not comply with OCGA § 15-14-5, and using a template that consistently allowed her to collect more compensation than she was permitted to receive under the law, engaged in illegal conduct and actionable fraud, negligent misrepresentation of facts, theft by taking, breach of contract, unjust enrichment and conversion.

     The laws of Georgia do not deprive Michelle Murphy from obtaining damages from an official court reporter who engaged in the illegal conduct in which Nan Freeman engaged.

Procedural Background

Michelle Murphy, through counsel, first, informally and very politely, sought the audio recording of the May 27, 2014 proceedings from Nan Freeman, the official court reporter in Murphy v. Murphy— counsel approached Nan Freeman while she was still sitting at her court reporting station.

     The audio recordings were initially sought by counsel to provide to regulatory authorities to report the Code of Judicial Conduct violations by Judge Baldwin that had just occurred.

     The report of the conduct of Judge Baldwin was appropriate, as his violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct were prevalent on several earlier occasions, but none were as monstrous as Judge Baldwin’s mental blowout on May 27, 2014.

    The audio was relevant to obtaining the removal of Judge Baldwin from Murphy v. Murphy.

     Nan Freeman initially refused the literal begging of counsel to purchase the audio recording for Michelle Murphy’s use — counsel then, to no avail, sought the audio recording with a Georgia Open Records Act request to Troup County, Coweta County and Nan Freeman.

     The Open Records Act request is Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6 to the Deposition of Nan Freeman, and is Attachment 6 to this response. Counsel sought assistance from the Board of Court Reporting, with first an informal request for help, followed by a formal complaint.

     Counsel for Michelle Murphy was refused assistance in obtaining the audio recordings for Michelle Murphy until after an action was filed against the Board of Court Reporting, Nan Freeman and Freeman Reporting, Inc., that, with other efforts and concessions, resulted in Michelle Murphy obtaining the audio recordings.

     It was a review of the audio recording that supported the illegal conduct of Nan Freeman.

     Nan Freeman, over an extended period of time, thought to have begun on, or before, 1996, engaged in illegal court reporting that counsel for Michelle Murphy discovered and documented at the initial cost of in excess of $10,000.

     The Answer of Nan Freeman to the original complaint against her by Michelle Murphy is included as Attachment 1.

      That Answer, as well as the complete record of the original case, are now in the records of the Superior Court of Troup County and are relied upon in support of this response. The litigious nature of Nan Freeman in not fulfilling her contract with Michelle Murphy, by engaging in false, demeaning depictions of Michelle Murphy, in this Motion for Summary Judgment and elsewhere, qualifies Nan Freeman’s breach of contract for an award of attorney fees and punitive damages.

     A video recording and official copy of the transcript and video deposition of Nan Freeman are in the record of the Superior Court of Troup County.

      Nan Freeman’s attorney attached a copy of that transcript, without Exhibits, of Nan Freeman’s deposition to Nan Freeman’s motion for summary judgment.

     It is relevant to distinguish between the stringent requirements for an official court reporter to receive compensation, from the requirements of a court reporter, who, for example, reports at depositions.

     In order to obtain the audio recordings of the May 27, 2014 hearing and to have transcribed omitted portions of the transcripts that were thought available with the audio recordings, the Georgia Open Records Act requests were filed by counsel for Michelle Murphy. See Attachment 6 hereto, and Exhibit 6 to the deposition of Nan Freeman includes the Georgia Open Records Act requests to the Counties of Troup and Coweta, and to Nan Freeman.

      After the Board of Court Reporting members were dismissed as defendants from the Superior Court of Fulton County portion of this case, Nan Freeman, on her motion, was successful in having the case transferred to the Superior Court of Troup County.

     The original complaint, upon which the motion for summary judgment relies, was amended before the response Michelle Murphy to this motion for summary judgment was due.

     The Complaint against Nan Freeman contains issues that are embedded within each of the causes of action that affects the damages that should be awarded against Nan Freeman.

     The embedded issues in each cause of action are

(1)      the proportion of the tortious conduct by Nan Freeman that can be attributed to her violation of protections provided to litigants by the Code of Judicial Conduct, OCGA §15-14-5, the Uniform Superior Court Rules, the Constitutional provisions of the United States and the State of Georgia equivalent, First Amendment, Equal Protection, Due Process protections, statutes, decisional law, Georgia Code of Professional Conduct, the Court Reporter Code of Professional Ethics (or, collectively, or separately, “LAW*”).

     Nan Freeman’s intentional participation in the illegal conduct of Judge Baldwin in order to deprive Michelle Murphy and her children of their protections under the LAW* by Nan Freeman’s reckless and wanton disregard of consequences, evinced an intention to inflict injury upon Michelle Murphy —

(2)      the proportion of Nan Freeman’s tortious conduct that is attributed to her intent to obtain illegal financial and employment benefits for herself —

(3)      the proportion of Nan Freeman’s tortious wrongdoing that is attributed to her fraud and negligent misrepresentation; and —

(4)      the damages caused to Michelle Murphy as the result of Nan Freeman’s illegal and unethical conduct that included Nan Freeman’s participation in attempting to secret and otherwise participate in the illegal conduct and other violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr. Response to the Individual Statement of Purported Facts relied upon by Nan Freeman in support of her motion for summary judgment. [The purported statement of fact by Nan Freeman is first quoted in an italicized font, then the response follows.]

     Response to Nan Freeman’s Purported Statement of Material Facts for Summary Judgment Page 12 of 28 1.

     Since 2012, Ms. Freeman has served as the court reporter for Chief Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr. of the Coweta County Superior Court. Dep. of Nan Freeman at 8:19-9:12. A copy of the transcript of Ms. Freeman’ s Deposition is attached to the Affidavit of Kenneth Lamar Gordon (“Gordon Affidavit”) as Exhibit A. Response to No. 1

     Nan Freeman has been an official court reporter in the Coweta Judicial Circuit since approximately 1999, and a court reporter since approximately 1996 (Freeman Dep. p. 8).

     During that time, she has been the official court reporter first for Judge Keeble, then Judge Baldwin, and, now, the newly appointed Judge W. Travis Sakrison. At all times excepting August 13, 2013, when another reporter, Alice Moore, was assigned to the case for that one hearing, Nan Freeman was the official court reporter during the Murphy v. Murphy case.

     The official transcript of the deposition of Nan Freeman is filed in the Superior Court of Troup County.

     Counsel for Nan Freeman did not attach the exhibits to the deposition of Nan Freeman, which are relevant to the testimony contained in the transcript.

     The exhibits are attached to the official transcript filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Troup County. 2.

     From April 2012 until February 2015, (other than a brief period of time in which the case had been transferred to another judge) Judge Baldwin presided over child custody litigation between Plaintiff and her ex-husband, John Murphy (the “Child Custody Litigation”) See Murphy v. Murphy, No. 2012-cv-413 (Ga. Super. Ct., Coweta Cnty. filed Apr. 11, 2012). Response to No. 2

     After Michelle Murphy filed extensive challenges to the absence of a Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1 case management plan with disqualification motions and otherwise in the Superior Court of Coweta County, a Rule 3.1 mandated case Response to Nan Freeman’s Purported Statement of Material Facts for Summary Judgment Page 13 of 28 management plan was implemented by the Coweta Judicial Circuit.

     Under that plan, Judge Dennis Blackmon was assigned the Murphy v. Murphy case, as confirmed by the Clerk of the Superior Court of Coweta County. Judge Baldwin, through a process that did not comply with the LAW*, obtained the case from Judge Blackmon.

     There were continuous pleas to the jurisdiction of Judge Baldwin presiding after Judge Blackmon’s Rule 3.1 case management plan assignment. The Murphy v. Murphy case was a modification of custody, or in the Alternative, Parenting Time of John Harold Murphy that also involved a modification of child support.

     John Harold Murphy initiated the litigation that resulted in Counterclaims against John Harold Murphy and a Third Party Complaint against Renee L. Haugerud, his spouse, who is a hedge fund operator. At that time, the case in the Superior Court of Coweta County was styled as follows.

     John Harold Murphy, Plaintiff vs. Civil Action No. 12V-413 Nancy Michelle Murphy, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff vs. A Jury Trial is Requested on the Child Support Issues, the Counterclaim and the Third Party Complaint Renee Haugerud, Third Party Defendant The hedge fund operator, third party defendant was dismissed by Judge Baldwin without allowing a hearing.

     Judge Baldwin refused counsel for Michelle Response to Nan Freeman’s Purported Statement of Material Facts for Summary Judgment Page 14 of 28 Murphy the right to depose Renee L. Haugerud or to call her as a witness at any time, despite numerous requests. 3.

     On April 1, 2014, Judge Baldwin issued an Order in the Child Custody Litigation (a) requiring Plaintiff to submit to a psychological examination pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-35;

(b)      setting a compliance hearing for May 27, 2014; and

(c)      warning Plaintiff that the issue of temporary custody of the children would be considered at the compliance hearing, if necessary.

     A copy of the April 1, 2014 Order in the Child Custody Litigation is attached to the Gordon Affidavit as Exhibit B. Response to No. 3

     On April 1, 2014, Judge Baldwin filed an Order in Murphy v Murphy, that is incorporated as Attachment 2.

     The Attachment is the representation of the designation of the content of the Order, as Michelle Murphy is opposed to the characterization of the litigation and the characterization of the Order contained in the No. 3 statement of purported fact of Nan Freeman.

4.      On May 27, 2014, Judge Baldwin conducted the compliance hearing in the Child Custody Litigation.

     Following Plaintiff’s admission on the stand that she had failed to comply with the Rule 35 psychological examination, Judge Baldwin awarded temporary custody of the children to Plaintiff’s ex-husband, John Murphy. Response to No. 4 Judge Baldwin, on May 27, 2014 did not conduct a hearing that provided Michelle Murphy her Due Process rights, as Judge Baldwin presided at a proceeding that violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, as evidenced by his recusal. Attachment 8, p. 1 is incorporated here.

     On May 27, 2014, Judge Baldwin commenced what was scheduled to be a hearing in the case of Murphy v. Murphy.

     Judge Baldwin would not allow any of Michelle Murphy’s witnesses to testify and would not even allow direct examination of Michelle Murphy by her counsel, while Judge Baldwin, in attempting to examine Michelle Murphy, violated the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as the protections that the law provided to Michelle Murphy.

     Judge Baldwin abruptly refused to allow Michelle Murphy even to explain her answers to questions that he posed, or questions posed by opposing counsel. Judge Baldwin apparently predetermined that he was going to use his judicial authority to abuse Michelle Murphy. Judge Baldwin, by illegal and unethical conduct, attempted to and did prevent Michelle Murphy from presenting her justifiable defense.

     Judge Baldwin would not allow Michelle Murphy, through her testimony, or through her witnesses’ testimony, to present her defenses.

     The characterization of the litigation and the purpose of the proceeding is inaccurate, and is accurately explained in the Affidavit of Michelle Murphy, Attachment 3.

     Nan Freeman’s illegal conduct deprived Michelle Murphy of a verbatim transcription or even a complete and accurate audio version of the May 27, 2014 proceeding, explained in the First Amended Complaint against Nan Freeman as follows.

     Nan Freeman, intentionally or through negligence engaged in a deceptive physical appearance at the May 27, 2014 proceeding that Response to Nan Freeman’s Purported Statement of Material Facts for Summary Judgment Page 16 of 28 gave Michelle Murphy and her counsel the appearance that she was fulfilling her legal obligations in the courtroom, as an official court reporter under contract to Michelle Murphy, including being located at her reporting station with her equipment, that was a scheme or an artifice to defraud Michelle Murphy and thereby her counsel and the appellate courts and all other courts.

       On May 27, 2014, Nan Freeman failed to take down, audio record, accurately and completely transcribe Judge Baldwin’s Order and assurance to Michelle Murphy, her children and her counsel that the children would be allowed to testify at the May 27, 2014 proceeding, and, thereby, deceptively engaged in actionable fraud and/or alternatively, negligent misrepresentation conduct, creating damages sought in the First Amended Complaint against Nan Freeman by Michelle Murphy. See, Affidavit of Millard Farmer attached to this Response.

     At the time of the May 27, 2014 proceeding, Nan Freeman was a person known to Michelle Murphy and her counsel as the official court reporter who was assigned to the case as the official reporter whom Michelle Murphy, through her counsel, contracted to report and transcribe the proceeding on May 27, 2014.

     Nan Freeman, as a part of her fraud and/or alternatively, negligent misrepresentation conduct, requested that Michelle Murphy make payment to her for work which Nan Freeman deceptively failed to perform while appearing to perform as required by the Board of Response to Nan Freeman’s Purported Statement of Material Facts for Summary Judgment Page 17 of 28 Court Reporting Rules and Regulations.

     Nan Freeman charged, and Michelle Murphy paid for pages of the transcript that did not meet the legal requirements of being page eligible to be included in the fee charged and collected by Nan Freeman.

     In addition to not recording and transcribing the first part of the proceedings, while deceptively appearing to be recording the court proceedings, Nan Freeman, as a part of her fraud and/or alternatively, negligent misrepresentation, provided Michelle Murphy, opposing counsel and the Court a certificate stating that the transcript of the May 27, 2014 proceedings provided to the parties, which Nan Freeman was compensated to produce, was a “true” record of the proceedings. (Freeman Dep., Exhibit 5)

     Not only was the certificate not legal, but Nan Freeman had illegally charged for ineligible pages and omitted portions of the proceedings.

     Nan Freeman, who personally transcribed the transcript from a recording that she produced, (Freeman Dep. p. 7) as a part of her fraud and/or alternatively, negligent misrepresentation conduct, in addition to omitting the beginning of the proceeding, omitted the four pages of Judge Baldwin’s massive temper tantrum at the end of the proceeding that no human in attendance could forget.

     Nan Freeman engaged in fraud and/or alternatively, negligent misrepresentation conduct by attempting to have Judge Baldwin use his authority as the presiding Judge to influence counsel for Michelle Murphy not to bring an action against Nan Freeman that ultimately provided counsel for Michelle Murphy the information to learn of a substantial portion of the fraud and/or alternatively negligent misrepresentation conduct of Nan Freeman, much of which was verified during the deposition of Nan Freeman, where she continued to conceal her fraud and/or alternatively negligent misrepresentation, by first making false statements and frequently feigning that she did not remember.

5.       After issuing this ruling, Judge Baldwin stated ”that’s the end of this hearing today” and left the bench. Compl., Attach. 7, at 41. Response to No. 5 Purported Statement 5 is deceptive, as it attempts to imply the end of the proceeding. Instead, Judge Baldwin stood up, but did not leave the bench, and immediately was engaged by counsel and responded with his monstrous temper tantrum, contained in the omitted pages of the “true record” transcript involving the “Blame Yourself,” “Blame Yourself,” Blame Yourself,” of Judge Baldwin that is included in the Addendum, accompanied with the “indicating” comment and the statement of Larry King to Judge Baldwin that is also included in the Addendum to the May 27, 2014 transcript of Nan Freeman. (Attachment 4)

     Even if Judge Baldwin accosted counsel, as he had during the monstrous temper tantrum, after a hearing, and Nan Freeman had the recorded audio of that conduct, she was equally required to transcribe the conduct of Judge Baldwin in order that the relevance of the conduct could be weighed by the regulatory authorities and an appellate court.

     Purported Statement 5 of Nan Freeman mischaracterizes the type of deceptive conduct in which Nan Freeman engaged when she took money that did not belongto her for preparation of numerous transcripts. See, OCGA §15-14-5; Court Reporters’ Fee Schedule of the Judicial Council of Georgia. It also raises the issue of what conduct and testimony was omitted from the transcripts of other litigants for whom she was contracted to provide transcripts.

6.      Despite Judge Baldwin having ended the hearing, one of Plaintiff’s attorneys in the Child Custody Litigation continued to argue, prompting Judge Baldwin to return to the courtroom and direct Ms. Freeman to “[s]top taking down.” Compl., Attach. 8, at 4.

      Response to No. 6 Purported Statement 6 continues to mischaracterize the litigation and the conduct of counsel for Michelle Murphy, and the location of Judge Baldwin in the courtroom.

     At a point in time, at the end of the proceeding’s omitted pages of the certified as “true” transcript, Judge Baldwin, while remaining in the courtroom, did direct Nan Freeman to stop taking down the statements of counsel to Judge Baldwin.

      This occurred at the very end, after the omissions of Nan Freeman that she, after being caught, included in the Addendum. Attachment 4, p. 4. 

     On June 5, 2014, Judge Baldwin entered an Order in the Child Custody Litigation regarding his award of temporary custody of the children to Plaintiff’s ex-husband. A copy of the June 5, 2014 Order in the Child Custody Litigation is attached to the Gordon Affidavit as Exhibit C. Response to No. 7 The June 5, 2014 Order in Murphy v. Murphy is attached to the Gordon Affidavit as Exhibit C.

     There are problems with the veracity of the content of Orders of Judge Baldwin. It is the opinion of counsel that the false statements contained in the Orders of Judge Baldwin are most predictably derived from persons other than Judge Baldwin. Counsel for Michelle Murphy observed that Michael Williams Warner, a young Glover & Davis lawyer, made a false swearing to the Magistrate Court of Coweta County that other Glover & Davis counsel acquiesced in Michael William Warner’s using.

     This case against Nan Freeman does not include the illegal conduct of persons other than Nan Freeman, although the illegal conduct of persons other than Nan Freeman is identified, as Nan Freeman attempts to demean Michelle Murphy and her counsel.

     Having observed the legal ability of Judge Baldwin during this litigation, counsel for Michelle Murphy has the opinion that Judge Baldwin did not write the June 5, 2014 Order, but that a person undisclosed to counsel for Michelle Murphy, either presented the Order to Judge Baldwin’s law clerk, or to Judge Baldwin for Judge Baldwin’s signature.

     The June 5, 2014 Order contains false statements not supported by evidence that comports with Due Process requirements, or obtained while Judge Baldwin was conducting a proceeding within the requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

     Nan Freeman, upon their request, earlier provided the Glover & Davis lawyers a copy of the last portion of her transcript, which she certified as “true” and which she filed with the Court that did not include the Addendum. It was that early provided portion of the transcript that was used for the drafter of the June 5, 2014 Order signed by Judge Baldwin, most likely, again, without him reading the Order before he signed it.

      The Addendum was not produced by Nan Freeman until June 11, 2014. See Attachment

9.      Judge Baldwin has signed Orders prepared by the Glover & Davis lawyers in the Murphy v. Murphy case without reading them on at least two other occasions during that litigation. This comports with Judge Baldwin’s signing without invoices presented by Nan Freeman to authorize payment by the Counties for her services as official court reporters, without checking to see that she is in compliance with the law. (Freeman Dep. pp. 34-35)

8.      At the request of Plaintiff’s attorneys in the Child Custody Litigation, Ms. Freeman prepared and filed an “Addendum” to the transcript of the May 27, 2014 hearing.

     The “Addendum” included the additional statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel after Judge Baldwin had terminated the hearing. Compl., Attach. 8. Response to No. 8 Nan Freeman, initially in her purported statement mischaracterizes the litigation issues in Murphy v. Murphy, most likely as counsel for Nan Freeman and those opposing Michelle Murphy wish to continue concealing the fact that Nan Freeman assisted Judge Baldwin in attempting to conceal his misconduct.

      The statements by Larry King and Millard Farmer toward the end of the proceeding that are included in the Addendum were made before Judge Baldwin terminated the hearing. Judge Baldwin did not terminate the hearing until the end of the Addendum.

     A copy of the May 27, 2014 Addendum, as provided to us by Nan Freeman, is included as Attachment 4.

9.      On June 10, 2014, one of Plaintiff’s lawyers in the Child Custody Litigation sent an Open Records Request to Ms. Freeman seeking, inter alia, the audio recording of the May 27 hearing. Compl., Attach.

5.       Response to No. 9 Again, Nan Freeman, initially in her purported statement mischaracterizes the litigation issues in Murphy v. Murphy. Attachment 6 and Exhibit 6 to the deposition of Nan Freeman contain the Georgia Open Records Act request sent to the Counties of Troup and Coweta and to Nan Freeman. The audio recordings were sought.

10.      On June 26, 2014, Ms. Freeman and Judge Baldwin forwarded CDs of the audio recording of the May 27 hearing to Plaintiff’s counsel. Gordon Aff., Exhibit D, at 16. Response to No. 10 The events relating to obtaining the audio disk forwarded on June 26, 2014 occurred as follows. On June 18, 2014 Nan Freeman communicated that she would file a copy of the audio recording in the Clerk of Court’s file. Exhibit D, p. 18 to Affidavit of Kenneth Gordon.

       On June 19, 2014 Judge Baldwin sent a letter to Millard Farmer; the copy of this letter which Nan Freeman provided to counsel contains on the right side of the page a note in the handwriting of Nan Freeman as follows, “This email is not altogether accurate, but it of course is what he sent to MF.” Exhibit D, p. 25 to Affidavit of Kenneth Gordon.

     On June 24, 2014, The Board of Court Reporting dismissed the Complaint that was filed for Michelle Murphy against Nan Freeman. Attachment 5 On June 25, 2014, after the dismissal of the Complaint by the Board of Court Reporting, Michelle Murphy filed the civil action against Nan Freeman, et. al. that included as defendants members of the Board of Court Reporting in the Superior Court of Fulton County.

     On June 26, 2014, the CD containing the audio recording of the May 27, 2015 proceeding was forwarded to counsel for Michelle Murphy.

11.       In March 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Board of Court Reporting challenging Ms. Freeman’s refusal to provide an audio recording of an earlier hearing. Plaintiff alleges that she later amended her grievance to include allegations that Ms. Freeman overcharged for certain transcripts due to the number of spaces per line in the transcripts. The Board of Court Reporting has not issued a decision on Plaintiff’s complaint. Compl. 1.3.1, 1.4.9. Response to No. 11 The Board of Court Reporting had issued a decision on June 24, 2014, as described above in Response to

10.       Attachment 5. Response to Nan Freeman’s Purported Statement of Material Facts for Summary Judgment Page 24 of 28 12.

     Before Plaintiff raised the “spaces per line” issue, Ms. Freeman was not aware of any error in the number of spaces per line in her transcripts. Ms. Freeman testified that, when she initially set up the word processing program for her court reporting software, she “remember[ed] counting spaces, “but that “at some point,” the spaces per line in her transcript “inadvertently [ ] changed from 63 to 61,”possibly a result of changes in the different versions of Microsoft Word. Freeman Dep. (Gordon Aff. Exhibit A) at 31:2-8. Response to No. 12 Nan Freeman does not create a defense by maintaining that she did not know the law — in fact as an official court reporter, Nan Freeman concedes both her liability and her absence of understanding of her computer program.

13.      As soon as Ms. Freeman learned of the “spaces per line” issue, she immediately corrected her transcript program and recalculated the cost of Plaintiff’s transcripts to determine if the error had resulted in any overcharges. Ms. Freeman determined that, over the entirety of the Child Custody Litigation, the spaces per line issue had resulted in only $45 of overcharges to Plaintiff.

      Freeman Dep. at 28:21-29:24, 31:4-9, 33:5-9, 86:24-87:7. Response to No. 13 An official court reporter, as Nan Freeman, cannot personally design a template, as she did around 1996, and use it in each of her official court reporter’s contractual fulfilments until she is caught in 2014 and then legally urge the defense of mistake — the law burdens Nan Freeman, as a condition of qualifying and being compensated, as an official court reporter, to both learn and comply  with the legally permissible fees and the legal requirements for the preparation of transcripts that qualify for the fees legally obtainable as an official court reporter.

     Nan Freeman stated at her deposition that she produced her transcripts and did not have an assistant do her transcriptions. (Freeman Dep. p.6) Returning compensation illegally taken does not absolve one of the consequence of violating the law.

14.      Shortly after Ms. Freeman’s deposition, Mrs. Freeman’ s attorney, Ken Gordon, tendered Plaintiff a check for $50 to cover any overcharge.

     Gordon Aff.ii7, Exhibit E. Response to No. 14 Nan Freeman’s check in the amount of $50 to cover any overcharge did not cover the liabilities of Nan Freeman.

     For further response, the response to purported Statement 13 is incorporated and included here.

     The fees and the conditions upon which an official court reporter in the State of Georgia can obtain compensation is mandated by the Judicial Council of Georgia.

     Nan Freeman was required by law to charge only the Judicial Counsel of Georgia authorized fees to persons whom wished, or were required to purchase transcripts from her in her capacity as an official court reporter for the Coweta Judicial.

     The fees follow that were allowable for Nan Freeman to charge for legally prepared transcripts in the Superior Court of Coweta County case of John Harold Murphy v. Michelle Murphy, and related Counterclaim, Third Party action Civil Action No. 12V-413 (or, “Murphy v Murphy.”)

     Nan Freeman did not comply with the certificate requirements legally imposed upon her by the OCGA § 15-14-5, Duty to transcribe statute — Nan Freeman used an abbreviated, incomplete version of the required certificate.

OCGA § 15-14-5.

     Duty to transcribe; certificate. It shall be the duty of each court reporter to transcribe the evidence and other proceedings of which he has taken notes as provided by law whenever requested so to do by counsel for any party to such case and upon being paid the legal fees for such transcripts. The reporter, upon delivering the transcript to such counsel, shall affix thereto a certificate signed by him reciting that the transcript is true, complete, and correct.

     Subject only to the right of the trial judge to change or require the correction of the transcript, the transcript so certified shall be presumed to be true, complete, and correct. [emphasis supplied]

     Nan Freeman, as a part and parcel of her habitual violations of the laws of Georgia, did not provide Michelle Murphy’s transcripts with an OCGA § 5-14-5 required certificate containing the certification that the transcript is “true, complete and correct. . ” as required by OCGA § 5-14-5 — — The transcripts provided and paid for by Michelle Murphy was not true or complete or correct.

     Nan Freeman has never provided to Michelle Murphy, or other litigants, the required certificate that is an indication of the pattern of her illegal conduct.

     The habitual violations of the OCGA § 15-14-5 requirements and the authorized fees is relevant to identify that Nan Freeman did not just make an one time error,

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TEXAS CUSTODY-SWITCH BILL, “S.B. 423,” NUNC PRO TUNC MANDATES SEXUAL ABUSE BY CPS


S.B. No. 423
S.B. No. 423
AN ACT
relating to the flexible response system for investigations of
child abuse or neglect reports by the Department of Family and
Protective Services.
       BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
       SECTION 1.  Section 261.3015, Family Code, is amended to
read as follows:
       Sec. 261.3015.  FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SYSTEM. (a)  In assigning
priorities and prescribing investigative procedures based on the
severity and immediacy of the alleged harm to a child under Section
261.301(d), the department shall establish a flexible response
system to allow the department to make the most effective use of
resources to investigate and respond to reported [by investigating
serious] cases of abuse and neglect.
       (b)  Notwithstanding Section 261.301, the department may, in
accordance with this section and department rules, conduct an
alternative response to a report of abuse or neglect if the report
does not:
             (1)  allege sexual abuse of a child;
             (2)  allege abuse or neglect that caused the death of a
child; or
             (3)  indicate a risk of serious physical injury or
immediate serious harm to a child.
       (c)  The department may administratively close a reported
case of abuse or neglect without completing the investigation or
alternative response and without providing services or making a
referral to another entity for assistance [and by screening out
less serious cases of abuse and neglect] if the department
determines, after contacting a professional or other credible
source, that the child’s safety can be assured without further
investigation, response, services, or assistance.
       (d)  In determining how to classify a reported case of abuse
or neglect under the flexible response system, the child’s safety
is the primary concern [The department may administratively close
the less serious cases without providing services or making a
referral to another entity for assistance.
       [(a-1)     For purposes of Subsection (a), a case is considered
to be a less serious case of abuse or neglect if the circumstances
of the case do not indicate an immediate risk of abuse or neglect
that could result in the death of or serious harm to the child who is
the subject of the case].
       [(b)]  The classification [under the flexible response
system] of a case may be changed as warranted by the circumstances.
       (e)  An alternative response to a report of abuse or neglect
must include:
             (1)  a safety assessment of the child who is the subject
of the report;
             (2)  an assessment of the child’s family; and
             (3)  in collaboration with the child’s family,
identification of any necessary and appropriate service or support
to reduce the risk of future harm to the child.
       (f)  An alternative response to a report of abuse or neglect
may not include a formal determination of whether the alleged abuse
or neglect occurred.
       (g) [(c)]  The department may implement the alternative
[flexible] response in one or more of the department’s
administrative regions before implementing the system statewide
[system by establishing a pilot program in a single department
service region]. The department shall study the results of the
system in the regions where the system has been implemented
[region] in determining the method by which to implement the system
statewide.
       SECTION 2.  Not later than December 1, 2013, the executive
commissioner of the Health and Human Services Commission shall
adopt the rules necessary to implement Section 261.3015, Family
Code, as amended by this Act.
       SECTION 3.  This Act takes effect September 1, 2013.
______________________________ ______________________________
   President of the Senate Speaker of the House
       I hereby certify that S.B. No. 423 passed the Senate on
April 4, 2013, by the following vote:  Yeas 30, Nays 0.
______________________________
Secretary of the Senate
       I hereby certify that S.B. No. 423 passed the House on
May 15, 2013, by the following vote:  Yeas 145, Nays 0, two
present not voting.
______________________________
Chief Clerk of the House
Approved:
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Robin’s Story, and also for Matthew, Laura, and Christopher|Rockwall/Dallas, Texas


Sixteen Years Without Children and Life to Go

Robin Karr’s Story, and also for Laura, Matthew, and brother, Christopher Karr, who will not be silenced, that you shall come home to your Real Mommy who Refuses and Refused Offer of Silence–No Con tract, Judges!

Robin Karr.Rockwall.TX.Judge Cynthia Kent.any relation to federal impeached judge Samuel Kent who my sons paternal aunt was law clerk for.Supervised_Visit_Police_Station.242215910_std

Robin Karr with Baby Laura and Matthew Duckworth near Rockwall, Texas (near Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas)

Robin Carr.Rockwall.Tx.family court fraud and abuse.me-matthew-and-laura-2004-150x150

JUSTICE.WALL OF SHAME.NJCOURTCORRUPTION.DEREK SYPHRETT

 

JUDGE CYNTHIA KENT.SMITH COUNTY TX.TYLER.KIDNAPPER OF ROBIN KARR'S CHILDREN NEAR ROCKWALL TX SIXTEEN YEARS NO CONTACT

 Judge Cynthia (Stevens) Kent, ret., 114th court

Tyler, Texas

(SMITH COUNTY)

 Judge Sue Pirtle,

 NOT PICTURED FOR FEAR OR COWARDICE LEST S/HE, TOO, SHALL BE JUDGED BY GOD ALMIGHTY

Former Judge Sitting by Assignment (Visiting Judge)

State of Texas

January 2000 – Present (15 years 4 months)State of Texas (Region I)

Family, Civil, Criminal

DID WE HAVE THE SAME JUDGE, OR

JUST THE SAME FRAUDULENT FAMILY COURT R.I.C.O.

COURT CON?

 

The haunting melody of the nostalgic voice of the untimely, tragically gone, but not forgotten songstress, Karen Carpenter’s recording of “Yesterday Once More” is the soundtrack for the paralyzing feeling that what all of us mommies  who are still  reading  so strongly knew we were surely “imagining,” but could not be, the rote rehearsal style routine practice and patterned protocol and procedure suborned and commissions pre-packaged, pre-priced, pre-screened, pre-determined outcomes, the levels funding based kidnappings of our sweet little healthy, happy, adoptable children by the family courts in Texas, below:

Judge Cynthia Kent Grants Custody to an Abuser

 

January 5, 2000
Judge Cynthia Kent
c/o Elaine Holmes

RE: Cause No. 1-98-435 (382nd District Court, Rockwall County, Texas)
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF EDWARD NEIL DUCKWORTH AND
ROBIN LEE DUCKWORTH AND THE INTEREST OF MATTHEW NAKAI
DUCKWORTH AND LAURA DANIELLE DUCKWORTH MINOR CHILDREN

Dear Judge Kent,

I am the co-founder of Children And Loving Parents (CALP)-a chartered non-profit organization located near Rockwall Texas. I am writing in an effort, to appeal to your knowledge, your wisdom, your faith, and your conscious. I am writing on behalf of Robin Duckworth, however, I am not writing at her request. This letter serves two purposes:

1) To serve as evidence in the Duckworth file that CALP is very concerned about the integrity of both the judicial system’s actions and the actions of CASA and CPS in Robin’s case, and;

2) to bring to surface a few facts that you may have never known at the time you rendered your verdict.

We believe that the Duckworth case has been filled with trickery, deceit, mockery, and cruelty -none of which are desirable attributes for our legal and judicial systems.

I am sure that you agree. Unfortunately, the one’s who have suffered are the innocent children and their grieving mother.

We attended many of the hearings regarding this case, including the last part of the final hearing that you presided over. I couldn’t help but notice your references to family and the importance of parents in the lives of their children.

Without a doubt, CALP agrees with you- if the parent is a safe and good influence upon the children. Yet, we are perplexed and saddened at the many successful attempts to thwart Robin Duckworth’s good intentions.

Even worse, we are upset that he court system has not recognized these ‘tricks’ used by Ed Duckworth and his attorney to intentionally make Robin’s life miserable.

My question is this. What would you do as a mother to protect your children if you thought they were living in an unstable and unsafe environment?

Even a stubborn, proud, ‘never ask for help’ man would humble himself to ask every available person for help – again and again. You and I probably wouldn’t do this for ourselves, but we would for our children. Isn’t this exactly what Robin has done? Is this so wrong?

At what point did Robin act so inappropriate that she deserved to have her children kept from her. Did she break the law? No. (She was put in jail for crying and not leaving the courtroom when Judge Pirtle and Trish Verde refused to advise her as to when she could have her next visitation. Is this really ‘irrational’ when a mother hasn’t seen or held her children in a very long time?

By the way, why was she arrested for criminal trespass when there were still many other people in the courthouse? Why weren’t the other people that were present arrested for trespassing?)

Does Robin have a history of running away with the children? No. Does she have a history of hurting the children? No. Does she have a history of disobeying the courts? No. (Ed’s attorney stated that Robin had told the Kentucky court that she would not abide by the visitation decree from her first marriage. She may or may not have said that .. but, what did she do? She abided by the visitation decree very well. She even notified, in writing, the Kentucky court within 2 weeks of when she moved to Houston. We are in possession of that letter. Unbelievably, Judge Pirtle did not allow that letter to be submitted into evidence.)

Now let’s compare the history of Ed and Robin. Robin graduated high school and college with honors. Ed barely passed high school. After almost 6 years in college he dropped out with a GP A below 2.0. Who held a job and supported the family?

Robin did. She worked at Dillard’s and excelled as a departmental manager. Ed failed to hold a job, including one stint as a car salesman. When they moved to Kentucky, Robin continued working at another clothing store. Ed attempted a gig as a local police officer, however he quit when faced with being tired for shooting and killing a chained dog.

While living in Kentucky Ed filed for divorce. In his affidavit to the court Ed stated Robin should be named the fit and proper caretaker of the children! He never alleged Robin of being unfit in any way as a mother.

However, wanting to salvage their marriage, Robin replied to the court that she did not believe their marriage to be beyond repair. (Wouldn’t anyone that takes their vows before God in a serious manner do all they could to save the marriage? Robin did – Ed didn’t.) Just think if Robin had given up as easily as Ed had, she would be the managing conservator of Matthew and Laura at this time.

Instead, Ed, his attorney, and the Texas judicial system have raked Robin over the coals and treated her like a criminally insane parent. Robin has always been the reliable provider for the children, yet she has been punished and ridiculed for her faith.

The reason: Supposedly she said something to Ed on a tape that was later played to Melody East, an unlicensed social worker with CASA. Melody East then recommended to Judge Pirtle that Robin have only supervised visitation because she expressed ‘alarming’ religious beliefs and had made ‘alarming’ remarks.

One such remark was, “I hope God takes your lives if you continue to harm the children.” How did this statement start ridiculous allegations that Robin might harm her children?

Personally, I also wish that God would remove all child abusers from the earth. Does this make me a danger to children? No. It doesn’t make Robin a danger to her children either.

Also, Melody East never completed the social study. She never interviewed Robin’s mother or Robin’s other references. Incredulously Melody never spoke to the number one witness Christopher Karr. Christopher is Robin’s son from her first marriage.

Christopher witnessed Earnest Duckworth’s (Ed’s father) verbal, mental and physical abuse first hand. In fact, Christopher had written several letters to friends about the abuse well before Robin moved out of the Duckworth house.

Wouldn’t these letters be undeniable evidence that abuse was taking place? Wouldn’t Christopher’s testimony have been the most important evidence in this case?

Yet, Melody East never spoke to Christopher or Robin’s other witnesses. In addition, Judge Pirtle would not allow Christopher’s letters into evidence.

Even mare appalling- Robin’s witnesses were never allowed to testify. All of her witnesses came to trial on Feb. 26, 1999. Robin had at least 4 witnesses including her mother, one cousin, Christopher, and a close friend from Houston who had known Robin and Ed when they lived there. Robin’s witnesses traveled a combined distance of almost 3000 miles.

Unbelievably, Judge Pirtle made no offer to let Robin’s witnesses testify since they had come such a great distance. Instead, Judge Pirtle allowed Ed’s attorney, Charles Schuerenburg, to ask questions (stall for time) to Melody East, Tish Verde, and others. Judge Pirtle knew that Robin could not afford to fly her witnesses down a second time.

We believe that Judge Pirtle knowingly and purposefully hindered Robin’s right to a fair trial by not giving her witnesses the opportunity to testify. Judge Pirtle even scheduled the second half of the trial nearly two weeks away, instead of the following Monday, insuring that Robin’s witnesses would not testify.

In addition, sanctions were imposed against Robin and her attorney for filing a supposedly ‘frivolous’ report to CPS and requesting a Protective Order concerning abuse that Robin felt had occurred at the hands of Ed’s father. (Perhaps, Judge Kent, you were not knowledgeable of all the facts when you sanctioned Robin. That is what we hope.)

Doesn’t state law require that a person must report confirmed or suspected abuse to a child?

Mr. Duckworth’s attorney tried to make Robin look like a liar, because she didn’t report the abuse at the time it happened. Instead, he stated that she was now conveniently making it up since there was a battle for the children. How absurd!

The facts show that Robin and Ed were living in the home of Mr. Duckworth at that believe they can protect their children until they can develop an escape plan away from the abuse. Once again, the facts show that Robin moved back to Kentucky shortly after the abuse.

Doesn’t the fact that every time Robin saw her children with substantial bruises (I have pictures.) and reoccurring sickness during each visitation also give cause for concern, suspicion and reporting?

Doesn’t the fact that the two children have been to the doctor and/or hospital 31 times in 10 months give rise to concern and suspicion? Doesn’t the fact that she witnessed abuse while living with Ed’s parents cause concern?

Doesn’t the fact that Christopher, Robin’s oldest son, wrote letters concerning the abuse to friends before the court case started (I have copies) give cause for concern and suspicion?

Doesn’t the fact that Christopher also signed an affidavit confirming the abuse give cause for concern and suspicion?

Betty Hable, director of the Ombudsman’s office, has even confirmed that CPS has concerns that the paternal grandfather was physically abusive toward Matthew.

We are very troubled that you fined and penalized Robin for reporting suspected abuse when she was faced with disobeying the law if she didn’t report her suspicions! We are even more upset with the fact that Robin is reprimanded from making any other allegations of suspected or confirmed abuse. I ask, is this justice?

How could this happen? How did Robin get fined for doing what is right? I know we all make mistakes. I’m willing to admit that I do. I hope that you too are willing to admit that you made a mistake in your judgements against Robin. I hope even more that you will do all you can in your judicial authority to correct this wrong and make it right. Robin is not an insane mother making improper allegations. She is a protective, caring, loving mother that wants to see her children in a safe, nurturing environment. Once again I ask. what would you do .. not as a judge – but as a Christian and a mother?

Now Robin faces yet another obstacle – meeting the demands of a visitation decree that is both confusing and extremely burdensome. In your judgement you stated that you believed Robin had a medical problem that required medication. Then, being sure of your evaluation, you based the decree upon Robin seeing a psychiatrist and taking the medicine that they would prescribe her. But what was to happen when Robin’s nationally acclaimed psychiatrist did not find Robin to be in need of medication- but only finds her to be severely depressed due to missing her children (a natural response for a concerned, loving mother)?

In addition, you required Robin to line up a psychiatrist within a month. Finding a psychologist is relatively easy but a psychiatrist can take months! (My wife and I have been searching for a psychiatrist to evaluate our daughter’s ADHD. The shortest waiting list we found was 5 months!)

It took Robin a month to line up her psychiatrist. ‘This automatically made her miss the first date (July 1) you had based her visitation rights upon.

However, since acquiring a psychiatrist she has tried to do everything stated concerning her psychiatric evaluations.

However, Ed’s attorney has written a letter stating that they will seek to have her thrown in jail for not following the order. In addition. Robin has not been able to afford trips to Texas to see her children.

She has another son that she must take care of. His father has not been paying child support, which makes things even more difficult for Robin. With the psychiatrist and expenses she has been forced to rely only upon phone calls to stay in her children’s lives.

But this has been made even more difficult due to the fact that Ed will not answer the phone and has turned off his answering machine – all in an effort to distance Robin’s children from her.

However, through all of this, Robin saved enough money to buy birthday and Christmas gifts and a plane ticket to Dallas during November. Once again, Robin did everything she thought she was supposed to do according to the visitation decree.

She sent letters to Ed and the District Clerk. by Nov. 1, 1999, concerning her psychiatric evaluation(s) so that she could see her children on Nov. 13·14.

She sent all letters certified mail. She took 4 days off work to come to Rockwall to see her children, even though Ed’s attorney, Charles Schuerenberg, threatened to get a bench warrant for her arrest if she came to Rockwall.

Despite all this, she still came to see her babies. If that’s not true love I don’t know what is. Upon arriving in Rockwall, Robin gave my wife and I a notarized statement to act as the competent adults to pick up the children -just as stated in the decree. We felt this would
definitely be better for the children since it would avoid any possible conflicts between Ed and Robin. Upon arriving at Ed’s house, Ed absolutely refused to hand over the children.

Ed then ran back into his house and called the police. When the police arrived Ed fabricated a lie and told the officers that he had spoken to Robin’s psychiatrist the day before and that her psychiatrist was sending a second letter forbidding Robin to see the children! We then asked the officers to ask Ed if he would allow Robin to see the children for a supervised visitation the next day.

The officers told my wife and I that Ed made it clear to them that he would never let Robin see the children again no matter what! The officers then advised us that we needed to keep a good paper trail of what had occurred. We were then told that Robin needed to go to the police station and file “Interference with Child Custody”, which is what she did.

Robin was never allowed to see her babies. Can you believe she has never been allowed to celebrate either of Laura’s birthdays? She has never celebrated Christmas with her either.

How discouraged would this make you feel as a mother? Yet, Robin somehow finds the courage and desire to hang in there. Robin loves and misses her children deeply.
Now Robin’s good intentions are once again being turned against her. Charles Schuerenberg has written Robin to threaten her again. He is using the visitation decree that he wrote, against her.

He stated that he intends to have her thrown in jail. I believe this is revenge for Robin filing “Interference with Child Custody” against Ed. What Ed did was wrong and downright mean!

Robin came 1200 miles to see her children, hold them, love them, and give them gifts.
Your honor, please listen to your heart on this matter. Robin is really doing her best. If shemoves here from Kentucky, her older son can’t see his dad. Either way, she gets slammed.

So she does her best. You even stated in your final words of the hearing that the order periods of possession would “be subject to very definitely financial ability.”

This tells me that you were trying to recognize Robin’s peril in paying for psychiatric sessions, making expensive trips to Texas, taking off from work, and juggling all the issues.

We are asking that you reconsider your order. We don’t believe that you ever meant to say Robin could not see her children in November if she didn’t get every psychiatric report completed in July.

It seems to us that you were saying Robin’s visitations were to be based upon her complying with her psychiatrist’s orders then submitting that compliancy letter from the psychiatrist before she attempted visitation.

If your order were interpreted in any other way then Robin’s inability to see a psychiatrist by July 1, 1999 would prohibit her from ever seeing her children again.

I do not believe that you is what you intended. However, Ed’s attorney is trying to have Robin thrown in jail based upon his manipulation of the visitation decree.

Robin had no choice but to file “Interference with Child Custody” against Ed. His actions as dictated by Texas state law are a criminal act, not a civil act.

Therefore, Robin had aresponsibility to file a report even though she did not obtain leave of court to do so. Robin’s report to the Rockwall police was not merely a ‘complaint’ but was a witness’ statement to a felony crime. The police made the choice to ask the D.A. ‘s office to bring charges against Ed.

We hope and pray that you will see things the same and not allow your instinct as a mother, a Christian, and a parent, to be clouded by your judicial experience in today’s corrupt society.

Sincerely,
Derek S.
Co-Founder and V.P.

Read also, http://janiemcqueen.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Judgee-Pirtle-Wanted-for-Kidnapping.pdf

1.     Click on the link below to read mother and author, Robin Karr’s provocative case supported by strong evidence against, generally, but not limited to, “‘state’ of Texas,” and also on behalf of all maternally deprived mothers and children, being natural (wo)man and individuals,

http://www.motherswithoutcustodyworld.com

2.     Click on the link below to read Kentucky Senator Virgil Moore’s scathing letter against and addressed to, among other public officials, “state” and local Texas and social services and county officials on behalf of parents Doug and Kathie Harliss and their “business or commercial assets,”

http://www.motherswithoutcustodyworld.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/Kentuky_State_Senator_Letter_about_Texas_Taking_Children.250130237.pdf\

Mothers Without Custody World

Laura Turns Sweet 16

 

 

Robin Karr.precious Laura found.on facebook

Robin Karr’s Baby Laura, Sixteen Years Later, Found Picture on Facebook.com

Dear Laura, will you ever know how much your real Mommy, Robin Karr, loved, adored, and missed you every second of every minute of every day and painful, agonizing, most likely sleepless nights?  How could you?

Dear Robin, will you ever know what your little girl felt or the pain she felt without you?

How could she?

I I pray and hope with all ;my heart and real mommy of little Julian’s soul that you, Laura have come home to Mommy, whatever age.

From one to another mother whose child bought and sold  just shall surely find them out.

Fair Use and Legal Disclaimer (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

Author of this blog, Dedicated to the Real Mommies and Daddies of the Real America, and our Children Who Want to Come Home, and Especially to My Little Julian, is not a lawyer, attorney, or legal practitioner, therefore, no information contained herein this post and/or blog could be (mis)construed as “legal advice.”  Anyone who exercises he/r rights, and private property sometimes called “child” for deceptive, possibly malicious or retaliatory, and profiteering/privateering and in the “best interests” . . . of the “state” Texas General and other Funds at one’s own peril, risk, and/ or self-fulfillment.  The choice is yours.

  • CENSORSHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED AS IT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE IN THE THIS REPUBLIC USA, THE LAWS TO WHICH YOU WILL BE HELD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the uS Constitution and  Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, uS Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.
  • (3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.
  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and/or requirement/demand, then contact Author of this blog immediately as fair notice and due diligence requires so that Author shall act lawfully and reasonably with expedience pursuant to any supplemental knowledge.

Rare Victory – Protective Mom Finally Wins Protection for Daughter!| Nelly and Noulenns’ Story


Real Mommy Nelly with daughter, Nouenn

 

 

Rare Victory – Protective Mom Finally Wins

Protection for Daughter!


8 Years and A Quarter Million Dollars Later – Nelly Gets Sole Custody

  HOPE FOR PROTECTIVE MOTHERS


On November 26th 2014, after 8 years of struggle both in the US and in France, the Quimper Family Court Judge gave me custody of my daughter, Noluenn, in France. Her father will be allowed to meet her 2 hours every two weeks in a supervised setting in Quimper, but right now, his visitations are suspended.”


Protective Mom, Nelly

Nelly and Noluenn’s story fits the Pattern of most Court Licensed Abuse cases: Child discloses sexual abuse; evidence disregarded; biased judge finds mom to be alienating; judge grants father full custody.

But Nelly fled the U.S. to France after which the biased and corrupt CLA Judge issued an arrest warrant.

Fortunately this story has a happy ending.

Congratulations to Nelly and Noluenn who are both safe in France!

Nelly, Never Without her Daughter

To read the English version, click on the first link below, or otherwise cut-and-paste into your browser or enter manually.

http://mothersoflostchildren.org/2014/11/after-american-court-fails-mother-france-provides-justice/

En Francaise,
http://www.letelegramme.fr/bretagne/enfance-nelly-jamais-sans-sa-fille-27-05-2014-10184147.php

See also, case of actress Kelly Rutherford’s case in which children have been taken to France by wealthy father, a case recently taken on by lawyer Wendy Murphy:

http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/gossip-girl-kelly-rutherford-takes-deported-kids-battle/story?id=24960793

Image result for kelly Rutherford caseImage result for kelly Rutherford caseImage result for kelly Rutherford case

Fair Use and Legal Disclaimer (PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED):

Author of this blog, Dedicated to the Real Mommies and Daddies of the Real America, and our Children Who Want to Come Home, and Especially to My Little Julian, is not a lawyer, attorney, or legal practitioner, therefore, no information contained herein this post and/or blog could be (mis)construed as “legal advice.”  Anyone who exercises he/r rights, and private property sometimes called “child” for deceptive, possibly malicious or retaliatory, and profiteering/privateering and in the “best interests” . . . of the “state” Texas General and other Funds at one’s own peril, risk, and/ or self-fulfillment.  The choice is yours.

  • CENSORSHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED AS IT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE IN THE THIS REPUBLIC USA, THE LAWS TO WHICH YOU WILL BE HELD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
  • (1)  This post is made in GOOD FAITH and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.
  • (2) Content in this post is protected by Julian’s Real Mummy’s First Amendment herein claimed rights as a natural-born American, “sovereign,” “elect” citizen pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the uS Constitution and  Bill of Rights made applicable to the states via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal, uS Constitution and incorporated Bill of Rights, under the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to speech.
  • (3) All content in this post is also protected pursuant to the Federal statute 17 U.S.C., section 107 (“Fair Use”) as this content is solely intended for general knowledge, academic research, and/or entertainment purposes.
  • (4)  If anyone should desire, require, or demand a retraction or modification in part or in full, you must contact the author of this blog for fair notice to correct, pursuant to reasonable and lawfully obtained evidence supported by all legal and factual bases for your desire, demand, and/or requirement/demand, then contact Author of this blog immediately as fair notice and due diligence requires so that Author shall act lawfully and reasonably with expedience pursuant to any supplemental knowledge.